

May 7, 1965

my education. I'd rather work for civil rights. It's more exciting and it means more."

Putting two and two together, one can easily see the backbone of a new revolution in Alabama which could rout Governor Wallace and many segregationists as soon as the next elections are held if the franchise is given the Negro. There is no turning back now and Alabama Negroes are ready to sacrifice lives, property, and individual futures for the common cause.

This is a heartening development considering the long years of apathy and complacency. But it is a process fraught with danger; whites in Alabama must decide the tools or weapons for the shaping of the future. If there is cooperation and teamwork, the change will be peaceful; if there is continued violence and hatred, there will be counterattacks and a bloody confrontation.

On the first day, the hypocrisy of the Alabama system was clear to every marcher: a hypocrisy fortified by Senators and Representatives in Washington erupting with charges of "communism" at every assault on their dynasty. Each day saw Alabama's Governor urging constituents to protect white supremacy and further divide the races, the State's police trying to weed out militants by excessive head rappings, its possees roving streets and roads at night to harass civil rights workers. Here in a great Southern State of the world's greatest democracy, it took a vast army—helicopters in the air, mine demolition teams scouting ahead for dynamite, GI's posted 50 feet apart the full route, truckloads of troops at every intersection, a 200-man Army force following the pilgrims, hundreds of FBI agents and Justice Department aids, thousands of the federalized Alabama National Guard, and the President, himself to guarantee safe travel for the nonviolent demonstration a mere span of 50 miles.

In a nation that propagandizes democracy throughout the world, with soldiers snaking along the front in Vietnam, and shortwave radios dotting the globe, it was incongruous for many of the outside visitors to believe that the state of affairs had drifted to such brutality and bestiality in Alabama. Such a revelation plus the hardship of travel brought anguish and pain to newcomer civil righters, causing a white minister to suffer a mental collapse.

For the hazardous journey, it took a determined spirit and a sound body and mind to become an effective cog in the pilgrimage to the cradle of the Confederacy. Only a small number of the 10,000 who joyously left Selma on "that great getting-up morning" had any ambitions of walking the 54 miles to Montgomery—except by auto after the first 8-mile stretch. For one thing, the court order limited the number to 300 on the two-lane section of the highway.

The first day's army was a motley collection—a California couple wheeling a baby, ladies in high-heeled shoes, barefoot college students, VIP's from across the country, maids and porters, clerics with sleeping bags and youngsters. The atmosphere was moving, emotional—a ragged army tramping through a wasteland.

By the time the line reached a railroad 6 miles from Selma, where 1,000 were supposed to be entrained back, the passengers refused to drop out. They wanted to reach the first camp, the farm of David Hall, a Negro father of eight who had survived the heartache of deciding whether to welcome the marchers and be harassed or turn them down. His farm was less than prosperous and his livestock consisted of a small herd of cows, a few hundred chickens and four guinea hens. His four-room house added little to the value of the 80 acres. But Farmer Hall's contribution couldn't be

judged in a material sense. He became the first Negro farmer to defy threats and offer a campsite to the marchers. His courage was a selling point to other Negro farmers along the route.

This spirit of militancy among Alabama Negroes was a key factor throughout the march. The courage and drive inspired the whites in moments of greatest despair. Recognizing this peculiar circumstance, SCLC strategists devised a campaign plan which focused attention on the Alabama natives as "the chosen few" of the march—the ones who would walk the entire distance—while many of the out-of-staters were assigned to housekeeping chores to keep the people's army on its feet as the pilgrimage snaked through one of the most barbaric sections of Alabama.

Devotion of the whites to task of keeping army marching was exceptional. California priests and ministers set up and dismantled the camp tents. Whites manned the communication system, the security operations, the mess tents, the latrine trucks and even cleaned up the sites. A Canadian professor, Sam Farr, helped clean a latrine truck. Pittsburgh Pastor Richard Bigeler passed out coffee in the breakfast line. Purnell Roberts (Adam of TV's Bonanza family) picked up litter around the tents.

Against a backdrop of terror—inclement weather and dropouts from fatigue, the teamwork of whites and Negroes forged a unity that defied comparison in the bigoted State. A subfreezing temperature at the first stop disillusioned some and slowed down preparation of supper and nocturnal vespers. But with marchers shivering and hesitating to roll out sleeping bags, big Jim Orange, the song leader, hopped onto a truck and launched a singing session. "Freedom" he shouted and hundreds huddling around fires to keep warm soon turned the campsite into a singing, swaying mass of humanity.

Obviously, survival under the adverse conditions (which forced accompanying GI's to gripe about hardships) brought on soul searching. "Was this worth it?" many a marcher, Negro and white, asked himself. "I froze and you can quote me," boomed Rev. Richard Leonard, pastor of New York City's Community Church, the largest Unitarian congregation in the country. "But I found myself. Suffering intensifies determination." Negro TV actor William Marshall, who turned down contracts to participate, told reporters, "This is my State and the State of my friends. We must bring it in line with the 20th century." He admitted that he didn't sleep a wink on the first night, but as a security marshal, he tended to his job day after day.

Shivering in the cold in a transient militarized ghetto was one type of suffering. The intense Alabama sun was so broiling at times that medics had to apply sunburn lotion to faces—making some marchers look like zombies. Driving rain frequently soaked freedom lovers to the skin and turned fields into oceans of mud so unfirm that tents could not be erected and there was no dry standing room. The constant drain on food and water found some going hungry and thirsty for hours without relief. At one time, the water rinkled with kerosene from a tank car that had been used for other purposes and some of the people developed stomach disorders. Suffering for the cause was the theme, the life, as feet blistered, legs and backs ached and faces burned with too heavy a dose of the sunshine of freedom. Because this type of existence was not the life of many of the middle class visitors, the survival etched a memory which could not easily be forgotten. To endure meant commitment and involvement in a lifelong civil rights struggle. At a camp breakfast, SCLC aid Andy Young summed up the predicament

in explaining why the oatmeal was served without cream. Said Young: "Folks down here make less than \$2,000 a year and don't know what cream tastes like."

Of the chosen few selected to tramp the entire distance, five gleamed with almost heroic brilliance. Prosperous Baltimore, Md., Physician Thomas C. Jones "woke up one morning" and decided he had a stake in the march. Leaving five patients at a hospital in care of a colleague, he flew to Alabama and worked around the clock for a full week. Riding ambulances, walking, answering sick calls in camp at night, he became "The Doc" for hundreds. Why did you participate? "It was the toughest assignment I've ever handled," Dr. Jones replied. "But, golly, it was the most inspiring, too. More of us have to get involved." Easygoing Judge King, a 20-year-old Marion, Ala., civil righter, walked a good bit with Mrs. Leah Washburn, a white Atlanta mother. They chatted, sang, and he carried her coat for spells. "I got new ideas about white people," he described the period. "Some are real nice. Now I feel like a man." Declaring that he traveled to Alabama and walked the entire distance, rather than be a "4-hour marcher," New York State race relations expert George Fowler hiked, ate the camp food, and bunked down in a sleeping bag alongside Alexander Aldridge, Gov. Nelson Rockefeller's cousin and aid and former White House staffer Harris Wofford. Said Fowler: "This is an amazing experience. I'm convinced the movement should touch the northern big cities and bring the pride to its people that this march has brought to these fine deprived people in Alabama. It is remarkable and I have grown, too." Arrested seven times in Selma for demonstrating, 17-year-old Joe Boone was typical of Alabama's new breed. Serving as a marshal for the highway trek, Boone went right to work when he arrived at campsite, heading a cleaning detail. His enthusiasm and executive ability were noted by pilgrims who could visualize the great waste of Negro talent. "My mother and father never thought this day would come," stated Boone, "but it's here and I want to do my part." Perhaps the most apologetic pilgrim was 82-year-old Rager Lee, the grandfather of slain civil righter Jimmie Lee Jackson. He walked only a few miles on the first day and had to quit with tears in his eyes. He came back off and on to put in a few miles as a show of his interest. "Just got to tramp some more," he kept repeating.

From the swamps of hate and despair, the pilgrims trudged nearer Montgomery. The goal was in sight. Cars stopped and passengers ran across the strip of grass to join their freedom brothers. Buses and trucks unloaded more. Hundreds joined the line stretching it from 100 yards long to three miles of moving and singing pilgrims. No longer was there the studied wave of Negroes—a flick of the hand or the nod of a head to avoid suspicious of whites.

At the crossing into Montgomery, shouts, cheers and singing came from some 500 well-wishers who waited for hours at the city limits. There were tears, big and bouncy, running down cheeks. There was arm waving, including some whites. Teachers and students rushed from buildings to urge on the marchers and some even embraced and kissed Dr. King. Cooks ran out from pantries, leaving patrons with standing orders. In windows of motels, chambermaids waved and cried with joy. While whites silently watched, the Negroes jumped for joy. At intersections and along the way, crowds stood and joined in the singing.

It was the day of freedom. The weary had come home.

From 50 States came supporters—all determined to make the last assault onto the American flagless Alabama State capital.

Pouring in by train, bus and plane, the backers continued to come. At first, reports counted 10,000, then more and more. The city was packed tightly—in hotels, homes, and churches.

Tomorrow would be better.

Led by Drs. King and Bunche, and featuring the army of the new republic, the 300 "chosen few" with red capes as a badge of honor, the last-lap march passed the Jefferson Davis Hotel where a huge Confederate flag stretched across the front, the Old Slave Square where many of their forefathers had been sold on the auction block, and up to the State Capitol. The front lines had reached the Capitol and marchers were still leaving the City of St. Jude, stretching their might and power three miles across the city. The pilgrimage was the largest in city history—50,000—and its interracial force was awesome to the tiny band of State lawmakers who gasped at the show of power. More American flags were carried in the hands of the pilgrims than flew in Montgomery, and perhaps, throughout Alabama. "We Shall Overcome," the marchers, Negro and white, sang loud and clear in a beautiful blend of democracy. During the historic program, two Negro maids listened from a window of the guarded State capitol and waved during the tremendous singing of the freedom anthem, causing some to marvel at the new courage of the Alabama Negro—no matter his age or job. The new will to gain freedom spread throughout Montgomery, throughout Alabama, and had spread on to other Southern States and even to the North. Inspired by deaths of two civil rights figures, and harassed throughout by the fear of death, the Selma-to-Montgomery pilgrimage concluded also with two deaths, those of Detroit housewife Viola Liuzzo and Jim Crow.

THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that letters, telegrams, and editorials which I have received in support of my position against the unjustifiable war in Vietnam may be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WEST LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
May 7, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Your magnificent courage in behalf of peace deserves the thanks of millions.

S. I. Casady, President, California Democratic Council; Henry Waxman, President, California Federation of Young Democrats; Don Smith, Chairman, Los Angeles CORE; Ruth Abraham, American Civil Liberties Union; Rev. J. Hugh Anwyll, Mount Hollywood Congregational Church; Maurice Welner, Vice President, Californians for Liberal Representation; James Scott, 30th District Director, California Democratic Council; John Slevin, American Friends Service Committee; David Cheal, Friends Committee on Legislation; Gail Eaby, Women's Strike for Peace; Gussie Sitkin, Women for Legislative Action.

MAY 6, 1965.

Hon. Senator MORSE.

DEAR SIR: Everyone is against you but the people. God bless you, Senator, keep up your fight. Let's get out of Vietnam.

G. ORBAN.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO,
Tokyo, Japan, April 30, 1965.

Hon. WAYNE L. MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

SIR: I was a Fulbright exchange graduate student for the year 1955-56, and a Rockefeller fellow during 1956-57. I visited the United States again last year as an Eisenhower fellow. While in America, I was always greatly impressed with the courage and independence you showed in criticizing a wrong policy of the administration and in advancing an imaginative and sound alternative.

I am writing this letter in a serious hope that the voice of the Japanese people concerning the war in Vietnam will be heard by influential political leaders in the United States.

If you allow me to speak with candor, I must tell you that the United States is appearing in the eyes of the Japanese public as an increasingly violent, horrible, and perhaps deranged nation as far as its policy in Vietnam is concerned. Furthermore, the brutalities directed against civil rights marchers were reported almost every day with pictures of what we had been told to consider as utterly "un-American"; i.e., uncivilized and undemocratic scenes. What is happening in the mind of the common citizen here is something far beyond a political disagreement to the U.S. policy toward Vietnam. It is a deep moral indignation against the stand taken by the U.S. Government and, indeed, the moral prestige of the United States seems to have reached by far the lowest point in the whole postwar history of United States-Japanese relations.

The Japanese are gravely concerned with the situation in Vietnam not only because we have profound sympathy with the people of South Vietnam, whose earnest desire for peace and survival is disregarded by the United States which is allegedly fighting for their freedom, but also because escalation of war will almost inevitably involve Japan in a conflict in Korea and over the American bases in Okinawa and on the main island.

The general consensus among the Japanese, even including the political leaders in the Conservative Party, business leaders, and many intellectuals, who have been committed to Japan's alliance with the United States, is that the Vietcong are more nationalist than Communist, the domino theory is untenable and irrelevant, and a settlement should be worked out, not by war or the bombing of North Vietnam or the use of poisonous gases and napalm bombs, but by diplomatic negotiations.

There is a recent opinion poll taken toward the middle of March by the Mainichi, one of the three largest national papers with a circulation of approximately 4 million. As high as 100 percent of the sample knew that a war is being waged between the South Vietnamese Government and the U.S. Armed Forces, on the one hand, and the "Vietcong," on the other.

One of the questionnaires reads: "What do you think is the first step to be taken for the termination of war in Vietnam?"

	Percent
Withdrawal of U.S. troops.....	40
Opening of international negotiations.....	46
Cease-fire by "Vietcong".....	4
Increasing bombing of North Vietnam.....	0
Don't know and others.....	10

Although I am aware that, strictly scientifically speaking, there are some minor questionable points in the techniques used in this poll, I do feel that this survey represents a fair picture of the general reactions of the Japanese people. Please note that this poll

had been taken before the use of gas by the U.S. troops was reported.

The hope created by President Johnson's address on April 7, has been completely canceled out by the massive bombardment on the following days. In retrospect, his speech even contributed in strengthening the indignation of the Japanese public against American policy because many of us found ourselves "cheated" by the hopeful illusion produced by the President's address.

In view of the critical situation in Vietnam which is threatening peace in Asia and the security of Japan, 93 intellectual leaders living in the Tokyo area addressed an appeal to the Japanese Government, by way of handing it over to Prime Minister Sato on April 20. It called for a prompt and effective action by the Japanese Government toward peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese problem. It urged the Japanese Government (1) to clarify its position that if war should escalate into a larger scale involving additional countries Japan would disapprove American bases in Japan being used for combat operations, (2) to appeal to the U.S. Government for an immediate suspension of air attacks on North Vietnam, and (3) to appeal to the United States and other countries concerned to open diplomatic negotiations at once, to which the "Vietcong" should be a party, and to effect an immediate cease-fire.

The full text of the statement, despite its being of considerable length, has been published by two of the largest national papers, the Asahi with a circulation of approximately 5 million and the Mainichi mentioned above. This was an extraordinary treatment by the press of an appeal issued by an ad hoc group of intellectuals.

It may also be noted that this appeal was an unusual action by nonleftist, liberal intellectual leaders here and that many of the signatories hold influential positions not only among academic circles but as advisers to the Government—a fact that would in part explain the willingness on the part of the Prime Minister to meet the five representatives.

Enclosed, I am sending you (1) a copy of the English translation of the appeal, (2) a clipping of the front page of the Mainichi Daily News, English edition of the Japanese Mainichi, that carries a report on the statement, and (3) an editorial of the Asahi Evening News, again English edition of the Asahi in Japanese, that gives full support to the appeal. You will also find (4) a news report of the Japan Times, which is known for its pro-American orientation, on the remarks of Mr. Matsumoto on the Vietnamese war. He was former Ambassador to Great Britain and has just been to southeast Asia as special envoy of Prime Minister Sato. You might also be interested in information on (5) the agreement between Mr. Lodge and Premier Sato that Japan can never become a direct operational base for the American forces fighting in Vietnam. Mr. Matsumoto's remarks as well as this agreement indicate hesitation and reluctance on the part of the Japanese Government to become involved in the war in Vietnam in collaboration with the United States.

I am sending you these reports in the hope that they will draw your attention and prove to be of interest to you. I should be deeply grateful if you take into your consideration the view of the Japanese public stated herein.

Sincerely yours,

YOSHIKAZU SAKAMOTO,
Professor of International Politics.

APPEAL TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT ON THE
WAR IN VIETNAM

The devastation and the danger brought about by the war in Vietnam are being ag-

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gravated day by day. Not only is this war causing unsurpassable misery to the people of Vietnam, but it is also constituting a great menace to peace in Asia and to the security of Japan. It is no wonder that there is rapidly growing among the Japanese people concern and apprehension as to the implications of the war. We deeply regret that the Japanese Government has not taken any positive action by way of fulfilling its responsibilities to guarantee the security of Japan, and to restore peace in Asia.

Therefore, we strongly urge our Government to make a prompt decision according to the three proposals we present below, and to declare its intention to the Japanese people and to other nations.

1. If the United States should persist in her present policy, there is an imminent danger of armed conflicts ensuing between the United States and the People's Republic of China, regardless of the calculated design of the Government of the United States. Furthermore, there is a natural fear for the tension being heightened at the 38th parallel in Korea, between South Korea, who has sent troops to South Vietnam, on the one hand, and North Korea, who has pledged military support to the National Liberation Front (Vietcong), on the other. It is past any dispute that our involvement in these armed conflicts resulting from the military operations of the United States will be absolutely incompatible with the security of Japan.

It is true that Japan is bound by the security treaty to collaborate with the United States. Nevertheless, article I of this treaty holds that, in accordance with the provision of the United Nations Charter, international disputes shall be settled by peaceful means, and the parties to the treaty shall refrain from "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." We believe that the present use of force by the United States in Vietnam is in violation of these provisions. It is evidently in line with the general rule of international law that in such a case Japan is not necessarily bound by the above-mentioned duty of collaboration. This point is clearly illustrated by the position of the United States who, at the time of the Suez crisis, opposed the military actions undertaken by Britain and France, in spite of the fact that the United States was in alliance with these two nations.

Accordingly, we appeal to the Japanese Government to manifest its position immediately to its own people and to other nations that if the war in Vietnam should escalate into a war on a larger scale involving additional countries, Japan would refuse to let the U.S. bases in Japan be used for the purpose of military combat operations. A declaration of the Japanese Government in making this stand will in itself be an important impetus toward preventing the war in Vietnam from escalating into armed conflicts between the United States and China or the Soviet Union.

2. The direct cause of such expansion of the war in Vietnam is the air attacks by the United States on North Vietnam. For this reason, the first thing that should take place to prevent this danger is the cessation of the bombardment on North Vietnam by the United States and the South Vietnamese forces.

Moreover, the air attacks on the north are in themselves operations beyond the limits of self-defense, even if further escalation of the war might somehow be avoided. Such an abuse of the right of self-defense is contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter and article I of the Japan-United States Security Treaty. It may be noted that the Government of the United States no longer endeavors to justify its actions by invoking such concepts as retaliation or collective self-defense, as it did at the beginning of the air attacks on the north.

Though there may be a certain degree of aid given by North Vietnam to the National Liberation Front, even the figures given by the U.S. Government in the "White Paper on Vietnam" show clearly that the military assistance from the north is very modest in terms of military force. Looking back on the whole process of the war in Vietnam, we are persuaded to believe that the aid from the north has been more of a counterbalance to the enormous amount of military aid offered by the United States to the South Vietnamese Government, which has taken measures to suppress any groups opposing its policies, and has forfeited the support of the people. This means that the United States is not entitled to justify the air attacks on the north, by citing the help extended by North Vietnam to the National Liberation Front.

For these two reasons, we urge the Japanese Government to appeal to the United States for immediate suspension of the air attacks on the north.

3. At present, in South Vietnam, a gruesome war is going on, side by side with the air attacks on the north. We cannot refrain from expressing our profound indignation against the recent use by the U.S. forces of napalm bombs, poisonous gases and other atrocious weapons, and especially against the bringing in of tactical nuclear weapons into South Vietnam.

If the United States should continue to fight the National Liberation Front with such means of warfare, which would make the war in Vietnam literally a war of annihilation, the greater part of South Vietnam will inevitably be reduced to a scorched land of complete devastation. The people of South Vietnam are exhausted by the war that has lasted more than 20 years. There is no doubt about their not desiring continuation of such a war. The United States, however, is pursuing war efforts and destruction, against the will of the Vietnamese people who are longing for peace. The fact that Japan belongs to Asia makes it all the more impossible for us to remain inactive in the face of the suffering of the people in South Vietnam.

In view of what has been stated above, the war in South Vietnam conducted by the United States cannot escape from being called an unexcusable disregard of human dignity and the right of national self-determination. In order that South Vietnam should emerge out of its present condition of misery and despair, diplomatic negotiations should be opened without delay to terminate the war. In this respect, we welcome President Johnson's statement, made in response to the proposal by the 17 non-aligned nations, to the effect that the United States "remains ready for unconditional discussions." This kind of diplomatic discussions, however, must be accompanied by an unconditional cease-fire, so that there can be no room for continued military operations with the aim of gaining a favorable position for negotiation.

The essential conditions for a solution to the war in Vietnam will be firstly to base the whole argument on the recognition that this war is fundamentally a civil war, and should be treated as such; the National Liberation Front should be recognized as a party to the negotiation; the U.S. troops should eventually be withdrawn; and there should be corresponding suspension of the aid from North Vietnam.

We fervently hope that the Japanese Government, in full realization of the points cited above, will send urgent appeals to the United States and other nations concerned to open diplomatic negotiations at once, to which the National Liberation Front should be a party, and to effect an immediate cease-fire, so that there will be the earliest possible restoration of peace in Vietnam.

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Hirotsu, Kazuo, writer.

[From the Asahi Evening News, Apr. 22, 1965]

APPEAL ON VIETNAM CRISIS

We are in complete agreement with the aims of an appeal submitted on Tuesday to the Japanese Government by 93 scholars and men of letters. This is because we believe the most important problem now is how to prevent the danger of the Vietnam situation from escalating.

First, we wish to take note of the fact that it took the form of an appeal to the Japanese Government. We think that this is the proper line to take in any such movement. The reason is that if, instead, such a movement takes the form of direct statements or actions aimed at the United States or the Communist side, there is danger of it being led in an unexpected direction by a sudden outburst of feelings.

Utmost care must be exercised so that such a movement does not move toward fostering bad feelings against a certain country or race. One of the saddest results of the Sino-Soviet polemics is in its fanning of racial antagonism. The Vietnam war may further increase this danger.

If Hanoi is bombed, what a big shock will be felt by our people. There is a possibility of a recurrence of the disturbance that broke out in 1960 over the problem of the Japan-United States Security Treaty.

In considering the possibility of such danger, it will become of increasing importance in the future for such movements in our country to take the proper course and be directed to the Government or the Diet. And if we can trust the Government and the Diet to properly understand the current feeling of the people and act accordingly, the movement will of itself maintain order.

AMERICAN VIEW

In criticizing the appeal, it is pointed out that the U.S. Government and the majority of the American people consider that North Vietnam is invading the South and that the prerequisite to negotiations is to stop it. Aside from whether this American view is wrong or not, it is also pointed out that the Americans believe so.

It is reasonable. But even if there had been a little aid to the south from the north, as a real problem, as a result of the bombing of the north, the aid from the north to the south can be imagined to have been cut, while the aid that the United States has extended to the South Vietnam Government is far greater than the aid from the north to the Vietcong. In view of this, an appeal to the United States and South Vietnam to first stop bombing the north cannot be said to be unreasonable so as to cease the vicious cycle in which one retaliatory action leads to another.

In particular, we wish much thought to be given to how much the friends of the United States were hopelessly disillusioned by the series of bombings of the north, which were launched immediately after President Johnson gave his Baltimore speech, which was so rich in suggestions.

At the same time, we must strongly ask the Vietcong and the Communists not to make the withdrawal of American troops the prerequisite for negotiations for peace. Such a demand for withdrawal is eventually right, and the United States itself is not against it, but it must be said to be too costly a demand that ignores commonsense.

We imagine that the most difficult problem remaining would concern the treatment of the Vietcong. Negotiating with "rebels" or their participation in talks may be hard to bear. But historically, this has been so for all movements of colonies for liberation. American independence started with the revolt against the mother country, Britain. It

has been so in the independence of Ireland and India. French President Charles de Gaulle was wise in deciding to negotiate with the Front de la Liberation Nationale (FLN) in Algeria.

In considering the problem thus, the basis for a judgment lies in just how much territory and how many people the Vietcong presently has under its control. On this score, the Vietcong, whether one likes it or not, must be recognized as a belligerent organization.

REASONABLE

After all, Japan cannot take the stand that it does not matter if South Vietnam is communized. Therefore, opinion is strong that it should aid the United States and South Vietnam. This is reasonable in a way.

But actually, is not the problem of how to meet communism more important?

It is not wise to oppose ideology with armed force. The U.S. Government is probably fully aware of this reasoning. But the tragedy of South Vietnam may be said to have been in not discovering a democratic reformer for a leader.

It may be logically contended that the United States can do nothing but strengthen its military actions at the present stage. But it is also a fact that as the military operations are strengthened, the originally non-Communist democratic people as well as the nationalists will be rapidly pushed toward communism. Experience has frequently shown that if people who are not Red are branded as such and continually called so, they will really become Red.

Not only the United States but the Soviet Union and China, the big powers, tend to be short in understanding the nationalism of the small countries. Even among Communist countries, which stand on the principle of internationalism, the nationalism of the small countries is strong.

Even if the fears of the United States against the expansionism of China are justified, is not the United States itself breaking down the strongest barrier against China's expansion by its bombing of North Vietnam?

PREDICAMENT

If the United States-Vietnam policy fails, Japan will be placed in a terrible predicament. Therefore, we wish the United States to consider the advantages and disadvantages, not from a small military and political standpoint, but from a broader standpoint.

To be sure, the argument may be made for a continuation of the bombing of the north, and if China comes out, to take it as a chance to hit and destroy its nuclear power in the bud. But victory on the ground cannot be gained by destruction from the air alone. Japan has proved by its experience in China that even if points and lines are secured, the war will not end and the tide of popular feelings cannot be won over.

The important thing now is to end the escalation of the war. Consideration for world opinion can be discerned in the joint statement by the Soviet Union and North Vietnam. President Johnson's Baltimore speech reveals that it was motivated by a peace appeal by unnamed nations.

The present situation can move toward an expansion of the war, or it can be the right moment for listening to the peace appeal. It is at a most delicate stage when moves can be made either for peace or war.

The present, therefore, is no time for the Japanese Government and ruling party to stand idly by watching developments in the belief that there is little possibility of an armed clash between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. The reason is that there are many Japanese who take a serious view of the situation. Since there are so many such people, the way to ally their

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fears and make them move with reason is to listen to their voice and take proper action.

[From the Japan Times, Apr. 24, 1965]

DIET COMMITTEE HEARS BRIEFING ON VIETNAM WAR—BOMBING WON'T INDUCE HANOI TO FAVOR PEACE TALKS, MATSUMOTO SAYS

Shunichi Matsumoto, adviser to the Foreign Office and former Liberal-Democratic member of the Diet, said Friday he doubted if U.S. air raids on North Vietnam would induce North Vietnam to respond to bids for peace talks.

Matsumoto, former ambassador to Britain, who recently toured the three Indochinese nations as a special envoy of the Government, appeared before the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee to brief on the Vietnam situation.

Also appearing at the committee session were Takeshi Kaiko, author of "The War in Vietnam," and Tokumatsu Sakamoto, professor at Aichi University and chairman of the Japan-Afro-Asia Joint Committee.

All three men spoke up against the U.S. policies toward Vietnam.

Qualifying his statement that it was a purely personal point of view, Matsumoto said that, while the Vietcong did identify itself with communism and were receiving help from North Vietnam, he disagreed with the contention of a highly placed U.S. Government official that 90 percent of the Vietcong were Communists.

About U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, Matsumoto said:

"I am not so sure if the bombings would make North Vietnam feel like heading for a peace conference table. In the light of Ho Chi Minh's past record and disposition, North Vietnam isn't going to give up easily in spite of the air raids."

Matsumoto said it would be extremely difficult to weaken the Vietcong with air raids and sporadic attacks alone.

"If you want to exterminate them," he said, "you'll have to destroy the whole land. And that would be a formidable task even for a strong army."

Matsumoto noted that the United States was beginning to realize that air raids on North Vietnam would not bring about the desired results.

He said that was why the United States was stepping up warfare against the Vietcong.

Matsumoto said if the United States continued to escalate its bombings of North Vietnam, Communist China and the Soviet Union would probably not remain silent. He also said if the United States intensified its attack on the Vietcong, the entire Vietnamese people would oppose the United States and the war might be turned into a fierce "racial battle."

Consequently, Matsumoto continued, it is necessary to bring peace to the embattled country as soon as possible.

"However, there have been no concrete reactions to President Lyndon B. Johnson's speech at Baltimore and it is regrettable that the Vietnam situation is becoming more aggravated," Matsumoto added.

Matsumoto said the U.S. proposal of providing \$1,000 million for the development of southeast Asia, including North Vietnam, was an indication that the United States has recognized the necessity of promoting the welfare of the people in that area. He said it would also be well for Japan to increase her economic assistance to the countries in the area.

Matsumoto said the stabilization of the area cannot be achieved for long by military actions, politics, and ideology alone. An ultimate solution to the problem must be obtained by raising the living standards of the people and developing the economies of the countries.

Meanwhile, Kaiko declared that the farmers hold the key to Vietnam but they do not

trust the South Vietnam Government and lean more toward the Vietcong.

"If the Vietnam war is to be won by military action, it must be done by land forces which will be able to weed out the enemy from every nook and corner of South Vietnam. However, if the Vietcong are to be annihilated, all the farmers must be killed. The United States is stuck in a quagmire, not knowing whether it can win the war or not."

On the other hand, Sakamoto said he did not think the four conditions decided at the North Vietnam Congress on April 10 could be put into practice immediately. The four conditions include respect of the 1954 Geneva agreement on Vietnam and the withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam.

He said it was necessary to call upon world opinion for the realization of this principle and restore peace as soon as possible.

Sakamoto said that the Vietcong were organized by political, religious, and mass organizations before the formation in January 1962 of the People's Revolution Party, which corresponds to the Communist Party.

He said the true character of Vietcong was set forth in the 10 principles announced at the time of its formation and 6 others adopted at its second convention in January 1964.

Its aim, he said, is to knock down "U.S. imperialists and their agents" and set up a racial and democratic coalition government.

He said the other objectives included enforcement of a land reform program, adoption of policies dedicated to neutrality and peace, and peaceful reunification of North and South Vietnam.

Answering questions by committee members, Matsumoto said there was no need for Japan to propose the holding of a peace conference at present.

He said various moves are being made to convene such a conference and that it is sufficient for Japan to declare itself as one of the chief advocates of peace in the area.

Socialist Satoko Tokano then said she believed the Government should tell the United States that bombing of North Vietnam is meaningless and asked Matsumoto's view on this matter.

Matsumoto replied that he was of the same opinion, adding that he hoped Henry Cabot Lodge, special envoy of President Johnson, would convey this view to the President.

Kaiko said he had heard that even U.S. veterans who fought in the Korean war were of the opinion that "farmers cannot be blamed for helping Vietcong guerrillas," or "Vietcong will win this war."

He said "now that the Vietcong have decided to fight to the last, there will be no alternative but to recognize the Vietcong group as a legal entity and, finally, for the United States to withdraw from South Vietnam."

[From the Asahi Evening News, English edition of the Japanese Asahi]

JAPANESE VIEWPOINTS: AMERICANS' JUSTICE (Letter to the Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo)

EDITOR: I do not understand the Americans any more. The United States is continually bombing North Vietnam because they think communism is evil.

Why don't the Americans, many of whom are people of good commonsense, think about putting an end to the war?

Is the United States to continue bombing till North Vietnam is totally destroyed?

I now remember the atomic bombings on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. The United States may have its own argument for dropping the A-bombs on those two cities. But still there remains in us something that is unconvinced about the justification of atomic bombings.

We, as the country which first triggered the war, have avoided discussion of this subject.

However, the attacks on North Vietnam face us squarely with all the realities involved.

It seems to me that the United States is bombing North Vietnam for reasons which are not acceptable to other nations.

Why on earth must the United States continue to drop bombs on North Vietnam when even Canada is voicing its opposition?

I do not understand any longer what the American people claim as justice.

EIGO SEGAWA,
Jobless.

SENDAI CITY.

[From the Japan Times, Apr. 25, 1965]

LODGE AGREES JAPAN WILL NOT BE TURNED INTO VIETNAM WAR BASE—L.B.J.'S ENVOY SEES PREMIER; REQUESTS JAPAN AID EFFORT

Special U.S. presidential envoy Henry Cabot Lodge and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato Saturday agreed that Japan can never become a direct operational base for the U.S. forces fighting in Vietnam.

Their meeting at the Prime Minister's official residence at Nagata-cho Saturday began at 4 p.m. and lasted more than 2 hours. Lodge arrived at 1:59 p.m. Saturday.

Sato told Lodge that Japan is increasingly concerned over expansion of the Vietnam war and also conveyed Japan's desire that the United States make more efforts to find a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict.

Lodge, former ambassador to South Vietnam, said the United States is fighting to secure the freedom and liberty in South Vietnam and also expressed a hope that Japan understands the difficulties now facing the United States to obtain these objectives in Vietnam.

Lodge also urged that Japan undertake an active role in the development of southeast Asia under the program recently suggested in President Lyndon B. Johnson's Baltimore speech.

Lodge, who is on a tour of Oceania and Far Eastern countries as Johnson's special envoy, arrived at Tokyo International Airport by a special plane Saturday afternoon for a 3-day stay in Tokyo.

Soon after his arrival, Lodge visited the Prime Minister at his official residence, accompanied by U.S. Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer.

The meeting was also attended by Foreign Minister Etsusaburo Shima and Chief Cabinet Secretary Tomisaburo Hashimoto.

After the meeting, Hashimoto said Lodge did not have a special proposal to make but exchanged views with the Prime Minister on the Vietnam issue.

Hashimoto, however, refrained from disclosing whether or not Sato presented to Lodge a concrete Japanese plan for peaceful settlement of the Vietnam question.

Hashimoto said that Sato told Lodge that the United States should not involve Japan in the Vietnam war by turning its bases here into direct operational points for its military operations in Vietnam. Lodge reportedly answered that he agreed with Sato's view on this matter.

According to Hashimoto, Lodge, going into details over Johnson's plan for southeast Asia's economic development, added that the United States does not yet have a concrete plan for such a program. He said, however, that the United States expects Japan can cooperate actively in the program because of its geographical proximity, experience, and know-how in the Asian development.

[From the Mainichi Daily News, Apr. 21, 1965]

JAPANESE SAGES URGE IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION OF NORTH VIETNAM AIR ATTACKS

President Tetsuzo Tanikawa, of Hosei University, Novelist Jiro Osaragi and three professors emeritus of Tokyo University—Toshiyoshie Miyazawa, Hyoe Ouchi and Sakae Wagatsuma—Tuesday filed a joint proposal

with Prime Minister Eisaku Sato that the Government appeal to the United States for an immediate suspension of air attacks on North Vietnam.

In this proposal, they also urged the Government to clarify its position that if the war in Vietnam should escalate to a larger scale involving other countries, Japan would disapprove American military bases in Japan being used for combat operations.

At the same time, they asked the Government to appeal to the United States and other nations concerned to open diplomatic negotiations at once, to which the Vietcong should be admitted, and to effect an immediate ceasefire.

They sent an English version of this three-item proposal to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President HUBERT HUMPHREY and U.S. Senators Tuesday in an attempt to deepen the American authorities' understanding of their efforts to restore peace in Vietnam as quickly as possible.

Prime Minister Sato made no immediate answer to their proposal, but the five intellectuals told the press later that they believe the Prime Minister will take their request into full consideration.

A total of 93 scholars, artists, novelists and educators signed the proposal before it was handed to the Prime Minister at his official residence Tuesday afternoon.

According to Chief Cabinet Secretary Tomisaburo Hashimoto, the Prime Minister told the five representatives of academic and cultural circles that the Government is counting on action by France to have the North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam suspended, by utilizing her diplomatic relations with the North Vietnamese and Communist Chinese governments.

Sato also explained his stand that, although it is difficult for the Government to step into the Vietnamese dispute at the present stage, he intends to spare no efforts to restore peace in Vietnam, and support the recent Johnson speech as a member of the free nations.

The text of the appeal follows:

"The devastation and the danger brought about by the war in Vietnam causing unsurpassable misery to the people of Vietnam, but it is also constituting a great menace to peace in Asia and to the security of Japan. It is no wonder that there is rapidly growing among the Japanese people concern and apprehension as to the implications of the war. We deeply regret that the Japanese Government has not taken any positive action by way of fulfilling its responsibilities to guarantee the security of Japan and to restore peace in Asia.

"Therefore, we strongly urge our Government to make a prompt decision according to the three proposals we present below, and to declare its intention to the Japanese people and to other nations.

"1. If the United States should persist in her present policy, there is an imminent danger of armed conflicts ensuing between the United States and the People's Republic of China, regardless of the calculated design of the Government of the United States. Furthermore, there is a natural fear for the tension being heightened at the 38th parallel in Korea, between South Korea, who has sent troops to South Vietnam, on the one hand, and North Korea, who has pledged military support to the National Liberation Front (Vietcong), on the other. It is past any dispute that our involvement in these armed conflicts resulting from the military operations of the United States will be absolutely incompatible with the security of Japan.

"It is true that Japan is bound by the security treaty to collaborate with the United States. Nevertheless, article I of this treaty holds that, in accordance with the provision of the United Nation Charter, international

disputes shall be settled by peaceful means, and the parties to the treaty shall refrain from "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." We believe that the present use of force by the United States in Vietnam is in violation of these provisions. It is evidently in line with the general rule of international law that in such a case Japan is not necessarily bound by the above mentioned duty of collaboration. This point is clearly illustrated by the position of the United States who, at the time of the Suez crisis, opposed the military actions undertaken by Britain and France, in spite of the fact that the United States was in alliance with these two nations.

"Accordingly, we appeal to the Japanese Government to manifest its position immediately to its own people and to other nations that if the war in Vietnam should escalate into a war on a larger scale involving additional countries, Japan would refuse to let the U.S. bases in Japan be used for the purpose of military combat operations. A declaration of the Japanese Government in making this stand will in itself be an important impetus toward preventing the war in Vietnam from escalating into armed conflicts between the United States and China or the Soviet Union.

"2. The direct cause of such expansion of the war in Vietnam is the air attacks by the United States on North Vietnam. For this reason, the first thing that should take place to prevent this danger is the cessation of the bombardment on North Vietnam by the United States and the South Vietnamese forces.

"Moreover, the air attacks on the North are in themselves operations beyond the limits of self-defense, even if further escalation of the war might somehow be avoided. Such an abuse of the right of self-defense is contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter and article I of the Japan-United States Security Treaty. It may be noted that the Government of the United States no longer endeavors to justify its actions by invoking such concepts as 'retaliation' or 'collective self-defense,' as it did at the beginning of the air attacks on the North.

"Though there may be a certain degree of aid given by North Vietnam to the National Liberation Front, even the figures given by the U.S. Government in the 'White Paper on Vietnam' show clearly that the military assistance from the North is very modest in terms of military force. Looking back on the whole process of the war in Vietnam, we are persuaded to believe that the aid from the North has been more of a counterbalance to the enormous amount of military aid offered by the United States to the South Vietnamese Government, which has taken measures to suppress any groups opposing its policies, and has forfeited the support of the people. This means that the United States is not entitled to justify the air attacks on the North, by citing the help extended by North Vietnam to the National Liberation Front.

"For these two reasons, we urge the Japanese Government to appeal to the United States for immediate suspension of the air attacks on the North.

"3. At present, in South Vietnam, a gruesome war is going on, side by side with the air attacks on the North. We cannot refrain from expressing our profound indignation against the recent use by the U.S. forces of napalm bombs, poisonous gases and other atrocious weapons, and especially against the bringing in of tactical nuclear weapons into South Vietnam.

"If the United States should continue to fight the National Liberation Front with such means of warfare, which would make the war in Vietnam literally a war of annihilation, the greater part of South Vietnam will inevitably be reduced to a scorched land of complete devastation. The people of South

Vietnam are exhausted by the war that has lasted more than 20 years. There is no doubt about their not desiring continuation of such a war. The United States, however, is pursuing war efforts and destruction, against the will of the Vietnamese people who are longing for peace. The fact that Japan belongs to Asia makes it all the more impossible for us to remain inactive in the face of the suffering of the people of South Vietnam."

In view of what has been stated above, the war in South Vietnam conducted by the United States cannot escape from being called an unexcusable disregard of human dignity and the right of national self-determination. In order that South Vietnam should emerge out of its present condition of misery and despair, diplomatic negotiations should be opened without delay to terminate the war. In this respect, we welcome President Johnson's statement, made in response to the proposal by the 17 non-aligned nations, to the effect that the United States "remains ready for unconditional discussions." This kind of diplomatic discussions, however, must be accompanied by an unconditional ceasefire, so that there can be no room for continued military operations with the aim of gaining a favorable position for negotiation.

The essential conditions for a solution to the war in Vietnam will be firstly to base the whole argument on the recognition that this war is fundamentally a civil war, and should be treated as such; the National Liberation Front should be recognized as a party to the negotiation; the United States troops should eventually be withdrawn; and there should be corresponding suspension of the aid from North Vietnam.

We fervently hope that the Japanese Government, in full realization of the points cited above, will send urgent appeals to the United States and other nations concerned to open diplomatic negotiations at once, to which the National Liberation Front should be a party, and to effect an immediate ceasefire, so that there will be the earliest possible restoration of peace in Vietnam.

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THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM

(By George McT. Kahin and John W. Lewis)

(NOTE.—The authors are professors of government at Cornell University. Mr. Kahin is also director of Cornell's southeast Asia program, and author of "Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia" (1952) and editor of "Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia" (1964) and "Major Governments of Asia" (1963). Mr. Lewis is author of "Leadership in Communist China" (1963) and "Major Doctrines of Communist China" (1964).)

During the past decade we have come full circle in Vietnam, both militarily and in the effort to build up a viable non-Communist government. The United States cannot afford to disregard the similarities between the present situation and that of 10 years ago.

The Vietcong has for some time now controlled substantially the same amount of territory—and in most cases the same areas—in South Vietnam as did the Vietminh in 1953-54.¹ Moreover, in those areas of the south still under Saigon's authority, popular loyalty to the Government is tenuous and not appreciably greater than that accorded to France and her Vietnamese proteges.

The French under Gen. Henri Navarre made their major military effort in 1953-54 not on the assumption that they could defeat the

¹ Compare for example, the map showing the position at the end of May 1953 in Henri Navarre, "Agonie de l'Indochine (1953-54)" (Paris, 1956), p. 37, with the map in the New York Times of Jan. 31, 1965.

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Vietminh but as a necessary step in building a position of greater strength from which to negotiate.² Similarly, we are now insisting that greater military power must be brought to bear before we can attain a suitable position for negotiations. The French ignored then, and the United States is ignoring now, basic political factors that limit what can be achieved by military power. With us as with the French, the lack of popular support for a regime artificially fostered by Western backers and out of line with the mainstream of Vietnamese nationalism has precluded any politically effective application of military power.

EARLY ATTEMPTS TO BUILD A GOVERNMENT

American efforts to build up an anti-Communist government in Vietnam began at least 5 years before the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina and were initially undertaken in cooperation with and in support of the French.³ Abandoning Roosevelt's post-war objective of denying Vietnam to France and making it a United Nations trusteeship,⁴ the Truman administration backed France in her efforts to reimpose military control.⁵ In adopting this policy, Truman's advisers were hoping that either concurrently or following the reestablishment of such control, France would grant a substantial measure of independence to a non-Communist Vietnamese Government. But that hope rested on a fundamental error in assessing Vietnamese political forces and was shattered politically quite as dramatically as subsequently it was militarily with the debacle of Dienbienphu. During its early efforts to build up a Vietnamese Government, Washington failed to appreciate the extent to which Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh were regarded as the symbol of Vietnamese nationalism—for most non-Communists as well as Communists.

² See Anthony Eden, "Full Circle" (Boston, 1960), p. 100, and Navarre, op. cit.

³ By 1954 American aid to the French war effort in Indochina was considerably greater than the amount France herself was spending on these operations. In September 1953 the French Prime Minister announced that the additional aid then being granted by the United States would defray 70 percent of France's expenditure on the war. Finally in 1954 "the American Government undertook to underwrite the entire cost of the war, allocating \$1,175 million for that purpose" (Donald Lancaster, "The Emancipation of French Indochina" [Oxford, 1961], p. 417).

⁴ Roosevelt indicated that he had this in mind at the 1945 Yalta Conference; see Allan B. Cole, ed., "Conflict in Indochina and International Repercussions: A Documentary History, 1945-55" (Ithaca, N.Y., 1956), pp. 47-48.

⁵ The United States consistently urged the French to grant real independence to the states of Indochina, but our urging was polite and restrained. Any real pressure, it was felt, would so antagonize the French as to have adverse effects upon American plans to make France a keystone in the defense of Europe. Even after 1950, American efforts to exert pressure on France in the Far East were inhibited by what the United States deemed to be her more important European objectives—first the commitment to NATO, and later the attempt to establish a European Defense Community, which was ultimately defeated by France herself.

⁶ Even if France had yielded to our request that she grant real independence to the puppet government she promoted under Emperor Bao Dai, it was most unlikely that a majority of the Vietnamese would have chosen him over Ho Chi Minh. As Eden described Bao Dai, he was "neither a popular nor an inspiring figure. He preferred the casino to the council chamber and the antics of his corrupt and transient ministers in Saigon did not appeal to moderate nationalist opinion" (Eden, op. cit., p. 89).

And the United States, by associating itself with France's effort, took its first long step toward making the Vietnamese cynical about American protestations of support for national self determination. Thus ended the first U.S. attempt to build up a competing government in Vietnam.

This failure left two important political legacies: First, the Vietminh had gained overriding control of Vietnamese nationalism; and second, most of rural Vietnam, south as well as north, had become accustomed to being administered by the Vietminh and had reason to be loyal to it. In the eyes of the Vietnamese peasant, the Vietminh had rid the country of colonial rule and had enacted beneficial social reforms, especially in the agrarian sphere. These legacies have powerfully affected the political scene in post-Geneva Vietnam and still limit the possibilities for attaining American objectives there.

Yet despite these inherent disadvantages, soon after the Geneva Conference the United States for the second time attempted to establish an anti-Communist Vietnamese government, this time no longer in association with France. Although the circumstances might have seemed to doom this American effort from the outset—no matter how enlightened its execution—there was one crucially important, though temporary and in a sense artificial, advantage which the United States enjoyed. This derived from the unequivocal provision in the Geneva accords that elections would be held in July 1956, under international supervision, to unify the country under one government.⁷ In anticipation of these elections (and also because of its preoccupation with the economic rehabilitation of the North), the Vietminh initially honored a central provision of the accords and abstained from militant tactics in the South. The American-sponsored Ngo Dinh Diem government thereby won a reprieve lasting several years in which to could have built up popular support.

THE GENEVA ACCORDS

To understand why the Vietminh granted this reprieve, and indeed to appreciate both the course of subsequent developments and the possibilities open today, it is essential to understand certain features of the Geneva accords which have frequently been overlooked. Moscow and Peking each for its own special reasons,⁸ pressured the Vietminh into signing an armistice with France and negotiating a political settlement which, it

⁷ See article 7 of the "Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference," in "Further Documents Relating to the Discussion of Indochina at the Geneva Conference, June 16-July 21, 1954," hereafter referred to as Geneva Accords (London [Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Cmd. 9239], 1954), p. 10. Significantly, article 7 stipulates that the elections were to be antecedent to and a necessary condition for the "fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions" and that the elections were to be held "in order to insure . . . that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will." This particular portion of the accords has frequently been quoted out of context, with the key phrases in reverse order, in order to justify the refusal to hold elections on the grounds that the necessary conditions did not exist.

⁸ The Soviet Union probably put pressure on the Vietminh in order to induce France to stay out of the projected European Defense Community; see Lancaster, op. cit., pp. 336-337, and Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron, editor, "France Defeats EDC" (New York, 1957), pp. 16-17. China, on the other hand, had determined to embark on its somewhat delayed 5-year plan and temporarily to lay aside its more militant line. For China's relationship to the Vietminh at the conference, see Lancaster, op. cit., p. 334.

was generally agreed, gave the Vietminh control over far less territory than its military position warranted.⁹ Nevertheless, had they been carried through in their entirety accords could have served the Vietminh's interests.

The basis of the accords was a military truce between the Vietminh and France. This was designed to end the 9-year-old war and open the way for an internationally supported political agreement which would provide for the peaceful resolution of outstanding problems. The political accords agreed to at Geneva¹⁰ established the conditions for transferring political competition to the electoral plane. The Vietminh, yielding to Soviet and Chinese pressure,¹¹ laid down its arms and agreed to the temporary partition of the country,¹² pending reunification through nationwide elections.¹³ It dis-

⁹ The Vietminh agreed not only to give up control of rich areas in the delta south of Saigon but also to evacuate major centers of support north of the 13th parallel. As French Premier Mendès-France stated before the National Assembly: "So far as the demarcation line is concerned, the enemy was asking for the 13th parallel; and today we have the 17th. Now between the 13th and 17th parallel Tourane [now Danang] and Hué are located, and there are three provinces which have always shown allegiance to the Vietminh and which the Vietminh is now going to evacuate so that they may pass under our control" (Journal Officiel de la République Française, Débats Parlementaires, Assemblée Nationale, Séance du vendredi 23 juillet 1954 [Paris, 1954], p. 3580).

¹⁰ The political accords at Geneva were subscribed to by verbal assent by Cambodia, China, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Vietminh), France, Laos, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom. The United States and the State of Vietnam (French-sponsored Bao Dai regime) were not parties to the accords, but the United States made its own unilateral declaration (see [17] below).

¹¹ As the New York Times correspondent, Tillman Durdin, cabled from Geneva: "Vietminh leaders are not entirely happy about the peace settlement in Vietnam. A number of members of the Vietminh delegation have declared openly that pressure from Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov forced their regime to accept less than it rightfully should have obtained here." These Vietminh officials contended, according to Durdin, that the military situation in Vietnam would have given the Vietminh almost full control within a year, and that Cambodia and Laos could have taken over eventually. They saw the settlement as a sort of appeasement; "In interests of Soviet and Chinese Communist international relations," they feel "their revolution has been slowed down, if not halted, right on the verge of complete success" (New York Times, July 25, 1954). See also Jean Lacouture and Philippe Devillers, "La fin d'une guerre: Indochine 1954" (Paris, 1960), pp. 282-285.

¹² The Vietminh, as well as China and the Soviet Union, also recognized the potential danger in further fighting, should it lead to a massive American intervention. With the promise of elections before them, however, the Communists had little reason to challenge the United States further and thereby determine the credibility of vague warnings about massive retaliation.

¹³ The official Vietminh newspaper, Nhan-Dan, reflected the confident expectation of the North Vietnamese that elections would be held when, just after the conclusion of the Conference, it reported: "The final declaration of the Geneva Conference has stipulated the withdrawal of foreign troops from Indochina and . . . general elections in each country of Indochina. . . ."

mantled its government south of the 17th parallel and withdrew its armed forces to the North. It was generally anticipated that the Vietminh would win the elections scheduled for 1956;¹⁴ and because the accords stipulated that France would remain in South Vietnam until the elections were held the Vietminh felt that its interests were secured.

The military truce, it must be emphasized, was between the Vietminh and France alone. And France was to maintain responsibility in South Vietnam until elections were held.¹⁵ The question at issue is not affected by the fact that neither the United States nor Bao Dai's representative signed the Geneva accords. Bao Dai's government was not endowed as yet with any real political substance.¹⁶ It was no more than an adjunct of and subordinate to French power, and was so regarded by the Vietminh. The United States, for its part, while unwilling to signify its adherence to the accords, did issue a unilateral declaration, which stated, specifically with reference to the provision for elections in Vietnam: "In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly."¹⁷

The above-mentioned recognition and stipulation, on the one hand, guarantee the consolidation of our basic victories, and on the other, create favorable conditions for us to overcome all difficulties and go forward to settle peacefully the question of complete national unity and independence" (Radio Hanoi, July 25, 1954). See also Ho Chi Minh's interview with Hsinhua News Agency, Radio Peiping, Sept. 21, 1954, and the statement of Premier Pham Van Dong reported on Radio Hanoi, Nov. 5, 1954.

"Former President Eisenhower has written: 'I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting possibly 80 percent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh'" (Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953-56" (London, 1963), p. 372).

"Paragraph (a) of article 14 of the 'Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities' could not be more explicit. It states: 'Pending the general elections which will bring about the reunification of Vietnam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present agreement'" (Geneva accords, p. 30). This was clearly the Vietminh's understanding. Thus, on Jan. 1, 1955, Premier Pham Van Dong declared: "It was with you, the French, that we signed the Geneva agreements, and it is up to you to see that they are respected" (Philippe Devillers, "The Struggle for the Unification of Vietnam" in P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, (New York, 1962), p. 31).

"Not until early 1955 did France relinquish control over South Vietnam's defense, monetary and tariff policy, and port control, and it was in February of that year that South Vietnam gained control of its own armed forces. The Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed on Oct. 26, 1955, but French troops were not evacuated from the country until April 1956.

"Extracts from Verbatim Record of Eighth Plenary Session," Geneva accords, p. 7. Nowhere in its own declaration did the United States recognize the political partition of Vietnam; insofar as it referred to the country, it designated it as "Vietnam," not "South Vietnam" and "North Vietnam." In addition, the unilateral declaration stipulated that the United States would refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the accords and that it would view any renewal of aggression with grave concern and as a threat to international peace and security.

Hanoi initially carried out the central provisions of the Geneva accords and eschewed violence south of the 17th parallel. Expecting elections, it did not wish to alienate those whose electoral support it sought; in the years just after Geneva it relied primarily on political competition.¹⁸

It was obviously a much surprised Vietminh that came to realize during 1955-56 that the French were disengaging from the responsibilities they had accepted at Geneva—thereby permitting the introduction of an increased American presence—and that elections were not going to be held.¹⁹ When on July 16, 1955, the Diem government announced,²⁰ with American backing, that it would defy the provision calling for national elections, it violated a central condition which had made the Geneva accords acceptable to the Vietminh. Regardless of what sophistry has been employed to demonstrate otherwise, in encouraging this move the United States departed from the position taken in its own unilateral declaration. And France in acquiescing abandoned the responsibility which she had unequivocally accepted a year earlier.²¹

These aspects of the Geneva accords are central to any sound assessment of political developments in Vietnam. Yet they are not taken into account in the State Department's white paper of February 27, 1965. And they lead to a question which the white paper certainly does not ask: When a military struggle for power ends on the agreed condition that the competition will be transferred to the political level, can the side which violates the agreed conditions legitimately expect that the military struggle will not be resumed? As Robert Scigliano has described the Vietminh's position, "the only alternative to

peaceful reunification was reunification by force."²²

NGO DINH DIEM'S GOVERNMENT—AND AFTER

This was the context in which the United States set out to underwrite Ngo Dinh Diem, without any indication that he had a significant measure of Vietnamese support.²³ The American decision to back him was made even before his administration had secured the essential attributes of independence from France.²⁴

The story of the failure of America's attempt to build up an effective government under Diem is well known.²⁵ Despite a substantial period of insulation from Vietminh militancy, despite unstinting American economic and political backing, Diem failed to develop a real base of popular support. As a result, his government was unable to withstand competition with the Vietcong guerrillas²⁶ when from 1958 on they adopted increasingly militant policies.²⁷ After this, even in those areas not yet effectively penetrated by the Vietcong and where a security problem had not yet arisen, Diem's government could not secure the loyalty of most of the population.

In the rural areas it fell short in all its attempts to attract the support of the Viet-

Feb. 24, 1956 [Paris: 1956], p. 197). See also the London Times of Feb. 24, 1956, which reports Pineau as stating France's belief in the desirability of elections for the whole of Vietnam but noting that while France was supposed to guarantee these elections it could not enforce its desire.

In a note of Apr. 3, 1956, to the cochairmen of the Geneva Conference, France served notice of her decision to withdraw from South Vietnam (New York Times, Apr. 24, 1956). It was following this that an editorial in *Le Monde* of Apr. 12 asked: "But who will assume in our place the obligations undertaken at Geneva. . . . People will long discuss this French withdrawal, abandoning responsibilities which it no longer has the means of honoring."

"Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation under Stress (Boston, 1963), p. 134. The Communists have, of course, made similar statements that resumption of fighting was the only course open to them after 1956 for reunification.

"Ngo Dinh Diem had been appointed Premier by Bao Dai, the Chief of State, and installed in office before the Geneva negotiations were consummated.

"See (16) above.

"See W. R. Fisher, "The Eleventh Hour in Vietnam," Asian Survey, v. 2 (February 1965) 98-107; Roy Jumper and Marjorie Weiner Normand, "Vietnam," in George McT. Kahin, ed., Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia (Ithaca, N.Y., 1964), pp. 375-513; Scigliano, op. cit.; and Milton C. Taylor, "South Vietnam: Lavish Aid, Limited Progress," Pacific Affairs, XXXIV, 3 (Fall 1961), 242-256.

"The term "Vietcong," meaning Vietnamese Communist, was coined by Diem's government.

"The date at which the Vietcong began militant guerrilla operations has been subject to considerable dispute. P. J. Honey, for example, states that "the desperate and increasing food shortage led the DRV [North Vietnam] to decide—probably at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party held in May 1959—to change its tactics toward South Vietnam and to revert to the technique of the 'people's war'" (Honey, Communism in North Vietnam [Cambridge, Mass., 1963], p. 67). On Mar. 5, 1965, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said that Hanoi was impressed by improvements in South Vietnam and "with the backing of Peiping" decided to "launch its increased guerrilla aggression in late 1959 and early 1960" (Department of State Press Release, No. 36, Mar. 4, 1964).

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name people.²⁸ Programs urged by the United States for the improvement of social and economic conditions,²⁹ for winning the allegiance of the non-Vietnamese mountain-dwelling peoples,³⁰ and for the establishment of strategic hamlets³¹ were generally unsuc-

²⁸ Contrary to the position taken in the State Department's white paper of Feb. 27, 1965, this is the view of most independent and informed observers.

²⁹ Under Vietminh control the peasants were often given land and not required to pay taxes on it; but when the Diem government's land reform was put into action the peasants had to buy this land from the landlords and pay taxes. The Vietcong successfully presented this to the peasants as an oppressive measure. See J. L. Finkle and Tran Van Dinh, "Provincial Government in Vietnam: A Study of Vinh Long Province" (Michigan State University Advisory Group, Saigon, 1961). Moreover, the South Vietnamese peasants often ridiculed Diem's rural programs because of their non-Vietnamese origins. The Vietcong's denunciations of the My-Diem government—that is, the American-Diem Government—thus frequently echoed popularly expressed sentiments. See Scigliano, op. cit. pp. 158 and 206. The Saigon administration also made the mistake of frequently assigning upper level local administrators with regional backgrounds different from the rural populations under their authority.

³⁰ Despite its statements to the contrary, the Diem regime failed to develop a policy which took account of the tribal peoples' grievances. The government ignored a report prepared by the Michigan State University Advisory Group which urged real and "sorely needed" reforms in the relationship between the tribal peoples and the Saigon authorities (final report covering activities of the Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, for the period May 20, 1955–June 30, 1962 [Saigon, 1962]). Mounting tension between the government in Saigon and the tribal peoples eventually led to the limited rebellion of September 1964 in which the tribal people in the Ban Me Thuot area killed a large number of lowland Vietnamese and made demands for greater autonomy. A description of these events and some discussion of the background of tribal discontent is contained in the New York Times for the period Sept. 21–28, 1964.

³¹ This program received considerable publicity throughout 1962 and much of 1963. Almost all official U.S. comment during this period praised the achievements of the program. It is now widely admitted, however, that the program was a failure and that exaggerated claims were made for its success by both South Vietnamese and Americans. The program sought, in theory, to resettle peasants in protected hamlets, where they would be able to benefit from improved social services. Little attention was paid, however, to the basic sociological factors which were involved in such a program. The South Vietnamese peasants in the delta region are not accustomed to living in compact settlements. They resented being moved from their fields, the tombs of their ancestors and the village dinh, the spiritual center of the village. The hamlets into which they were moved were inadequately protected, leaving the peasants a prey to the insurgents, while the promised social improvements did not eventuate. On the failure of the strategic hamlet program, see in particular: the New York Times of Oct. 23, Dec. 13, and Dec. 23, 1963, and Jan. 10 and 12, 1964; Policy and Program of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam as Announced by Gen. Nguyen Khanh the Prime Minister on Mar. 7, 1964 (Issued by the Embassy of the Republic of Vietnam, Washington, 1964), p. 3; and G. C. Hickey, "Village in Vietnam" (New Haven, 1964), p. 54.

cessful. The consequence was an ever-greater alienation of the population. Moreover, in the 18 months since the assassination of Diem the situation has continued to deteriorate, and the shifting combinations of army officers controlling the government have remained just as isolated from the Vietnamese people.³²

When the United States in February 1965 began its air strikes against the north, Saigon's authority in the countryside was at a low point at the same time that the Vietcong was mounting a major military offensive to split the country. Against a confident, powerful adversary, the South Vietnamese forces seemed inept and undisciplined on the battlefield, and additional areas fell under Vietcong control. Between mid-December 1964 and mid-March 1965, more than 120,000 refugees fled to Saigon and other coastal areas from central highland areas recently taken over by the Vietcong.³³

Not only was the country's political leadership seriously weakened because of internal schism, but also the army itself, now seriously divided, was so absorbed in the struggle for power that it had lost much of its combat potential. Key units were alerted as often for transfer to Saigon, to support or oppose one or another of the military politicians, as for assignment to fight the Vietcong. In late 1964, dissension in the ranks of the army began to accompany an increased civilian disenchantment with the Saigon Government. By January 1965, the army was experiencing grave difficulty in conscripting recruits, an average of 30 percent of whom were reportedly deserting within weeks of their enlistment.³⁴

The rapidly deteriorating military position of the Saigon administration coincided with a decrease in its political cohesion and a perceptible growth in war weariness and in the demand for a peaceful settlement. In Saigon itself, as well as in such Buddhist strongholds as Hue, students and monks advocated an end to the fighting and called for negotiations with Hanoi.³⁵ Popular backing for such a course became so great that the Government could no longer silence the dissidence simply by jailing all of those who voiced these views. Preoccupied with the Vietcong offensive begun in December in the central region of South Vietnam, and fearing a military disaster, the United States further committed its forces to a protracted and costly effort. Yet this move must have seemed to many of the Vietnamese to condemn them to a struggle for which there was no end in sight. Together with the existing war weariness of the populace, it raised the possibility that the leader of a future coup might respond to widespread sentiment to end the war by undertaking bilateral negotiations with Hanoi. There was no evidence, however, that American policy allowed for such a possibility.

THE OTHER SOUTHERN REGIME

The increasing areas south of the 17th parallel from which Saigon has been ousted

³² This is made abundantly clear in the New York Times reporting during this period. Also, a U.S. official report released on April 1, 1964, stated that only 34 percent of Vietnam's villages were government controlled; 24 percent were "neutral," and 42 percent were outright Vietcong. In January 1964, The Observer (American Army newspaper in Saigon) wrote that "some four to five million people support the NLF in varying degrees." Both of these sources are cited in Bernard Fall, *The Two Vietnams* (New York, 1963), p. 396.

³³ New York Times, Mar. 16, 1965.

³⁴ New York Times, Jan. 19, 1965. The London Times of Mar. 6, 1965, reported that during February 1965 alone 1,450 men had deserted.

³⁵ For example, see New York Times of Feb. 26 and Mar. 2, 1965.

have not become administrative vacuums. Into most of them has moved a fully functioning Vietcong administration.³⁶ The Vietcong now controls more of South Vietnam than Saigon does, and at night, when Saigon's military patrols return to their bases, the area which the Vietcong administers expands still further.³⁷

The Vietcong cadres are not isolated strangers in an unfamiliar land. Most, recruits and hard core alike, are southerners with deep local roots, familiar with the area and living in what they rightly regard as their homeland. At least up to the end of 1964, nearly all those Vietcong who had infiltrated from the north were southerners.³⁸ As well as cadre and troops, the Vietcong relies upon administrators who are native to the areas in which they work.³⁹ Indeed, the Vietcong has consistently been far more sensitive than Saigon to the strong regional sentiment characteristic of politics throughout Vietnam.

Undoubtedly it was in part in order to come to terms with this regional feeling in the south that the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam—the NLF—was established in December 1960. Whatever the extent of its loyalty to Hanoi, the Vietcong has depended on southern support and has felt obliged to give the liberation front a distinctly southern slant—even to the point of using a different flag from the government in the north. The front calls on all anti-Saigon Vietnamese for backing; while clearly

³⁶ According to Peter Grose, writing in the New York Times Magazine of Jan. 24, 1965, the Vietcong has developed "a stable and orderly political machine across the country, their cadres paralleling the Saigon administrative structure at every level. Only a final political shift at the top is awaited before the entire Communist-led apparatus surfaces and exercises its control in the open. Under Vietcong provincial commissars and their central committees come district commissars, then the village or township cadres and finally the hamlet committees. Where Vietcong control is firm, the administration functions with scarcely an interruption. * * * By conservative estimate, 8,000 to 10,000 political administrators govern areas of South Vietnam controlled by the Vietcong."

³⁷ It appears that the Vietcong's taxing authority, in one form or another, extends over about three-quarters of South Vietnam. Citing a U.S. Operations Mission report of June 14, 1963, Bernard Fall notes that as early as then, in all but three of South Vietnam's forty-four provinces, the Vietcong was collecting taxes (Current History, Feb. 1965, p. 98). On Jan. 24, 1965, in the New York Times Magazine, Peter Grose noted that "as much as 50 million plasters (about \$700,000) could have been collected by the Vietcong last year in a wealthy province such as Long An. Saigon received 17 million plasters from Long An last year."

³⁸ According to the New York Times of Jan. 27, 1965, "before 1964 all infiltrators were trained in the north but were South Vietnamese in origin and were assigned to their native localities." Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy stated a few days earlier (New York Times, Jan. 24, 1965) that "significant numbers" of trained North Vietnamese soldiers had for the first time been infiltrating into South Vietnam." The State Department's white paper of Feb. 27 declares that "as many as 75 percent of the more than 4,400 Vietcong who are known to have entered the south in the first 8 months of 1964 were natives of North Vietnam." If correct, this figure (3,300) would be a small fraction of the total number of Vietcong.

³⁹ See George A. Carver, Jr., "The Real Revolution in South Vietnam," Foreign Affairs, XLIII, 3 (April 1965), pp. 406–407.

Communist-dominated, it enlists the support of many non-Communists as well.⁴⁰

Although the NLF leaders undoubtedly have close ties with Hanoi, there is evidence suggesting that the front has a significant degree of autonomy and independence of action. Not only has it established political representation in Peiping and a number of other capitals,⁴¹ but also the political line it takes in its radio broadcasts by no means faithfully follows that of Hanoi. It sometimes seems closer to Peiping.⁴² Although the interests of anti-Saigon southerners and Hanoi usually coincide, this has not always been the case; nor need it be the case in the future. The front cannot, of course, successfully attract and hold southern support if it does not appeal to southerners. Hanoi recognizes this fact, and the United States in dealing with Hanoi would be unrealistic not to allow for it.

THE NORTHERN GOVERNMENT

Following the Geneva partition, Ho Chi-minh's Vietminh set up a highly authoritarian but relatively effective government in the north. It cautiously adopted features from Communist systems abroad, evidencing a nondiscriminatory selectivity in its policies that gave it a distinctive cast.

Vietnamese nationalism has always been strongly anti-Chinese. The Vietnamese have usually been on the defensive against China and sensitive to any action which might be construed as a Chinese attempt to reimpose anything like the old vassal relationship.⁴³

⁴⁰ The success of the National Liberation Front is partly understandable given the character of its appeal. Its "Program," adopted in December 1960, calls for the overthrow of the Saigon government and its replacement by "an independent, democratic, peaceful, and neutral government" (presumably dominated by the NLF), which would provide for the economic welfare of the whole population, land for poor peasants, autonomy for minorities, and negotiations with Hanoi leading to the peaceful reunification of Vietnam. See Philippe Devillers, "The Struggle for the Unification of Vietnam," *The China Quarterly*, 9 (January-March 1962), pp. 19-20.

⁴¹ The NLF has permanent delegations in the People's Republic of China, Cuba, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Indonesia, and Algeria. It is a member of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization. The Communist Party of South Vietnam (South Vietnam Working People's Association) is regarded as the core of the front made up of more than 20 political parties and peoples organizations (*Peiping Review*, No. 52 [Dec. 28, 1964], p. 13).

⁴² See footnotes 61 and 62.

⁴³ The first and most extensive period of Chinese control was from 111 B.C. to A.D. 939, when a large part of North Vietnam was annexed by China and governed as a Chinese Province. It was also occupied from 1406 to 1427. In the historical museum at Hanoi, a major room is devoted to depicting the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people against Chinese feudal invaders." Referred to by Bernard Fall in A. Doak Barnett, ed., "Communist Strategies in Asia" (New York, 1963), p. 214.

That this attitude still persists is illustrated by a Hanoi broadcast of July 15, 1963, when, in reciting major military victories of the Vietnamese, three successful victories over Chinese feudal invaders were bracketed with Dienbienphu as wonderful military feats (*Radio Hanoi*, July 15, 1963). Honey suggests that "there are excellent ground for the belief that the principal *raison d'être* of such a powerful army in North Vietnam today is to protect North Vietnam against possible Chinese aggression" (Honey, op. cit., p. 98).

This sensitivity has been particularly strong in the north, for it was this area that China once absorbed and that most recently suffered Chinese occupation. In 1945-46, Kuomintang forces occupied Vietnam north of the 16th parallel. Allied plans for disarming the Japanese called for a Chinese occupation of this area, but the Chinese also took advantage of the opportunity to loot the country with a thoroughness not forgotten by the inhabitants.⁴⁴

Ho Chi-minh's government has always shown considerable independence of political judgment and action. Even under the increased pressures upon it resulting from the Sino-Soviet dispute it has tried to hold a middle course; standing sometimes closer to Moscow, sometimes to Peiping. It has never irrevocably bound itself to either.⁴⁵ In recent years, as was true in the preceding decade, the Vietminh's basic allegiance has been to Vietnam rather than to Peiping or Moscow.

Two major limitations, however, have prevented Hanoi from pursuing more fully an independent course. The first of these is its inadequate agricultural base,⁴⁶ which has led to a heavy reliance on China, the only Communist country in a position to relieve her food deficiency. Traditionally, South Vietnam was the area which compensated for the north's lack of foodstuffs; and thus it is understandable that Ho should have shown such a strong interest in establishing trade relations with the south, at least on a basis similar to that which exists between

⁴⁴ Ellen J. Hammer describes the 1945 Chinese occupation in this way: "The unruly Chinese Army spread over the countryside as though it were there to stay. It lived off the land and afflicted Tonkin like an invasion of locusts, looting Hanoi and surrounding regions" (Ellen J. Hammer, "The Struggle for Indochina" [Stanford, 1954], p. 134).

⁴⁵ This judgment on the relative independence of the North Vietnamese leadership in the Sino-Soviet dispute has been the subject of a fairly extensive literature. After an examination of the documentary record from 1961 to 1963, Alexander Dallin has concluded that "in the dispute between the CPSU and the CPC, the [North] Vietnamese Workers Party (Lao Dong) avoided committing itself to either side" (Dallin, ed., "Diversity in International Communism" [New York, 1963], pp. 396-397). The Chinese have, with fanfare, published several Vietnamese speeches and articles which follow Peiping's line fairly closely but which at the same time carefully avoid any real commitment to China. See, for example, Le Duan, "Some Questions Concerning the International Tasks of Our Party" (*Peiping*, 1964). Bernard Fall has commented on such documents in his "Our Options in Vietnam," *The Reporter* (Mar. 12, 1964). See also the articles by P. J. Honey and Bernard Fall in the *China Quarterly*, 9 (January-March 1962); A. M. Halpern, "The Emergence of an Asian Communist Coalition," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 348 (September 1963), 117-128; Jean Lacouture, "Uncle Ho Defies Uncle Sam," *New York Times* magazine, Mar. 28, 1965.

⁴⁶ North Vietnam has less than 5 million acres of arable land, to support a population estimated at 15,903,000—i.e., 0.3 of an acre per capita; population figures are based on a census completed by the Northern Government in March 1960 and reported in the *New York Times* on Mar. 21, 1960, and the figure for the amount of arable land is from a speech by Bui Cong Trung, vice chairman of the North Vietnam Scientific Research Commission (*Radio Hanoi*, Nov. 2, 1962).

East and West Germany.⁴⁷ Hanoi has attempted to offset this agricultural inadequacy by industrialization. Here the North Vietnamese are even more dependent upon outside support, but for industrialization Moscow has been in a somewhat better position than China to render assistance.

The second major limitation on Hanoi's desire to pursue an independent line within the Communist bloc has been its fear of American military intervention in support of the Saigon government and the possibility that this support might extend beyond the 17th parallel. Hanoi has concluded that she could not rely very heavily on the Soviet Union in such a confrontation; therefore, despite her aversion to Chinese intervention, she has had to depend more on Peiping, whose power might help deter the United States.

AMERICAN ESCALATION

This, then, was the situation in Vietnam on the eve of the U.S. air strikes against the north. Underlying the administration's decision to follow a policy of controlled escalation of the war was the assumption that Hanoi controls the Vietcong in the south. Yet this is a dangerous assumption on which to base American policy, as also is the view that Hanoi in turn is controlled by Peiping. There is no neat chain of command from Peiping to Hanoi and thence to the Vietcong. And even if the NLF were completely subordinate to Hanoi, the leaders in the north, being far removed from the actual area of the fighting, could not easily dictate the precise course of action of those in the field. It could not count upon compelling those who are fighting successfully in areas they regard as their home to lay down their arms and discontinue the struggle. The Vietcong has suffered casualties for years in its struggle against Saigon; and it seems unlikely that it would call off the fight just because the north had also begun to feel the sting of war.

In 1954 the Vietminh could induce its numerous supporters in the south to accept Vietnam's partition and to abandon their conquests south of the 17th parallel because partition was regarded as a temporary measure, to last only until elections. But we cannot assume that once again pro-Communist elements in the south will give up what they have won through long and difficult struggle. If over the last 5 years the doctrine of uncompromising resistance and the real expectation of victory have been so assiduously nurtured among the southern-rooted Vietcong, is it sensible to assume that Hanoi can abruptly call off their opposition—or enforce such compliance?

An important reason for the Johnson administration's reluctance to negotiate with Hanoi has been the belief that this would involve negotiating with China—a belief deriving from the assumption that Hanoi depends upon Peiping and is its agent. Certainly the Chinese would like us to believe that in dealing with Hanoi we must do so through Peiping. Although this is not yet the case, continuation of our bombing will certainly drive Hanoi into an ever greater reliance on Peiping and deprive North Vietnam of any significant independence of action. Therefore, if the United States wants to negotiate primarily with Hanoi rather than Peiping, it must move toward such negotiations very soon.

CHINESE POLICY

Sensing that the United States has committed itself to a path from which there are

⁴⁷ As Jean Lacouture observes ("Uncle Ho Defies"), Ho would like "to establish commercial relations permitting the North to buy rice from the South at a reasonable price."

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no acceptable exits, Mao Tse-tung's government waits for the United States either to back down without a settlement or unilaterally to overextend its military commitments in North Vietnam. The pattern of American policy since February has thus far coincided with Chinese expectations, and has led to a situation in Vietnam which conforms more to Chinese than to American and Vietnamese interests.

Chinese goals in Vietnam are less understood than those of Hanoi or the Soviet Union. Although Peiping does not intend to occupy or absorb into China the lands of southeast Asia, it does consider all of eastern Asia to be within China's exclusive political-economic sphere of influence. The Maoist leadership believes that the presence of strong American military power now denies it this influence. Mao's politburo seeks to avoid—and without unequivocal Soviet assistance could not contemplate—a full-scale military confrontation with the United States.⁴⁵ Rather, it plans to erode American power in Asia through political means while simultaneously working toward the conditions under which it could regain Soviet support on its own terms. In the long run, it is through their influence over national revolutionary parties and the major elements of the shaken Communist movement that Peiping's leaders hope to enhance China's global position.⁴⁶

Since February, Peiping's aim of discrediting American power in Asia has seemed closer to realization than ever. In particular, China's rulers have been able to capitalize on America's violent reaction to the crisis in South Vietnam. Throughout most of Asia they have assiduously spread the belief that in Vietnam the Americans are acting with brutal and unjustified violence against hapless Asians. Following the bombing raids, Peiping has ridiculed U.S. protestations of its peaceful aims in Asia, heaping scorn on Soviet Russia's advocacy of peaceful coexistence, and has gained further justification for its refusal to sign the nuclear test ban treaty and end its own nuclear program. For as long as the raids continue without a military response from North Vietnam and without any sign of actual Chinese military intervention, Peiping can expect that the strains on the Soviet-American detente and the NATO alliance will intensify, while the American position in Asia will be undermined. The State Department's white paper did little to counter the Chinese accusation that the Johnson administration had acted irrationally in order to conceal the inadequacies and failures of its program in South Vietnam. The Chinese have thus gained political advantage from Hanoi's adversity.

In contrast to their view at the time of the 1954 Geneva Conference, the Chinese now see how both their local and global objectives can be served by an intensified struggle against the United States in Vietnam. The struggle for Vietnam could reduce Vietnamese "independence" in the Sino-Soviet dispute, insure North Vietnam's long-term dependence on China, and at the same time strengthen China's influence among not only other Communist regimes and parties, but also among non-Communist unaligned nations in Asia and Africa; moreover, it could bring the security interests of China and the

Soviet Union into closer alignment. Intensification of the war in Vietnam also provides a domestic atmosphere more conducive to eradicating the "revisionist" and even pro-American sentiments which have been spreading among the Chinese youth, and enables Chinese life to be further regimented.⁴⁷

U.S. GLOBAL CONSIDERATIONS

These considerations underscore the argument that America's policies in Vietnam should conform to its global priorities. It has long been recognized that we should not pursue measures likely to undermine our peaceful relationships with the Soviet Union, and our tacit agreement with Moscow on the containment of Chinese power. Yet, the escalation of violence begun last February has set in train reactions outside of Vietnam which run strictly contrary to our previously accepted global priorities. This is the price we pay for our policy in Vietnam.

U.S. NEGOTIATING STRENGTHS

If the United States desires a peaceful settlement with Hanoi, various factors contribute to a strong U.S. negotiating position. This position cannot be strengthened by further escalation of military pressure. On the contrary, such action can only destroy or weaken this position and lose for the United States the opportunity of dealing primarily with Hanoi on essentially Vietnamese terms, rather than with Peiping on essentially Chinese terms.

1. Common American and Soviet objectives in southeast Asia: The Soviet Union and the United States have as their fundamental aim in southeast Asia the restraint of Chinese influence in the area.⁴⁸ The new Soviet leaders have thus far resisted Chinese pressures toward greater militancy, and have continued to place a high priority on Khrushchev's international policies of peaceful coexistence and amicable relations with the United States. Moscow apparently wishes to avoid risky commitments in southeast Asia, but does not want to lay itself open to Chinese propaganda by appearing to abandon any revolutionary movement. Although the Soviet Union would have to be circumspect in approaching negotiations on Vietnam because of the capital which China could draw from any apparent alignment between the Soviet Union and the United States, tacit Soviet opposition to China during the negotiations would be of particular importance in encouraging Hanoi to take an independent stance.

2. Hanoi's desire to remain independent of Peiping: Hanoi hopes to arrive at a settlement which will insure that all of Vietnam remains fully independent of China. While the Government of North Vietnam seeks national reunification, it does not want to see this achieved at the cost of dependence on China; moreover, Hanoi undoubtedly realizes that it would seriously damage its appeal to southerners if it even appeared to become dependent upon China.

3. North Vietnam's economic position: North Vietnam now relies much more on China than upon the Soviet Union for food, her most critical deficiency. As noted above, if she were given an opportunity to trade with South Vietnam and secure a significant part of its rice exports for her industrial centers, she could both reduce her depend-

ence upon China and abandon her own expensive and highly uneconomic efforts to grow food in marginally productive areas. Moreover, an end to the trade blockade of North Vietnam would benefit the country by enabling it to obtain items necessary for its further industrialization. Given the continuing increase of its population upon an unchanging base of arable land, such industrialization is a prerequisite for the economic development—and ultimately the economic viability—of the North. Furthermore, the United States could stand ready to dispatch Public Law 480 rice, thereby permitting an immediate relief of Hanoi's dependence upon Peiping, and to include North Vietnam in plans for the economic development of southeast Asia.⁴⁹

4. War weariness: This factor is not only operative in the South, but also affects the North. One should not underestimate the intense desire for an end of fighting and for family reunions,⁵⁰ which were important factors even before the bombing began.

5. The recognized threat to the use of greater military force: The North naturally wishes to avoid additional damage from U.S. air raids. However, as the raids continue, the North Vietnamese may be pushed ever closer to the conclusion that what remains to be protected in the North is no longer sufficient to outweigh the advantages accruing from striking southward. Further, as long as the threat remains unrealized, we leave Hanoi in a tenable position from which to negotiate.

If the United States is to derive maximum advantage from these negotiating strengths, it must give due weight to the political realities of the Vietnamese situation and recognize that these set limits for all parties. Even if the United States could win a decisive military victory in Vietnam, and even if this could be achieved without permanently antagonizing most of the Vietnamese people, these political realities would endure. Washington would still have to face most of the same problems which, since 1954, have obstructed the achievement of its objectives.

Persistent questions remain to be answered by Washington. Is the United States prepared to acknowledge the fact that most people in Vietnam—North and South—desire an end of the war and the reunification of their country? If we accept these as legitimate aims, what would be our position if Hanoi agreed to a cease-fire and the withdrawal of infiltrators on the condition that the United States and Saigon would honor the provision of the Geneva accords calling for national elections—particularly if it also agreed that such elections should take place under U.S. auspices?⁵¹ If a military truce were achieved, would the U.N. recognize that any political solution in the South enforceable by Hanoi must provide for some sort of grouping of regional authority and administration, whereby substantial areas would remain under National Liberation Front control?

⁴⁵ This possibility was foreshadowed in President Johnson's statement on Mar. 25, 1965. The United States could also agree to extend the projected Mekong River development plan to North Vietnam (see the article by Gilbert F. White in the December 1964 Bulletin). On Apr. 7, President Johnson expressed his hope that following a peaceful settlement "North Vietnam will take its place in the common effort" for regional economic development (New York Times, Apr. 8, 1965).

⁴⁶ For an indication of the number of divided families, it was reported that in Quangnai Province about 40 percent of the residents have relatives in North Vietnam or among the Vietcong (New York Times, Apr. 13, 1964).

⁴⁷ This would be in accordance with the United States own unilateral declaration at Geneva (see footnote 17 above).

⁴⁸ In the period since February, the Chinese have not overlooked the possibility that further escalation might lead to an attack on China. They have few illusions concerning the amount of damage that the United States could inflict on their cities and apparently hope to confine the arena of actual fighting to Vietnam. See Jen-min jhpaio editorial, Feb. 12, 1965.

⁴⁹ For a more comprehensive discussion of Chinese objectives, see the articles by A. M. Halpern and Morton H. Halperin in the China Quarterly, 21 (January-March 1965).

⁴⁹ John W. Lewis, "Revolutionary Struggle and the Second Generation in Communist China," the China Quarterly, 21 (January-March 1965), pp. 126-147.

⁵⁰ Moscow, of course, would favor the extension of Communist influence in southeast Asia at our expense, although it would simultaneously hope to prevent the extension of Chinese influence there. It has faced a policy dilemma, therefore, because it has not been easy to separate pro-Chinese and pro-Communist tendencies in Asia.

The Vietminh has good reason to be embittered over the fact that in the Geneva negotiations, the concessions which it made were futile because a central clause of the accords was not honored. Is it not reasonable to assume that this time Hanoi will refuse to negotiate a settlement, unless assured that there will be reasonably effective international supervision over execution of any agreement reached?

ASIAN NATIONALISM

Further, in our approach to the crisis in Vietnam we need to reexamine some of the hypotheses advanced as justification for our actions there. For example, Americans who subscribe to the so-called domino theory for the most part fail to take into account the differences between the political factors operating in Vietnam and those obtaining in other states of southeast Asia. Also implicit in this theory is the notion that individual Asians and Asian nationalism will react differently from Westerners and Western nationalism to force or the threat of force. But in fact Asians and Westerners react alike. Indeed, opposition to foreign encroachment, real or threatened, has been a primary generator of national consciousness among Asians and a major factor in strengthening national cohesion. The history of Vietnam's nationalist movement has been unlike that of any other state of southeast Asia; in none of these other countries did the intransigence of a colonial power so frustrate the nationalist movement as to force it into co-operation with, and ultimately subordination to, the Communists. In other countries of southeast Asia, nationalism has provided the strongest barrier to the growth of communism and to the influence of outside Communist powers.⁵⁵ There is a direct relationship between the fact that the governments of Cambodia and Thailand have remained in harmony with their countries' nationalism and the fact that there has been no strong development of communism in either state.

This is directly relevant to the administration's tendency to regard Vietnam as "a critical test of the Communist technique of military subversion" and to say that if America fails this test this will embolden Communists throughout the underdeveloped world to take up arms and attempt to seize power. Such a view not only ignores the role nationalism has played in containing communism, but also assumes that Communists elsewhere lack relevant local experience to guide them and are awaiting the outcome of the "test" in Vietnam before proceeding. Moreover, it takes no account of the fact that Western military intervention generally gives the Communists great political capital.⁵⁶ The

most significant conclusion that could be drawn from a failure of the American effort in Vietnam would be that, no matter how much force it applies, the United States cannot exert effective political leverage when its actions run counter to the tide of a country's nationalism, and where the majority of the population does not support these actions.

This does not mean, however, that the United States should not continue to provide assistance to the states of southeast Asia. If a government—one which reflects its country's nationalism and which enjoys broad popular support—should request aid in repelling military incursions by a more powerful neighbor, the United States should provide this aid. With this in mind, U.S. efforts to reach a peaceful resolution of the situation in Vietnam could appropriately be coupled with an offer to provide help to popular-based southeast Asian states that might request it.

THE POSSIBILITIES FOR SETTLEMENT

In approaching a settlement, the United States must recognize that Vietnam should be treated as a whole and that, at least on a gradual step-by-step basis, it should be reunified. Provisions for a progression toward economic and political integration would be indispensable for insuring that the majority of the Vietnamese would cooperate. International guarantees would be essential to assure the Vietnamese that any agreement entered into would be honored and that planned developments toward political and economic stabilization and national reunification would be carried out.

As a first step, and preliminary to a military truce, the United States would have to signify its willingness to stop bombing the North. Concurrently, it could stipulate its terms for a comprehensive military truce. Provision could then be made for the evacuation of all foreign troops and the introduction of a temporary international presence which would insure that the truce was carried out and the way kept open for implementing agreed measures for a political settlement.⁵⁷

One pattern of settlement which might warrant serious exploration would be a stage-by-stage establishment of a federation.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ This possibility would necessitate bringing in substantial international elements, but an operation of this kind would cost far less than the amount now spent by the United States in South Vietnam. The introduction of this international presence would have to coincide with the withdrawal of American troops and whatever Soviet and Chinese technicians or "volunteers" were then operating in Vietnam. If the U.S.S.R. and the United States could agree concerning the necessary budgetary arrangements, the U.N. Security Council might be able to make provisions for establishing this, and Russian cooperation might facilitate North Vietnamese acceptance of such a presence.

The proposal in March 1965 by Secretary General U Thant for a seven-power conference on Vietnam might have brought the United Nations into the Vietnamese crisis in a constructive way and led to discussions concerning the creation of an international peacekeeping force under U.N. auspices.

Another means of introducing an international presence might be to reconvene the Geneva Conference on Indochina. Hanoi has publicly used the Geneva accords as the baseline for its demands in the present crisis, and it might well be willing to use a reconvened Geneva Conference both as a forum for further negotiation and as a means for introducing an acceptable international supervisory presence.

⁵⁶ On Mar. 12, 1965, Radio Hanoi called for a national coalition, democratic, peaceful, and neutral government to be set up in South Vietnam with the participation of the

wherein the economic and political links between the component parts would be strengthened at stipulated intervals. Two levels of federation might emerge in Vietnam: in the south,⁵⁹ incorporating both Saigon-controlled and Vietcong-controlled areas; and later, between the federated south as a whole and the north.⁶⁰

When the perimeters of the southern federal components have been established, plans could be worked out first for local elections there, and then after an agreed interval of time, for national elections. The international presence could help insure that the proper conditions existed for the election campaigns and the subsequent voting.

With the existence of such an international presence—to which the United States could with honor transfer what it regards as its responsibilities in Vietnam—it might be possible for a political system to emerge which would reasonably reflect the wishes of the population. Some such solution would at least give time and scope for a peaceful accommodation between non-Communists and Communists, and would avoid the otherwise inescapable alternative of a continuing use of violence to resolve political differences.

Even if the Communists do eventually come to dominate all of Vietnam, need this be regarded as contrary to fundamental American objectives? Is not our principal objective in Asia to contain the People's Republic of China and provide the opportunity for states in southeast Asia to develop free from Peiping's dominating influence? If so, can we not adopt there, as we have in Eastern Europe, policies to encourage greater polycentrism among Communist states? Should we not extend to Asia our attempt to foster nationalism and greater independence among the lesser Communist states? The United States has come to accept Communist governments in Poland and Rumania, and tries to give them the sort of support likely to decrease their dependence on Moscow; why, then, should the United States not capitalize upon the strength of Vietnamese nationalism and its strongly anti-Chinese thrust?

NLFSV. Jean Lacouture ("Uncle Ho Defies," p. 112) has also suggested that Hanoi would be willing to set up two governments on a long-term basis with a liaison committee between the two zones.

⁵⁹ In order to insure that such a southern federation would be realistically based and as viable as possible, there would have to be some regroupment of the population, and here the United States would have to supply a large part of the funds. Already in the South there are identifiable areas which could become components of a federation. For example, it should be relatively easy to establish perimeters for the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai areas. As most northern Catholic refugees who settled outside of Saigon are clustered in agricultural communities with their own religious leaders, it should be possible to regroup them into viable Federal components. Similarly, with some of the major Montagnard minority groups boundaries could be established. Saigon and much of its hinterland could constitute a major Federal component. Finally, many areas long administered by the Vietcong are relatively clearly delimited and could be the basis of other units in a southern federation.

⁶⁰ Initially the southern areas under the Vietcong would not be merged with North Vietnam, but they would possess a substantial degree of autonomy within the south. With the federated components retaining substantial powers, and with each of them guaranteed by the international presence, the delegates could meet together and establish procedures for additional cooperation and exchange between the components.

⁵⁵ Beginning in 1948, Communists in Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines tried to seize power by force; in each case, however, their insurrections failed because they lacked sufficient nationalist support and even ran counter to the mainstream of their countries' nationalism.

⁵⁶ In the only major non-Communist country of southeast Asia where communism has developed significant strength—Indonesia—its road was smoothed by American interference, which provided important political capital to the Communists. American encouragement of and support to the anti-Djakarta rebels in 1957-58 provided a major stimulus to the growth of Indonesian communism and has been responsible more than any other factor for the deterioration of Indonesian-American relations. See Herbert Feith, "Indonesia," in Kahin, ed., op. cit., pp. 211-212, and George McT. Kahin, "Indonesia," in Kahin, ed., *Major Governments of Asia* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1963), pp. 646-649.

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THE U.S. POSITION IN MID-APRIL

What have been the consequences of the policy that the United States has been following in Vietnam? After more than 2 months, the bombing raids above the 17th parallel have not resulted in any significant decrease in Vietcong activity in the south. Hanoi has consistently demanded that the United States abide by the Geneva accords, and at times has seemed to indicate its interest in negotiations.⁶¹ The National Liberation Front, on the other hand, has expressed firm opposition to the idea of negotiations, a position prominently supported by China.⁶²

The United States, for its part, has extended its bombing of the north, as well as the south, and has accelerated the rate of introduction of its combat forces into the south. On April 7, President Johnson, while indicating that the United States was prepared for "unconditional discussions," evinced no willingness to depart from previous administration statements which had called for a reestablishment of the pre-1958 status quo. He made no proposal which could be expected to provide a realistic basis for negotiations. In fact, the terms offered Hanoi call upon it to compel capitulation of the Vietcong.

PROSPECTS FOR ESCALATION

If the United States continues to increase its military punishment of North Vietnam, Hanoi is likely to send elements of its 300,000-man army south. The decision to do this will presumably be made at the point when the United States has inflicted so much damage on the North Vietnamese that they will

⁶¹ Vo Nguyen Giap, Hanoi's Minister of National Defense, has given what may be regarded as the initial bargaining position of the Hanoi government. He stated that the United States must correctly implement the Geneva agreements and cease its acts of provocation against North Vietnam; also the United States must allow the Vietnamese people to settle the matter of reunification (Radio Hanoi, Mar. 10, 1965). This constituted an elaboration of an earlier statement by the North Vietnamese Premier, Pham Van Dong, to A. N. Kosygin of the Soviet Union on Feb. 6, 1965 (Radio Hanoi, Feb. 8, 1965).

Throughout the period since the first bombings in February, Hanoi has requested "the two cochairmen and the governments of the participating countries of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, the Socialist countries, and all peace-loving countries in the world to take timely and effective actions aimed at staying the hands of the U.S. imperialist aggressors and warmongers, insuring strict implementation of the 1954 Geneva accords on Vietnam [and] defending peace in Indochina and southeast Asia" (Radio Hanoi, Feb. 8, 1965).

⁶² On Feb. 14, for example, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the NLF "called on the entire army and people of South Vietnam to fight the enemy continuously and on all battlefields, fight more powerfully, wipe out more enemy forces, destroy many more strategic hamlets, urgently arm the entire people, endeavor to build and consolidate the fighting hamlets and villagers, [and] urgently build and develop the armed forces" (Liberation Radio [Vietcong], as rebroadcast by Radio Hanoi, Feb. 15, 1965).

While Hanoi continued to hark back to the Geneva accords and to demand action against the United States by the International Control Commission, China denounced those bodies and echoed the Vietcong's hard line. Jen-min jih-pao on Feb. 19 declared: "The Johnson administration is neither willing to accept defeat nor courageous enough to face the consequences of an extended war. * * * The aim of the Johnson administration is quite clear—to get at the conference table what it could not get on the battlefield."

have little to lose by a retaliatory attack and little to save through compromise or negotiation. Although we cannot predict with certainty what kind of a military operation North Vietnam would attempt, it seems likely that in view of America's vastly superior air and sea power, Hanoi would deploy its forces in ways whereby it would be least affected by that power. It might, therefore, send its troops into South Vietnam as small, highly mobile, guerrilla units.⁶³ These troops could enter the south all along the extensive, jungle-covered western Vietnamese border.⁶⁴ The United States would still face an essentially guerrilla war, but on a vastly expanded scale. The accepted and well-publicized formula that it takes 10 regular troops to counter each guerrilla would still apply; thus for each 100,000 men the Vietnamese introduced we would have to commit 1 million. The American public has hardly been prepared for such a high cost in American lives and material as would be entailed in an effort of this magnitude. Nor is it realistic to expect that, without some indication that this effort would yield results commensurate with such sacrifice, the American public could be brought to support it.

During this phase of the fighting, China's armies could be expected to remain out of the conflict,⁶⁵ though Peiping would presumably continue to supply heavy equipment, a few technicians, and possibly some volunteers. But China is not likely to provide us with such clear invitation to attack her as would be given by her massive intervention in Vietnam. By remaining behind her frontiers and restricting herself to providing primarily moral support to Hanoi, China could gain tremendous political and psychological advantages from continued U.S. attacks on the Vietnamese (although she would no doubt be uneasy about the possibility of American escalation spilling across her frontiers).

Despite the care the Peiping leadership has taken in Vietnam to do nothing which might invite an American attack on the Chinese mainland, the United States may still choose to enlarge its theater of operations to include China.⁶⁶ A decision to do this would probably derive in part from the belief discussed above that Peiping controls Hanoi. In addition, however, there is a not

⁶³ In the week following the first American raids on the north, Nhan-Dan provided some clues to a future North Vietnamese strategy. On Feb. 13 it said: "By launching 10 battles at the same time on various battlefields and simultaneously promoting all-sided guerrilla activities, the South Vietnam People's armed forces have shown their maturity in all fields, command, tactics, and technique. * * * During the recent big battles, they have also cleverly and creatively applied the fighting tactics, striking the enemy where and when he was least prepared and by methods which are most unexpected to them."

⁶⁴ Given the possibility of encountering massive American firepower, it could not, of course, be expected that North Vietnam would launch a massive frontal assault across the 17th parallel.

⁶⁵ Mao Tse-tung told Edgar Snow, before the February air strikes, that "China's armies would not go beyond her borders to fight. * * * Only if the United States attacked China would the Chinese fight." Mao added that "The Vietnamese could cope with their [own] situation" (the New Republic [Feb. 27] 1965, p. 22). Subsequently China has modified its position; see (67) below.

⁶⁶ An official Chinese Government statement of Mar. 12, 1965, commented on remarks in the U.S. press that China would not be allowed to remain a sanctuary, as it did in the Korean war. It added: "In plain language, this means it [the United States] would bomb China" (Radio Peiping, Mar. 13, 1965).

insignificant group in America that feels that a war with China is inevitable and should be waged soon, before China grows stronger and attains a real nuclear capacity.

But once we attack China—even without nuclear weapons—the whole context of the American effort in Vietnam would be drastically altered. China would retaliate, and she has explicitly said that she would not confine herself to the areas of conflict in which the United States is presently engaged. On February 9, 1965, for example, the Chinese Government declared: "We warn U.S. imperialism: You are overreaching yourselves in trying to extend the war with your small forces in Indochina, southeast Asia, and the Far East. To be frank, we are waiting for you in battle array."⁶⁷ The Chinese have repeated this threat to engage our "small forces" on a vast front in "Indochina, southeast Asia, and the Far East," and have carefully elaborated the "dire consequences" that would befall the U.S. forces involved.⁶⁸

There are at least 10 million people in China who are ethnically akin to the Thai, Lao, and Vietnamese. We could expect that China would use these people—as regular army troops or volunteers—in a greatly expanded guerrilla war in the jungles of southeast Asia. Such a war would not require massive Chinese logistical support and would minimize the vulnerability of Chinese forces to American air and sea attack. It would also present the United States with vastly greater difficulties than those it now faces in South Vietnam. The possibility that China would use these minority peoples has been suggested by the intensive militia campaigns conducted with particular fervor in 1964 in Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung—all Provinces which border southeast Asian states.

The Chinese believe that the United States could not win this type of war and that thereby the credibility of American power would be destroyed in southeast Asia.⁶⁹ As the Chinese probably envisage it, the war

⁶⁷ See Jen-min jih-pao, Feb. 9, 1965. Similar warnings were given during the subsequent 8 weeks. On Mar. 25, China and Russia both threatened to aid the Vietcong if the NLF so requested (Jen-min jih-pao, Mar. 25, 1965). These threats were made in response to a statement issued by Liberation Radio (Vietcong) on Mar. 23, that: "If the U.S. imperialists continue to send their troops and the troops of their satellites into South Vietnam or to expand the war to the North and Laos, the NLFV will call on the world peoples to send troops."

Peiping's threat to retaliate in Vietnam has been more direct and unambiguous than the one it made prior to entering the Korean war in 1950. Allen S. Whiting has observed, however, that "the problem of communicating a threat is formidable, and in the context of the Korean war it was especially difficult" (Whiting, "China Crosses the Yalu" [New York, 1960], p. 109).

In the present crisis, Peiping has moved with great caution, as it did in 1950; but it has also attempted to strengthen the credibility of its threat to aid Vietnam by recalling its intervention in Korea. For example, radio Peiping, Feb. 13, 1965, warned: "Your hope lies in making people afraid of you. But you [Americans] will become utterly helpless when the people resisting aggression, instead of being afraid of you, dare to fight, defy difficulties, and advance wave upon wave. You have been taught a lesson on this score in the Korean war. Do you want to have the lesson repeated in Indochina?"

⁶⁸ This was part of a thinly veiled Chinese effort to threaten the Philippines, Thailand, and the entire Indochinese peninsula. See in particular the broadcast of radio Peiping on Feb. 4, 1965, on the Thai patriotic front, and the Jen-min jih-pao article of Jan. 27, 1965, on the Philippines.

⁶⁹ See Jen-min jih-pao, Feb. 19, 1965.

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for continental southeast Asia would not duplicate that of Korea, where their troops, confined to a narrow peninsula, were subject to the risk of annihilation by American sea and air strikes and where most of the local population was hostile to them. China could be expected to mount offensives simultaneously at many points along a thousand-mile front. American military units attempting to cope with these forces in jungle terrain could neither gain a decisive victory nor compel them to withdraw.

Once again, the 10 to 1 ratio applicable to guerrilla war would hold. Substantially larger American forces would have to be committed for this war than for a war against the North Vietnamese alone. And it is even more doubtful that the American public would support an operation on this scale; once again Washington would lack clear-cut objectives and any likelihood of an outcome favorable to American interests would seem remote.

Given the unpredictable and possibly disastrous consequences of a nuclear bombardment of China, the United States would be unlikely to resort to this level of escalation. However, the possibility of nonnuclear attack cannot be ruled out. This could presumably achieve the destruction of China's industry, and even her major cities. But the United States would be totally unprepared to undertake the gigantic ground operation which would then be required. It would still confront China's main armies.

(NOTE.—The authors wish to acknowledge the help of Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, E. Sean Brady, Herbert W. Briggs, Daniel S. Lev, Myron Rush, and others who read drafts of this paper and made valuable suggestions. For the opinions expressed here, however, the authors are solely responsible.)

MISHAWAKA, IND.,
May 6, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR: The enclosed front page section and editorial, both appearing in the May 5 South Bend Tribune, struck me as warranting your attention.

The Tribune, previous to this issue, has been in full accord with the foreign policy of the Johnson administration, editorially and otherwise.

In this case, however, the choice of the lead article by W. R. Fry, unprecedented appearance (in the Tribune at least) of Senator MORSE in print on page 1, far from friendly editorial job; indicate an unmistakable departure in the Tribune's philosophy.

While one newspaper doesn't constitute a trend, I believe that it will not be an isolated incident.

There is a point beyond which patriotism degenerates into blind allegiance. I have faith that the Senate, the press, and the public will make this distinction.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN D. MARSHALL.

[From the South Bend (Ind.) Tribune,
May 5, 1965]

YANKEES, COME HOME

We must assume that the Johnson administration is prepared to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that the revolt in the Dominican Republic was taken over by Communists, even though he has not yet done it publicly.

Otherwise, there can be no conceivable justification for sending U.S. troops into Santo Domingo's front lines to relieve the fighting forces of the junta which, a year and a half ago, deposed Juan Bosch, the duly elected President of the Republic.

No matter how good the President's case turns out to be, it will not completely neutralize the damage the Dominican venture has done to the United States throughout the hemisphere. In Latin eyes, the sight of North American troops wading ashore on a Caribbean island does not touch off calm

deliberation. It brings back emotional memories of the saddest chapters of inter-American relations, of U.S. intrusion in hemispheric affairs that constitutes the deepest roots of the Yankee-go-home syndrome in Latin America.

The situation was not helped by Washington's shift in reasons halfway through the Dominican operation. At first, it was said the marines were there only to protect the lives of Americans and other foreign nations. We might have had some success selling that explanation if our troops had carried out their job and quickly withdrawn.

Instead, the marines were soon assigned to do the junta's work. The President says it was either that or see the Dominican Republic go the way of Cuba.

As the President has reminded his critics, it is not easy to be under the gun, and Mr. Johnson was caught in a painful dilemma. To act was to incur the wrath of many Latin friends. Not to act, the President has assured us, was to allow a second Communist country in this hemisphere. There was little time to weigh alternatives.

Once committed, it became too late to weigh alternatives. What must now be considered is how to salvage what remains of our good relations in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. And the first thing that must be done is to get our troops off the island of Hispaniola as quickly as prudence allows.

Washington must not allow itself even to think in terms of an "occupation." Once major fighting has stopped and order can be restored in Santo Domingo, the marines must leave.

Let us hope that, even then, we will not have saved half an island from communism at the cost of a hemisphere.

[From the South Bend (Ind.) Tribune, May 5, 1965]

DIPLOMATIC PRICE FOR INTERVENTION MAY BE FORMIDABLE

(By William R. Frye)

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y.—The United States is paying a formidable diplomatic price for the intervention in the Dominican Republic, events here suggest. U.N. people friendly to Washington hope it will prove to have been worth the cost.

U.N. sources added up the initial damage as follows:

1. A formidable wave of popular and governmental indignation in Latin America.

Many Latins, perhaps not fully informed, resent what they see as a revival of the "gunboat diplomacy" of the early 20th century, when marines were sent periodically to Latin America to prop up friendly rulers of "banana republics" and oust unfriendly ones.

President Johnson's assertion of a right to intervene whenever the United States thinks a Latin country is going Communist tends, in their eyes, to buttress this fear. They do not fully trust America to exercise dispassionate judgment where Castroism is—or may be—involved.

MORSE CRITICIZES AMERICAN ACTIONS

SCHENECTADY, N.Y.—Senator WAYNE MORSE, Democrat, of Oregon, yesterday criticized U.S. actions in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic and called for settlement of both disputes through the United Nations.

"I don't see how the United States can hope to set itself up as the policemen of the world and jump in whenever and wherever a revolution takes place," the Senator said at a news conference prior to an address at Union College here.

WISHART, SASKATCHEWAN, CANADA,

April 28, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: I just want to tell you how much I appreciate the decent stand that you are taking in regard to Vietnam. I am particu-

larly pleased that you gave our boot lickers in Ottawa a shellacking.

I hope that you can keep up this good work.

Yours truly,

J. MCPHAIL.

NEW CITY, N.Y.,

May 4, 1965.

Senator WAYNE B. MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Though I am not one of your constituents, I wish to tell you of my wholehearted support for your stands on both Vietnam and the situation in the Dominican Republic.

Your voice in this debate seems to be one of the few sounds of sanity in this country in general and in Washington in particular. I do wish that either you, or someone else if not you, would make an issue of the way in which the President is using the powers of the Executive to wage war and raise money to do so without a declaration of war from the Congress or the expressed wish of the electorate to become involved in war.

I wish to tell you also that you have the support of all the members of my family and all of my friends. We are behind you and urge you to redouble your efforts to bring back sanity and good sense to American foreign policy.

Very truly yours,

SOL STEMBER.

MAY 1, 1965.

HON. LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I just cannot remain silent. Complaints and appeals about U.S. foreign policy are almost a refrain.

Pope Paul begged leaders to hear mankind's desire for peace; for conversations and negotiations at all levels to avert the threat of war. Also he said "Today, as if no lesson had been learned from the tragic experiences of the two world conflicts, we have the dreadful spectacle in certain parts of the world." He is right.

United States landing in the Dominican Republic aroused criticism and bitter memories among Latin Americans—as in Chile, Venezuela, Argentina and Mexico. Seems we violated rules we ourselves made.

Mr. Lippmann, a top journalist-thinker, and Ralph McGill, and a host of renowned scientists, clergymen and journalists are a part of that huge body of Americans who do not want you to do for the United States what Governor Wallace is doing for Alabama.

Our colossally expensive nonintervention on two continents has led to a joint French-Soviet statement concerning "recent events" in Vietnam and the Geneva agreements of 1954. Mr. President, must U.S. behavior force a wedding of the power and influence of France, Russia, and China—three nuclear powers and so very much manpower?

This is Law Day. The Golden Rule if paraphrased might read: "Let us do unto foreigners on their soil as we say we want our Mississippians and Alabamians to do unto their fellow citizens of color."

And Senator WAYNE MORSE can't be all wrong.

Sincerely, for friendship and peace.

HARVEY G. BAKER.

DAYTONA BEACH, FLA.

[From the Daytona Beach (Fla.) Morning Journal, May 1, 1965]

IT'S LAW DAY, U.S.A.

One can observe the day this is only with a sense of sadness as he looks out across the world as it really exists in 1965. May 1 is Law Day, U.S.A., the U.S. answer to the Communist May Day.

We observe Law Day at the instigation of the American Bar Association to say to

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the world that we believe law should rule the affairs of men, not might; that we believe disputes should be settled in the courts, not by men shooting each other.

But Thursday, a 19-year-old American marine shot a man in the back in South Vietnam—an unarmed man who was fleeing for safety. The marine shot him because, in the "law" of war, a man doesn't run when he is challenged.

And in this same area of the world on the same day, 51 U.S. Skyraiders and Skyhawks rained bombs on North Vietnam in 1 raid, destroying 15 buildings which probably were not empty of people.

On Thursday too, we landed more troops in the Dominican Republic as that unstable nation once again was rocked with turmoil. The troops are there, we maintain, to protect U.S. citizens on the island, but in fact they are there in the hopes that it will discourage the new revolt that finally erupted following the coup which toppled the nation's only elected President in 30 years.

We're a long way yet from establishing a rule of law for the world as we follow the course of containing communism with the force of arms. Because communism still resorts to terrorist tactics, we must punish it militarily. Because it engineers coups, we must intervene with our marines.

There is a great debate going on in our country over whether this is the course we should take, and how far we can extend ourselves in doing it. The young are protesting angrily over Vietnam, marching on the White House in demonstration against Vietnam. The older, and surely wiser, heads around President Johnson are insisting that we can't deviate from the course, else it would encourage the terrorists to the point that they could rule the world.

There are those who say we should quit Vietnam and there are those who "pray" (Barry Goldwater) for an excuse to bomb Red China.

There are those who say we should fight actively the Communists in Santo Domingo, and there are those who warn us that rightists have been armed by those sympathetic to the late Dictator Trujillo and to "Pappa Doc" Duvalier on Haiti, the iron man of the Caribbean.

The truth, surely, lies somewhere in between.

The truth is that, in some way, we should be moving toward establishing the rule of international law to handle these explosions.

We do it at home. Rightists terrorists in the United States have their guns impounded, and if they have committed a crime, they are brought into court.

Communists are prevented by law from overthrowing this Government by force, and they are brought to trial for fomenting riots.

The extremists on either side are checkmated by a body of law geared to protecting human rights.

These laws are upgraded by Congress to meet new situations and new realizations of need, and American liberty to enjoy life is enhanced. We do not need any foreign power to come in and help us protect our freedom.

But, as the Wayne Morses of the Senate contend, we surely can't police the world's right to freedom alone. We know, anyway, that freedom can't be maintained by force of arms alone, for force breeds counterforce.

We protected freedom in Korea, but it is not free. Students toppled our puppet government there, and they still sack our libraries in angry demonstration over having a divided country. Night still holds back the dawn of freedom in South Vietnam after years of our efforts there.

Maybe all of this failure can be laid at the door of communism. Or maybe it can be laid at the door of another failure.

Communism is in a state of evolution in Eastern Europe. The originator of this false

idea, Russia, is beginning to understand the industrial era, and that if it is to have a part in it, there must be incentive for the people. So, under Khrushchev and still more under Kossygin, the Russians are practicing the profit system. Not quite as we do, but they have learned the mistake of ordered planning with no incentive for the planners.

And the people of Russia are no longer fearful of this nighttime bang on the door; no longer afraid to look an American in the eye. They no longer starve; no longer grovel in ignorance.

So the failure, we might say, is in not taking advantage of this change to persuade the Russians, earnestly, to help us establish a real rule of law for the world. We should have made it clear to this other nuclear power that our interest is in controlling all of the world's extremists through law, not force.

We should have demonstrated our sincerity in this respect by scrapping the reservation we have affixed to the U.N. Charter which excuses us from responsibility among the nations when we want to be excused. We should have backed wholeheartedly the international effort to establish a workable code of international law, and insisted that it be administered by the International Court of Justice. We should have insisted that individuals, in and out of all governments, be held responsible to that Court for infractions of law governing the rights of nations.

This is what Law Day, U.S.A., should be about. It should symbolize both our efforts to prevent such tragedies as a 19-year-old youth having to shoot a defenseless man in the back in obedience to the "law" of war.

It's said to contemplate on this day that we have failed thus far in establishing Law Day, the world.

ARDMORE, PA.,

May 5, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: My husband and I have long admired your independence and courage, never more than last August in your stand against this carte blanche approval the Senate gave President Johnson on Vietnam. Consequently, I write to you now to support your position on Vietnam, and to urge that you continue your efforts to change our policy. As Hans Morgenthau points out in the May 1 issue of the New Republic, our policy is forcing Russia to support China, and is seriously damaging the chances for peaceful coexistence.

What we read about the nature of the war, in the New York Times, the New Republic, I. F. Stone's Weekly, and the New Statesman, compared with the State Department's concept of it, makes us wonder, among other things, what is happening to democracy in our country. Clearly there is little left, that an individual citizen can do, but perhaps Senators still can carry some weight. We read yesterday that you and Senators FULBRIGHT, CHURCH, and CLARK are considering some action, and we urge you to take it. Particularly we urge you to vote against the President's request for more money.

Beyond that we urge the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, as worse than useless, and more than criminal.

Yours with admiration and respect,

FAITH H. PATTEN.

MAY 4, 1965.

Hon. Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: This letter is to commend you for speaking out and against the intervention of our Armed Forces in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic and the increasing amount of troops being sent to Vietnam and the bombings taking place there daily.

I don't understand enough about the pol-

icy in Vietnam; the people evidently do not support the regime, else why should there be so many changes as have taken place in the past year. Our first people were sent over as military advisers; now we are engaged in more or less a full-scale war and when will it stop? The Evening Star has an article by Doris Fleeson which probably expresses the thoughts of many people like myself far better than I could write it.

May you long continue to be the voice of sanity and clear thinking in the Senate. This we need in order to preserve our freedom.

Respectfully,

GREENBELT, MD.

SAMUEL JACOBS.

LYONS, KANS.,
May 4, 1965.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. MORSE: I wish to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for your fearless stand in denouncing U.S. participation in the Vietnam war.

I have written letters favoring U.S. withdrawal to President Johnson and to Senators CARLSON and PEARSON, of Kansas. I regret to state that none of these appear interested in ending this bloodshed.

It appears that the militarists of our country are in control of the Government. I feel this is a very dangerous situation and could likely end in disaster. Someone has stated that the United States has the power to destroy the world but not to conquer it.

I do hope you continue to have the courage to speak out fearlessly against those who entertain the idea that world problems can be solved by military might, destruction and bloodshed.

Respectfully yours,

C. A. PINKENBURG, D.C.

ATHENS, OHIO,
May 2, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I was very much impressed by the content of the speech which you delivered at Ohio University during the course of the mock United Nations. I hope that you will continue to strive for a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Vietnam, and I volunteer my services to you in any way which can be helpful.

Sincerely,

PAUL D. BRANDES,
Professor of Speech.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
May 4, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Just a word of appreciation from citizens who feel as you do about our Government's policies in Vietnam and now on Santo Domingo.

In addition to good judgment, your courage is to be commended.

Very truly yours,

Mr. and Mrs. STANLEY ROMAINE.

PLEASANTVILLE, N.Y.,

May 5, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Your courageous opposition to the American involvement in the Vietnam war is to be commended.

I only hope that soon you will be joined by more Senators in your fight for withdrawal.

I also wish that your important words would be published in full and in the most popularly consumed magazines so that the almost apathetic American public will begin to think, and those who are committed to President Johnson's policy will begin to question.

I am also concerned about our troops in the Dominican Republic. I hope you speak out about this.

Sincerely yours,

Mrs. E. KLEIN.

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May 7, 1965

BETHESDA, Md.,
May 4, 1965.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: In the field of foreign affairs, yours is one of the very few sane voices being heard in official Washington these days. Please continue to speak out. In the deepening gloom of administration Asian and Caribbean policies, many Americans are grateful for the beacon you are providing.

Yours truly,

DAVID SAVITZ, M.D.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS., May 5, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I wish to congratulate you on your forthright criticism of the administration's policy in Vietnam and now, also in the Dominican Republic. I hope you will continue to speak your mind.

The administration has embarked on a most dangerous course and with very little justification.

Sincerely yours,

RUTH WALD.

WALTHAM, MASS., May 4, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: This letter is being written to express my full support of your Vietnam and Dominican Republic positions. I am one of the overwhelming majority of faculty members and students in this area, who are shocked by the recent turn of events. I only hope that something can be done before it is too late.

Sincerely yours,

RONALD J. BAUMGARTEN, Ph. D.

ARLINGTON, VA.,
May 5, 1965.Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I am enclosing a copy of a letter I have today sent to the President on the subject of Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.

At the same time, I want to commend you for your unflagging efforts in behalf of world peace. You have many admirers who are not going to take the time to write you but I think you know that they are behind you all the way in your attempt to give thoughtful and responsible leadership. Keep up the good work.

Sincerely yours,

MILLIE HEDRICK.

ARLINGTON, VA.,
May 5, 1965.Hon. LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR Mr. PRESIDENT: When I voted for you in 1964, I did so because I believed you were sincerely for peace, and Senator Goldwater had made it abundantly clear that he was not. At the same time, many of us hoped that your election would serve notice on the followers of Senator Goldwater that the great majority of the American people was fed up with McCarthyism and the blight it cast over our Nation for so many years.

I have read your most recent statements on Vietnam and the situation in the Dominican Republic with some care and have concluded that your decision to accelerate the war in Vietnam is worthy of Senator Goldwater. Further, mixing into the affairs of the Dominicans "to stop a Communist conspiracy" sounds just like McCarthyism, even to playing the despicable numbers game—but on an international scale. How, then, does your position differ from Senator Goldwater's or the late Senator McCarthy's?

I do not like to criticize the President of the United States, especially one who had my enthusiastic support. But also I am utterly opposed to a national policy of global McCarthyism. I support Senator WAYNE MORSE's position on Vietnam and oppose American aggression in the Dominican Republic. (I am sending Senator Morse a copy of this letter.)

Mr. President, we have a war to fight here at home—the war on poverty and ugliness—and for that kind of war you, and your dear lady, have my utmost support.

Respectfully yours,

MRS. MILLIE HEDRICK.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
May 6, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: How many people will we have to kill before we make the world safe for democracy?

We need negotiations not Marines.

Please keep up your fight for a more sane foreign policy.

Yours truly,

MRS. J. DELL.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.,
May 5, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Congratulations on your firm, democratic stand.

May your reasoning on the cease-fire in Vietnam, our removal of our Marines from the Dominican Republic, and all your valid steps toward a true peace in the world, come to fruition.

Let's stop giving more and more money for armaments, and start to help people everywhere to live, through aid to the U.N.

The Goldwater philosophy that our present Government seems to have adopted is most frightening. Those of us who worked so hard to defeat Senator Goldwater are wondering and are confused these days. Can't we get our President back to his thinking a la his domestic program and expand it to the world scene?

May you continue to work ever more successfully for peace, along with our Senator CLARK, and others like you.

Respectfully yours,

MRS. FRANCES K. RUBIN.

URBANA, ILL.,
May 6, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Permit me to applaud and support your position on the war in Vietnam. I admire your courage and your analysis of the situation.

Sincerely,

ROBERT CARROLL,
Associate Professor of Mathematics,
University of Illinois.LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
May 4, 1965.Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: Keep up your speeches against the war in Vietnam. I feel that you are speaking not only for the people of Oregon, but for the people of California and the whole United States. We must not have another Korea, or even worse, a World War III because of the inability of the U.S. Government to admit to its past mistakes and change course.

Sincerely,

FRANK LINDENFELD.

CHICAGO, ILL.,
May 4, 1965.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: It is amazing that the popularity and poll conscious President has paid no heed to the most important and most accurate poll, the election of November 3, 1964.

Doesn't he realize that if the people wanted an escalation of the needless war in Vietnam they would have elected Senator Barry Goldwater as their President?

Wish we had more Members of Congress who had your backbone and courage.

Yours truly,

HENRY S. KAPLINSKI.

HAZARD, KY.,
May 4, 1965.Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: Just as an old fashioned American, I want to commend you for having nerve enough to come out in the open and tell the public what you think about South Vietnam.

As I understand it the Congress alone has the power to declare war. This has not been done by the Congress, yet we are in a war in South Vietnam by Executive action. We have also gone into Santo Domingo with more troops than are necessary.

I think the sooner we abandon the idea that we have a right to dictate to other nations the kind of government they ought to have, it will be better for us.

But aside from this the man on the street, on the farm and everywhere knows that if the present trend of Government spending and Government interference with the affairs of other nations continue, that it will be just a matter of time when we will close our own present form of government and go socialistic or communistic.

So far as I am concerned personally, since I am 79 years old, it does not mean so much to me, but it means a lot to my children and grandchildren.

Again I want to commend you.

Respectfully yours,

S. M. WARD.

TROY, N.Y.,
May 6, 1965.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Thank you for your excellent speech at Union College on May 4, 1965. Please continue your sane policy on Near Eastern affairs and do what you can to persuade others to join before it is too late.

Mrs. NED FREUND.

ANGOLA, IND.,
May 4, 1965.Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I congratulate you on your strong stand in your Senate address of last Monday blasting our Vietnam policy—and calling for the resignations of McNamara and Rusk.

Our Government seems to have forgotten the word "sovereignty." Each nation should have sovereignty—to decide what kind of government they want, even if that be communism. If we have made perpetual war against communism we have a long, bloody, and losing fight ahead of us.

Communism is not a cause. It is a result of poverty, inequality, oppression, ignorance. The more people waste in war, the more poverty and hence cause for communism.

If we really want to get rid of communism, we should find a road to peace—then slowly but surely build a more prosperous world. This is the one and only safeguard against communism.

I have a feeling that most of the have-not nations will go through a stage of communism until they find some measure of prosperity, then they will turn slowly to a free enterprise system—as Russia is now doing.

We are doing the same thing in Santo Domingo—trying to dominate their Government. The radio just stated that President Johnson was asking for \$700 million for mili-

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tary purposes. I hope it meets with a strong fight.

Again, congratulations. Keep up the fight.
A. H. SHOLTY,
Officer in the Intelligence Corps, World War II.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
May 4, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I have such great admiration for you that I can't express it.

I am truly dismayed by our Government's criminal policy in foreign affairs.

Is there anything ordinary people can do? I've written to President Johnson very strongly stating my beliefs—and to HUBERT HUMPHREY—and the California Senators. I've sent Western Union's POM's by the dozen. All this seems to be futile.

Most Americans do not support this trumped-up war in Vietnam—and lots of us are ashamed of the United States. And yet, like it or not, the war continues and grows.

Is there anything that could be done to help to get us out of Vietnam where we have no business to be?

I wish we could have a man like you for President—I'm sure this also is too much to hope for.

If I can do any good, any way, let me know.

Respectfully,

Mrs. EVE BYRON WYATT.

STAMFORD, CONN.,
May 6, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: God bless you. May you function as a Senator until you are 110. I only wish I had the privilege of voting for you.

As a liberal Democrat I have always been proud that as a whole our party has cared for the common man. What is happening to our Government? Where is the Senate and the House? Our President is operating the country like a one-man show in the area of foreign relations—it is not quite wartime yet. Sometimes I worry that the Republicans will espouse the cause of peace but they are probably too stupid.

If I were a woman I would cry nights about our foreign policy. As you know the inspiration for the freedom of the Latin American countries came from the examples set by us and France. Why is it that over the whole course of history we have never sided with the common man down there? All the most rotten dictators (no matter how much he has abridged individual rights under law) down there has to say is "We hate Commies" or "Commies are behind the plot" and we load him up with money, guns, and anything else. Historically the percentage of Commies in Latin America is nil. But at the rate our Government is going we will breed them down there faster than fleas.

Our history in South Vietnam is just as bad, but this letter is long enough.

Let's get out of Latin America and South Vietnam now.

You and the few that side with you in Congress have a lonely fight. I am sure you and your small group are being pressured to conform with the sick honey being spread around by administration aides to justify our unjustifiable foreign policy.

Don't weaken! Don't give up the fight! Don't let anybody muzzle you!

Yours truly,

CHARLES W. STOBIE.

SCOTTSDALE, ARIZ.,
May 5, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: We live in a metropolitan area served by only one Goldwater

Republican newspaper, the Arizona Republic. Therefore, little, if any, coverage is given the minority opinions in Congress on such disasters as Vietnam and our present incredible national policy in Latin America.

From brief news broadcasts on the networks, I gather you are once again one of the few with courage and wisdom enough to question the administration's actions.

We can't vote for you, of course, but I want to let you know we are grateful for your being in the U.S. Senate. Please do what you can to tell your colleagues our present recklessness will do more to further international communism than almost anything we could do.

Sincerely,

Mrs. E. J. LAETZ.

RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE,
Troy, N.Y., May 5, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Please know that there are many who are anti-Communists and who nonetheless applaud your great courage in criticizing the astonishingly brutal foreign policy of our President.

Sincerely,

ISADORE TRASCHEN.

DOWNEY, CALIF.,
May 5, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Attached is a copy of a letter to the Secretary of State proposing a course of conduct by the United States in South Vietnam. I do not purport to be any sort of an expert on the problems there. But it seems to me that we are hopelessly engaged there in what could easily become, at the least, a major disaster, and, at the worst, a world holocaust.

The proposal would have the effect, I would hope, of stabilizing the South Vietnam military, political, economic, and social situation. If it did not achieve this, it would allow the United States to withdraw under honorable circumstances.

A letter similar to this is going to several of your colleagues. Your consideration is appreciated.

Very truly yours,

PAUL COOKSEY,
Attorney at Law.

DOWNEY, CALIF.,
May 5, 1965.

HON. DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State, State Department,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The purpose of this letter is to propose a course of action with respect to South Vietnam that would have the following objectives:

1. Limit the duration of American military participation and assistance.
2. Disengage American prestige now committed in South Vietnam.
3. Forestall the entry of China and Russia into the conflict.
4. Promote economic, social and political reforms in South Vietnam.
5. Promote a viable, stable political government in South Vietnam.

The proposal is that the United States announce that it will continue all military assistance to South Vietnam for 1 more year ending July 1, 1966, but will discontinue all military assistance after that date as quickly as it can be withdrawn.

The 1-year commitment is conditional, however, as follows:

- (a) That there will be no land invasion north of the 17th parallel.
- (b) That certain economic reforms, principally dealing with the ownership and distribution of land, be initiated in South Vietnam.

- (c) That political equality be established.
- (d) That a stable political government be formed and further military coups be abandoned.

If these conditions are met, then the United States would further commit itself to a program of substantial economic assistance to South Vietnam in order to help its economic development and maintain its political stability.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your consideration of this proposal.

Very truly yours,

PAUL COOKSEY,
Attorney at Law.

CONCORD, CALIF.,
May 4, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: We urge you to refuse the unneeded extra defense appropriation President Johnson is demanding as a proof of congressional loyalty.

We are appalled at America's nakedly aggressive policies in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic. We utterly reject the cynical excuses of the administration. Liberty is not defended by supporting oppressive governments; communism is not defeated by brutally crushing a rebellion sparked by genuine grievances. And self-determination either means exactly that or nothing at all.

At home Mr. Johnson has been ruthlessly gutting the democratic process. Honest reporters, concerned citizens, and a few courageous and outspoken Senators such as yourself have all been made to seem disloyal. When will the witch hunt begin?

Thank you for your magnificent stand in the face of enormous executive pressure.

Sincerely,

Mr. and Mrs. RAYMOND D. GILBERT.

PAINESVILLE, OHIO,
April 4, 1965.

HON. WAYNE MORSE:

DEAR SENATOR: I wish to let you know that I am just one of thousands—yes, millions—who agrees 100 percent with your gallant, courageous, and loyal effort by trying to save America's prestige, good name, and sovereignty which we once possessed but unfortunately lost by now, by our foolish behavior. The whole world is mad at us. I hate to see the day when the whole world gangs on us and knocks the stuffing out of us.

More power to you, and God bless your good work.

Sincerely yours,

MATT HRIBAR.

BOULDER, COLO.,
May 3, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I would like to thank you for your forthright and courageous position for calling publicly for a moratorium on the bombing of North Vietnam and for greater efforts towards negotiations. It seems clear that this is the overwhelming sentiment of all Americans, and it is to express this view that the original of the enclosed photocopied letter was sent to President Johnson by a large number of extremely active members of the Democratic party in Boulder County, Colo. We are sending this to you to indicate the kind of support your stand has obtained; you will notice, for example, that there are many precinct committee men and women, as well as three members of the Colorado Democratic State central committee, among the signatories.

I believe that you and other Members of the Senate are in a position of crucial im-

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portance in the days ahead, and we all look to you to do everything in your power to effect a change in the direction of our foreign policy before it is too late.

Respectfully yours,

Mrs. LESLIE FISHMAN.

APRIL 21, 1965.

President LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As active Democratic precinct captains, block workers, and independent Republicans who worked enthusiastically for you during many long hours of the 1964 campaign, we would like to express our deep concern regarding your Vietnam policy, which seems to us not only to be morally wrong, but, politically, to be sheer suicide for the Democratic Party.

Boulder County, Colo., is normally a Republican county, and yet a clear victory went to you in November. It is our strong belief, based on hundreds of conversations while ringing doorbells and doing precinct work, that the many independents and Republicans who voted for you did so because of the fear of Barry Goldwater as a trigger-happy candidate who intended to defoliate the jungles, bomb the villages, and generally extend the war in Vietnam and even beyond.

The statement of one elderly Republican widow, who lives alone in a modest frame-house, is typical of the thoughts of most Americans at the time of the election. When approached by the Democratic block worker, she said: "I am a lifelong Republican, but I will never vote for Goldwater, and I don't see how any American mother could. I have grown children and small grandchildren, and I don't want us to get into another war. Goldwater, would get us in, but President Johnson will keep us out."

Mr. President, the sentiment of the millions of Americans who gave you the vast majority of votes in November has not changed. The war in Vietnam is the most unpopular war in American history, for the American people know that it is wrong. It is even more unpopular than the Korean war, and it was the promise to settle that one which elected Dwight Eisenhower in 1952.

It becomes increasingly hard for us to look squarely at our friends and neighbors whom we had told in November: "The Democrats are not the war party." It will be impossible, ever again, to convince the electorate of this fact, if the bombings and the acceleration of the war are not stopped immediately, and if some basis for negotiations is not found.

We are convinced that your astute and wise thinking can bypass conventional diplomacy, as represented by the many men in the State Department who have been committed for too long to a Dulles' policy, and that you personally can find an imaginative and honorable way to peace in Vietnam.

Respectfully yours,

Ann F. Johnson, Precinct Committeewoman; Victoria Ruwitch, Committeewoman 15th Precinct; Richard C. Johnson, County State Delegate; Jerrold H. Krenz, Block Worker; Carl Uebelohde, Committeeman, 15th Precinct; Mary Uebelohde, Secretary, Second Congressional District Convention; Philip A. Danielson, Member, State Democratic Central Committee; Mildred P. Danielson, Committeewoman, 21st Precinct; Regina D. Wieder, Member, State Democratic Central Committee; Helen J. Wilson, Democratic Block Worker; Eleanor G. Crow, Delegate to Boulder County Democratic Convention; Edward Sampson, Jr., Block Worker, Boulder; June S. Sampson, Committeewoman, Boulder; Gordon W. Hewes, Registered Democrat; Minna W. Hewes, Registered Democrat; Beatrice Hoffman, Democratic Block Worker; Nancy C. Kraushar, Democratic Party Worker; Mary Jo Uphoff, Block Worker, Boulder;

Leslie Fishman, Delegate to Boulder County Democratic Convention; Malcolm Correll, Democratic Block Worker; E. Victor Traibush, First Alternate to State Democratic Convention, Boulder County; Jon Traibush, Delegate, County Convention; Jean Gillette, Ferris, Registered Republican; Lillian I. Fraser, Delegate, 1964 Convention Democratic Committeewoman; William E. Goding, Baptist Chaplain, University of Colorado; Denna Hersh Mersky, Block Worker, Boulder, Colo.; Betty Irene Lovelace, Office Manager Democratic Headquarters, Boulder, Colo.

Richard B. Wilson, Precinct Committeeman; Robin B. Bowler, Block Worker; Ned W. Bowler, Registered Democrat; Virginia Hammond, Block Worker; Annabelle Cook, Block Worker; Beverly Plank, Block Worker; Ruth Kunz, Block Worker; Eleanor Goldstein, Precinct Committeewoman; Mavis McKelvey, Louis Phillips Hudson, Ruth A. Loose, Joseph L. Sax, Eleanor G. Sax, Block Worker; Sorin L. Jacobs, Registered Democrat; Marian Martell, Registered Democrat; Lonnie Coddling, George A. Coddling, Jr., Registered Democrat, Coddling County Convention; J. W. Allen, Aldithe S. Allen, Block Worker; Clark W. Bouton, Phyllis Bouton, Prudence J. Scarritt, Block Worker; James R. Scarritt, Roland Reiss, Betty M. Reiss, Block Worker. Evelyn Rose, Block Worker, Precinct 2; Edward Rose, Democrat; Florence Becker Lennon, Registered Democrat; Gary W. Bickel, Democratic Precinct Worker and Convention Delegate; Ray W. Alsbury, Committeeman, 7th Precinct; A. Glenn Hedgecock, former Treasurer, Boulder County; Hardy Lon Frank, Cochairman, Boulder County Young Citizens for Johnson and Humphrey; Marlon Higman, Registered Democrat, 25 years; Sadie G. Walton, Registered Democrat; June P. Howard, Democratic Committeewoman, Boulder Precinct 14; John L. Murphy, Registered Democrat; John M. Major, Block Worker; Charles Milton, Committeeman, Boulder Precinct 26; Arlene P. McClung, Block Worker, Boulder, Colo.; Joan R. Rowland, Block Worker, Boulder, Colo.; Nancy B. Kitts, Democratic Precinct Committeewoman, Boulder 24; Janet Weir, Democratic State Central Committee; Walter Weir, Democrat; John M. Adams, Democrat, Party Worker; Louise V. Adams, Democratic Party Worker; Margaret B. Hanson, Committeewoman, Precinct B4; Jack H. Gore, County Organizational Chairman.

Lyn Taylor, Cochairman, Boulder County Young Citizens for Johnson and Humphrey; E. D. Fraker, direct to H. H. Humphrey; Dorothy Jay Thompson, Democratic Precinct Committeewoman, Precinct 20-B, Boulder; Christopher R. Brought, Precinct Committeeman, Treasurer, Young Citizens for Johnson; Mayor Brought; Margaret H. Stahl; Robert I. Low, Finance Chairman, Boulder County Central Committee; Rosemary T. Low, Registered Democrat, Club Worker; Harriet T. Moskovit, Republican for Johnson, Precinct Worker; Leonard Moskovit, Republican for Johnson; A. Frank Knotts, Democrat, Block Worker; Mrs. Frank Knotts, Democrat, Block Worker; Adrian D. Gibson, Independent; Eleanor P. Fishman, Democrat, Block Worker.

WAUKESHA, WIS., May 5, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: All I can say is bless you, you're an honest man. How I wish that there were a hundred more of you—or that a hundred more like you possessed your courage and determination. You've earned my

everlasting admiration and respect for your truthful discussion of U.S. policy regarding Vietnam and now, heaven help us, the Dominican Republic.

I sincerely hope that you get a million or more letters of encouragement, although I know the American public to be lazy and apathetic toward writing their views. Please don't give up—each time I pick up a newspaper and read about you speaking in Milwaukee or on the Senate floor, my hope is renewed. Many thanks.

Respectfully yours,

Mrs. DOROTHY BOXHOEN.

NEW YORK, N.Y., May 5, 1965.

Sen. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: You have won my warmest admiration for your heroic stand on the atrocious Vietnam adventure. I only regret that I am unable to add a vote to my admiration. Nonetheless, I urge your continued opposition to the war, and in particular to the President's staggering request for a new military appropriation.

Very truly yours,

STEPHEN KOCH.

COOS BAY, OREG.

DEAR WAYNE: We, the people, are back of you 100 percent; we listen to your every word.

We know we did vote for L.B.J., but we are sorry, for our President is a warmonger, and is not a man to be trusted; in fact he should be recalled, as well as a few others I could mention.

Please do not let the warmongers scare you but stick to your guns and give them hell, Truman style.

I know that for today a vote against L.B.J. war would win by a big majority by the common man of the United States.

President Johnson is setting a bad example to the American people by his breaking his promises, when he was running for election, and he knows it.

My wife and I are for you, WAYNE, as well as thousands of others.

I remain,

Sincerely,

EDWARD N. TAYLOR.

MOCO LIMITED,

Toronto, Ontario, May 4, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: If we survive this crisis your name will become one of the most hallowed in American history. You are entitled to and have my heartfelt thanks for your courage in standing above the pack and telling the truth.

You have helped me keep my self-respect. I have three young boys at home and find myself thinking of fathers in Vietnam, of gas, of napalm, of fire bombs, and I know that I am guilty, too. I am trying to do as much as I can but the ways for most of us to protest are so limited.

Thank you again for proving there is still some hope for America.

Yours very truly,

NORMAN M. KELLY.

DAYTONA BEACH, FLA.,

May 4, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: The arrogance of Secretary Rusk in criticizing the members of university faculties who have spoken out again his war-escalation policy in Vietnam is the voice of the dictator, not a trusted servant of the people in a democracy.

Enlightened public opinion is a necessary ingredient of a government of the people for the people, and by the people. It must

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be expressed and respected by the administration in administration decisions. The most enlightened opinion in American classes and categories is in the academic community. Who does Mr. Rusk think he is besides a guardian of the corporate interests of America, and beyond the reach of the people's influence?

We spend vast sums on higher education and then permit a corporate-minded man like Mr. Rusk to discredit the product. The books being written by the so-called intellectuals of the State Department at the public's expense, are largely propaganda.

The Senate is the branch of Government invested with the responsibility to declare war. We are in war which the Senate has not declared and only a handful of Senators have the understanding or guts to protest.

Sincerely,

JOSEPHINE GOMON.

MCMINNVILLE, OREG.,
May 1, 1965.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
Senator From Oregon,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Let me again thank you warmly for your courageous stand against the war in Vietnam. The conditions that the President lays down before he will negotiate demand that the opponents submit to him in advance. They will not do it. Therefore he is tying himself to a scorched earth policy and will gain the enmity of all Asia. Africa will ally themselves with Asia. And already the European nations are objecting. If we brush aside world opinion, we had better stop wasting our money on propaganda.

It is all such folly. Thank you for being not a follower but a leader.

Yours sincerely,

RICHARD B. GREGG.

COOS BAY, OREG.,
May 4, 1965.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: It is certainly true that we live in a most complex world and it becomes increasingly difficult to chart a course in it. As we attempt to chart our course the direction of our foreign policy becomes of dire importance.

One of our continued vexing problems is that of Vietnam. Your stand has been most courageous and perceptive. My wife and I and many of our friends support you whole heartedly.

The recent action of our country in the sending of troops to the Dominican Republic gives us great concern. The action of our country bears an uneasy semblance to the action of Russia in deciding on the type of government of the satellite countries. A fear of communism cannot cause us to violate the national sovereignty of other countries. Law and order and mutual respect can never be "second" to national interest.

Perhaps it is to the best interests of our nation and of the world if Congress would refuse to give the additional money to the military budget.

As you exercise your influence in the leadership of our country we pray God to continue to illumine and direct you.

Sincerely,

VOLUS W. McEACHERN.

SAN JOSE, CALIF.,
May 5, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: As a non-Oregonian I would like for you to know that I appreciate your stand on the Vietnam problem

and I'm behind you 100 percent. We are wrong there and we are, if possible, wronger in the Dominican Republic. I can't understand how a nation can condemn Soviet action in Hungary then turn right around and repeat that very action they condemn. It is becoming pretty hard to hold my head up and proudly say "I'm an American" today.

Sincerely,

JACK FIELDS.

P.S.—Enclosed is a picture clipped from the local paper. When I first saw this I couldn't help but recall a similar photograph I had seen of another man taken 25 years ago in Germany. He too thought that his way was always right.

FARMINGDALE, N.Y.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: You do not stand alone in your brave stand against the Vietnam war, which only continues because many people including the President, and his two war-hawks—McNamara, and Rusk—think that America is the only Nation that does right.

We college students know better. Although I may be speaking with ideals rather than realities in my mind, I think the time has come when America should allow every country—right or wrong, pro-American or anti-American—to decide for itself which type of government it wishes to live with. Too many times we blame the Commies for something we began.

ROBERT STANTON, JR.

MILWAUKIE, OREG.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: There are many things that make me proud to be an Oregonian. By far the most important of these is the statesmanship of our senior Senator.

My wife and I wish to express our complete support of your courageous and intelligent stands on the U.S. actions in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.

Very truly yours,

E. D. SCHAMP.

BRONXVILLE, N.Y.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Thanks for you, Raymond Brown, Robert Engler, Carl Resek, and Harvey Swados.

SARAH LAWRENCE COLLEGE.

MENLO PARK, CALIF.,
May 1, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Thank you for your many statements against our Government's policy in Vietnam. I hope you will continue to make these statements and not be silenced.

I heard you speak at Stanford University and was greatly impressed by your knowledge of the situation and by your sincerity. I agree with everything you say; may it influence the opinion of your colleagues and the public at large.

Sincerely yours,

VIVIAN K. BEDELL.

BELMONT, CALIF.,
April 30, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE.

DEAR SENATOR: We appreciate and admire your courageous stand against the shameful action of our Government in Vietnam.

I am sure that if there were a couple of dozen like you in the Senate, things could be much better.

Unfortunately few have the moral strength nowadays, the ability, willingness to consider our actions with a humanitarian point of view.

Yes, we go to church, at least many of us do, under a mantle of humble Christianity, but a closer look will reveal ugliness to the bottom of our souls, and hands dripping with blood.

Our President before the election gave us plenty of peaceful promises, and now look what he is doing. I wonder if Goldwater would have been any worse.

If there is a law for gangsters, why not applying in this case? This concerns not only our country, but the entire world.

Have we become the boss? The police of the globe? This is the best way to get the prestige indeed. What we need now is a rope to keep the world from going around.

Respectfully yours,

MARY LURRY.

ARDMORE, PA.,
May 3, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: My husband and I support your stand on Vietnam and urge you to continue your good work.

Sincerely yours,

FLORA K. GERBNER.

ST. LOUIS, MO.,
April 27, 1965.

DEAR SIR: The enclosed resolutions were passed overwhelmingly at a public meeting attended by more than 450 people at Sheldon Memorial in St. Louis, Mo., April 21, 1965. The meeting was sponsored by the St. Louis Committee for Peace in Vietnam, an ad hoc organization composed of representatives from the Americans for Democratic Action, Citizens for Liberal Action, the St. Louis Fellowship of Reconciliation, Public Affairs Committee of the Ethical Society, Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and the Student Peace Union.

We urge your careful consideration of these resolutions and that you use your most sagacious influence in helping to stop the dangerous escalation of the Vietnam war and work toward a peaceful solution.

Most sincerely yours,

ZELDA STRICKBERGER,
Mrs. Monroe Strickberger,
Chairman, St. Louis Committee for
Peace in Vietnam.

RESOLUTIONS FOR PRESENTATION TO THE ST. LOUIS RALLY FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM

Whereas the prevention of nationwide elections by the U.S.-backed Diem regime in violation of the Geneva agreement of 1954 contributed to the armed conflict which in the past 10 years has cost the lives of more than 70,000 Vietnamese and caused widespread devastation of Vietnamese property and territory;

Whereas North and South Vietnam are not two sovereign nations but are, according to the Geneva agreement, two zones of one sovereign nation;

Whereas the conflict in Vietnam is a civil war among South Vietnamese political factions;

Whereas the United States has continually supported a series of regimes neither selected nor supported by the people of South Vietnam;

Whereas the United States is the only foreign power actively engaged in this conflict;

Whereas military escalation of the conflict increases the danger of widening the war to involve regular North Vietnamese, Chinese, and Russian military forces and decreases the likelihood of negotiation;

Whereas the Secretary General of the United Nations, Pope Paul and other major religious leaders, several leading statesmen from allied nations, and a body of 17 unaligned nations, have urged convening a conference of all concerned powers;

May 7, 1965

We, participants in the St. Louis Rally for Peace in Vietnam, on April 21, 1965—

Do urge the U.S. Government to end the bombing of North Vietnam, and to agree to an immediate cease-fire by all forces;

Do urge the President of the United States to extend his agreement to enter into discussions so that all major South Vietnamese factions, including the Vietnamese National Liberation Front, will be directly represented;

Do urge the Congress of the United States, and each Senator and Representative individually, to consider seriously their constitutional responsibilities in relation to war, and to consider these in the light of the enormous destructiveness of modern nuclear weapons.

We do, further—

Congratulate the President of the United States for his offer of major economic aid to such multilateral projects as that of developing the Mekong Basin;

Congratulate those Senators who have had the moral and political courage to speak publicly in favor of peace in Vietnam, especially Senators CHURCH, GRUENING, McGOVERN and MORSE;

Congratulate the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, whose columnists and editors have presented a clear and objective picture of events in Vietnam;

And we do—

Recommend that individuals act with urgency to express by telegrams and letters to the President of the United States and to Members of Congress their support for these resolutions;

Recommend that individuals make every effort to keep themselves informed about events in southeast Asia;

Recommend that individuals join in the efforts of such organizations as the sponsors of this rally to continue to express their concern and convictions about such events (Americans for Democratic Action, Citizens for Liberal Action, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Public Affairs Committee of the Ethical Society, Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, United Campus Christian Fellowship, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom);

Recommend that individuals interested form an ad hoc organization specifically devoted to the achievement of the goals of this rally, a just and lasting peace in Vietnam.

AN OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON

We, residents of the Elgin area, commend your willingness to negotiate the Vietnam conflict. In the nuclear age, there can be no victory in the traditional sense—all armed conflicts must eventually end in negotiation.

To facilitate these negotiations, we urge that you consider a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam for a trial period, as suggested by Senator FULBRIGHT:

Harold R. Bare, Margaret Bare, Edith Barnes, John Bather, Wanda Bather, Lois E. Baumgartner, Leland H. Beery, Beverly Beu, Anne Booth, Douglas Booth, Loren Bowman, Dorothy E. Brown, Mrs. Dorothy Brown, Merle Brown, Ethel and Everett Brubaker, Eula P. Brumbaugh, John W. Brumbaugh, Paul Brumbaugh, Wilbur Brumbaugh, Robert L. Brunton, Edith Cantrell, Richard Cantrell, Florence Carpenter, Kenneth W. Clardy, Mary E. Cline, Glen E. Cluts, Richard Coffman.

Esther Craig, Ralph Custer, Fern Custer, Paul Dailey, Lillian E. Davis, Pauline Delk, Ralph M. Delk, Judith Doss, John Ecker, Paula Ecker, Blanche C. Ewing, Mr. and Mrs. Charles Flory, Mr. and Mrs. E. Gergen, Ronald Glenn, Mr. and Mrs. Fred Greenawalt, Robert Greiner, Eleanor R. Hardt, Olga Hardy, Arnold

Hartman, Clint Heckert, Mildred E. Heckert, Emerson L. Helman, Mrs. Elva Hevener, Jean Henley, Marilyn Henley.

Edward W. Henninger, Cedric C. Herrmann, Rebecca F. Herrmann, Elmer M. Hersch, Sudie O. Hersch, Cinda Hibschman, Richard Hibschman, Blossom Hicks, Vivian Hileman, Mrs. Helen Hillmer, Carrie Hoffman, Marie Hofstatter, Moritz Hofstatter, M.D., Grace Hollinger, Ruby D. Honert, Jerry Hoover, Jewel D. Howlett, L. Wayne Howlett, John P. Humphrey, Ruth O. Humphrey, Charlene Hunn, Mr. and Mrs. Ora Huston, Lois Johnson, Ryerson Johnson, Don R. Jordan, Ellen S. Jordan, Joyce Jordan, Nancy Keller, Hazel M. Kennedy, Russell N. Kerr, Winfield D. Knechel, Ruby Koehnke, Bernard Land, Larry Land, J. S. LaRue, Maud Lengel, Will E. Lengel, Nancy Long, Erzell V. Lynn, Isabel M. Lynn, Eugene Martin, Mrs. Ina Martin, K. E. McDowell, Eda B. Meyer, Carol C. Miller, Leon Miller, Elmer E. Miner, Elmer F. Moeller, Gwendolyn Moeller, Wilbur E. Mullen, Carl E. Myers, Irene W. Myers.

J. T. Nelson, Nancy Newcomer, Glen E. Norris, Lois D. Norris, W. L. Olwin, Hazel Peters, Norma Peterson, John Post, Helen Reish, J. Elbert Reish, Martin R. Rock, Frances Rolston, W. Wendell Rolston, Leona Z. Row, Harry Row, W. Harold Row, Donald E. Rowe, Howard E. Royer, Harl L. Russell, Hazel Russell, Sue Russell, Mrs. Fern Schauer, Linda D. Schroeder, Donald H. Shank.

Eileen S. Shank, Ruth Shriver, Merlin Shull, Mrs. Pearl Shull, Phi Silvius, Revie Slaubaugh, Mary B. Smeltzer, Ralph E. Smeltzer, Helen Smith, R. H. Smith, Mr. and Mrs. Nell A. Swartz, Donald Thomas, Erma Joyce Thomas, John Thomas, Mr. and Mrs. Joel K. Thompson, Robert Carl Tully, Mr. and Mrs. Bruce Turner, Diane Warnke, Elizabeth Weigle, Dana G. Whipple, Lee G. Whipple, Stann Whipple, Roy White, Doris L. Wilson, Leland Wilson, Jean V. Wissman, George G. Worthen, Wilbur Yohn.

This open letter paid for by the persons listed above—Ruth O. Humphrey, route 2, Elgin, Ill.

STELLA MARIS, MALIBU, CALIF.

March 18, 1965.

My DEAR SENATOR: Like most people I am deeply confused and concerned regarding Vietnam, and like some, I have a few nagging thoughts as to the validity of our entry into South Vietnam.

In a recent correspondence with Dr. Linus Pauling, he suggested I write to you to send me copies of your Senate speeches and other statements about the subject.

I would appreciate it very much if you would do so.

Sincerely yours,

MARY ASTOR.

BOULDER, COLO.,

May 4, 1965.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Just a note to express my heartfelt thanks to you for your courageous stand against President Johnson's policy in Vietnam. Every fiber in my being tells me that this policy is wrong—dead wrong, and that somehow it must be redirected before it is too late.

McCarthyism as applied to domestic affairs can at best destroy a country; as applied to world affairs, can destroy the whole world. It can destroy for keeps: Shakespeare, Beethoven, Jesus, Jefferson, Confucius, Emerson, and on and on. Somehow our country must

get out of this stupid ideological rut it is in and come up with some real answers to the terrible problems facing mankind.

I am 38 years old, and for just about as long as I can remember taking any note of public affairs, the personage of WAYNE MORSE has been on the scene. There are, I am sure, millions of us. Don't, for God's sake, let us down now.

Sincerely yours,

WESLEY V. SEARS.

QUITMAN, MISS.,

May 1, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I congratulate you on your stand with reference to South Vietnam.

Our being in South Vietnam is a mistake.

The commitment of troops to Vietnam shall be one of the most tragic mistakes in history, as I feel later historians will record.

With kindest personal regards I am,

Yours very truly,

BILLY E. HARRIS.

DENVILLE, N.J., April 30, 1965.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Since the McCarthy era I have admired your adherence to the principles of individualism professed but abandoned by your colleagues. On no issue has this independence been vital than in the Vietnamese war. As John Kenneth Galbraith hinted in the New York Times, the administration clings to its stupid, hopeless bombing policies not to save this Nation, but to save the reputations of blundering bureaucrats who, rather than admit they were wrong, are not magnifying their errors in the vain hope that more of a bad thing will somehow prove good. From Adlai Stevenson through moral mediocrities like Dean Rusk, the administration's yes men are pretending not to notice the odor. Thank you for demanding that we clean up the stench.

Very truly yours,

C. W. GRIFFIN, Jr.

PENNSYLVANIA LUMBER & POST CO., INC.,
La Vale, Md., May 3, 1965.

U.S. Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I agree with your attitude on Vietnam.

Yours very truly,

W. H. SOLOMON,

Treasurer.

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY,
DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH,
Washington, D.C., April 30, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.

SIR: May I commend you on your courage and perseverance in opposing our immoral and impractical policy in Vietnam.

May I implore that you do not slacken in your purpose nor in your energy. Yours is one of the few sane voices in the Government that makes itself heard on this issue.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK TURAJ, Instructor.

CHRISTIAN FAITH MINISTERIAL
ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Big Rapids Mich.

Senator MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I admire your star against this senseless war in Vietnam.

There is only one way to stop a war. That is for Congress to refuse to furnish the money to carry it on. The people of United States do not want this war.

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If Congress refuses to finance it it will die a natural death, and that will be that. Why should we lay all our boys on the altar to be butchered by war, when we do not own a foot of ground in Vietnam?

For whom is this war being fought? Certainly no common man stands to gain anything but death over there. Stop this war and put a new law on the books that no war can be declared or fought unless the people of the United States represented by the Congress in Washington give their consent, and unless the people are willing to finance it.

Cut our income taxes so the Government don't have so much money to throw away on moon flights and war on the whole world, and lets give the elderly people a decent home and a chance to give their property to their children, as the Bible plainly teaches.

Let's raise our voices against "murder incorporated" that's all war is, financed by the Duponts and we are the fools who suffer most.

Your sincerely,

Rev. J. BAKER.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,

April 22, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

You speak for hundreds of thousands of Americans in your warning against further escalation of war in Vietnam; your voice sorely needed in present tragic conflict; our heartfelt thanks go to you.

KAY BOYLE.

STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE AT BROCKPORT,
Brockport, N.Y., April 26, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Congratulations on your continuing fight to maintain free discussion of our foreign policy in the Senate. Our war in Vietnam is immoral and unintelligent. Might it not be called the policy of Henry Cabot Lodge, the jingoist son of a jingoist father?

May I humbly suggest, however, that in your continuing debate you accent more the unintelligence of our policy than its immorality; how we have wedded ourselves to an image in the Far East of a 20th century Metternich, defending the plutocratic inheritors of the ancient regime against all respectable movements toward national self-realization. In a sense have we not been imitating British 19th century policy in India, cementing our power by making deals with the maharajahs and nabobs? Isn't it true that the patriots of Vietnam who liberated their country from the French went north, leaving the south to the rich and titled natives of Saigon, who had prospered under the French?

Why do we do this and why do we continue to do this, not only in Vietnam but around the world? This fundamental question must be faced; it is the background question and Vietnam is only an incident.

Another fundamental element in our difficulties is that we are caught in a dilemma between two foreign policies: (1) coexistence with communism and (2) containment of communism. One way out of this dilemma is to return to the policy that preceded our entry into World War II, that is, a policy against imperialism, against Japanese unilateral conquest of the Far East and German and Italian ditto of Europe.

Where the Communists are Imperialistic we must check them. On the other hand, here spontaneous national uprisings employ Communist weapons and advice, we have no clear call to intervene. Shouldn't we ask why these national uprisings do not turn to us for assistance? I suggest the answer is that we have been willing to do busi-

ness with the reactionary regimes which the rebels wish to supplant. Our policy has been cynical in this respect and even worse it has been lazy and naive. We haven't had the energy to mount an effort to export our brand of progress to the rising suppressed classes of the world. (Peace Corps is an exception.) Not having an ideology to export or a program, we have inevitably resorted to force—money, then fleets and air forces, now the marines. Tomorrow what?

The big thing that keeps American public opinion uneasily but still effectively behind the Johnson policy is very simple to identify. It is the fear that if we retreat from Vietnam all of southeast Asia will go Communist, perhaps even India. In my mind no counter argument will go very far unless we recognize this fear. It is a pervasive fear and not a totally unreasonable one. How do we quiet this fear? I suggest that the way to quiet the fear is to face it. Admit it. Let us suppose that our disengagement from Vietnam is followed shortly by the emergence of Communist allied governments in South Vietnam, in Cambodia; and that the Malaysian will resist Indonesia is weakened. Also let us suppose India feels driven into the Chinese orbit.

We must honestly face the consequences of this assumedly real possibility. What are these consequences? I suggest that they are no real threat to our security for these reasons: (1) The nations of southeast Asia are economically and militarily weak. (2) They will remain so for decades to come. (3) By turning to China they will merely aggravate their weakness by frustration. China is too poor to be of any real help. After the hysteria of nationalism and anticolonialism has spent itself, and the wine of independence has been drunk to the dregs, isn't it highly probable that quietly, one by one, these countries will seek our aid and to some extent at least come back into our orbit?

Some will say that my reasoning is that of a neoisolationist. I disagree. I think rather it is that of a sober, intelligent, and moral internationalist. I envision as the goal toward which this troubled but very dynamic and creative century is moving is a "planetary federation of states." This goal cannot be reached by imposition; that was the old way of the Pax Romanum. Indeed, all efforts on the part of particular great powers to impose a planetary order must be resisted, including our own. Rather, the planetary peace must be voluntarily arrived at, by the free will and the increasing cooperation of all the member states of this planet. This can only come if the suppressed states achieve freedom, self-determination, and the direction of their affairs by themselves. We want no puppet states in the United Nations, or in any greater unifying organization that will succeed it.

I despise negativity, but I must confess that I fear I smell war in the air. Just as the events of the late thirties—Ethiopia and Spain and all that—were preceded by the weakening of the League of Nations, so the current affair in Vietnam is accompanied by a great and ominous silence in the United Nations; 1914-39—exactly 25 years; 1939-64—exactly 25 years. The militarists have been rehearsing their war too long. They seek to perform; they seek catharsis in action.

Perhaps one telling weapon against Johnson is to accuse him of gross irresponsibility, of launching on an aggressive policy without first equipping the country with bomb shelters. That ought to get that politician where it hurts. In any case, I am sure that it will do no good in this fight to be merely morally indignant. We must be calm, deadly logical, insultingly intelligent. We must also demonstrate.

This letter has, I am afraid, turned into a lecture. In closing, I want to stress my unqualified approval of your position, and express my encouragement and support. I

am a professor in a college community of over 2,000 students and teachers. I think one can take hope from the situation here. Although the milieu is mentally very middle class and most of the students and faculty, I am afraid also, are from small towns in western New York, only the few hotheads are as yet beginning to vibrate to the escalated verbiage of the Johnson mouthpieces like Long. Most are puzzled and perplexed, and confess woeful ignorance of just what it is all about. In short, I do not yet believe we have gone over the dam.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN R. CROWLEY,
Associate Professor,
English Department.

TEMPLETON, IND.,

May 2, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I wish to contribute to the long list of letters that I know you have received commending you for your courageous and intelligent stand on the Vietnam affair.

The administration's "policy" if such it may be called is not enlightened from the point of view of the American people and certainly not enlightened or fair to the people of Vietnam. You are exactly right. The strife in that war-torn country is a civil war and since when has it become wrong for a people to strive to right their wrongs. Certainly we did it. The document which marked the beginning of our national existence is the Declaration of Independence. The right of revolution is set for in it. I have been very attentive to it and that position of the Declaration is never quoted any more. It is, however, the history of things that when a people has reached the seat of the high and the mighty that they become indifferent or even oppose the efforts of others to improve their lot.

I agree with you that Johnson should dismiss Rusk and McNamara. They are all mixed up in their own mental aberrations. Thanks a lot for your courageous stand.

With great respect, I am,

Sincerely yours,

J. H. NICHOLS,

NEW YORK, N.Y.,

May 3, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I am appalled at the position this Government has taken in both Santo Domingo and Vietnam in the use of arms and the spreading of war and its atrocities.

The use of American troops for intervening in the affairs of a foreign government is both contrary to the United Nations Charter, which we have pledged to uphold, and our beliefs in democracy.

I urge you to use your good efforts and office to stop this policy.

I regret to state that at present I am ashamed to be an American citizen.

Respectfully yours,

NORMAN LEVINE.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.,

May 4, 1965.

President LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR PRESIDENT JOHNSON: I was shocked to see that you sent our marines to the Dominican Republic.

In Vietnam, it seems as though our policy is up a blind alley, and your escalation of the war may very well be heading us all toward a nuclear holocaust. When the Buddhist monks died in flames. They were martyrizing themselves to stop the spread of the war; if we and our children go up in

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flames, it will have served no rational purpose.

Your foreign policy seems to be out-Goldwatering Goldwater. When I, together with the vast majority of Americans elected you to the Presidency, it was in great part because we were fearful of the trigger-happiness of Senator Goldwater. I believe that Senators FULBRIGHT and MANSFIELD, and the others who support them, are advocating a position which makes more sense so far as our country is concerned.

Unless you call for cease-fire now—and use the good apparatus of the United Nations, or some other international body—it seems to me that we are going to pay a heavy price for the grave mistakes that are being made.

Very truly yours,

IRWIN N. ROSENZWEIG.

DECATUR, GA.,

May 1, 1965.

DEAR MR. MORSE: You are without a doubt the bravest and most thoughtful man there is living today. I have enjoyed very much your wonderful speeches I have read in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

It is my feeling that perhaps Mr. McNamara and Mr. Rusk should be given sabbatical leaves as the strain they have been under has possibly left them unable to think and act in the best interests of our country and mankind at this critical time of world history.

Sincerely,

Mrs. W. K. ZEIS.

WILLOW GROVE, PA.,

May 3, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I congratulate you for your recent statements criticizing our Vietnam policy. I am in complete agreement with you. I only wish more Senators and Congressmen would join you, and counteract the voices of the Republicans and conservative groups which seem to be supporting President Johnson.

Sincerely,

ELAINE H. STALLWORTH.

CHICAGO, ILL.,

May 4, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Keep up your fine work of opposition to our cruel, amoral policy in Vietnam. I hope you will also oppose our current intervention in the Dominican Republic—what has happened to such principles and peacekeeping devices as international law, self-determination of nations, and the U.N.?

I have written my views on these two foreign policy issues to the President, Dean Rusk, Senators DOUGLAS and DIRKSEN, and Representative YATES.

Good luck.

Sincerely,

SIDNEY SCHONBERGER.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,

May 4, 1965.

Senator MORSE,
The Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I am glad to know that you are still keeping up the fight against the war in Vietnam and the new involvement in the Dominican Republic. I think the worst aspect of these military actions is that they are against the long run interests of the United States.

Sincerely,

GORDON V. AXON.

DEL MAR, CALIF.,

April 29, 1965.

President LYNDON JOHNSON,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR PRESIDENT JOHNSON: If you really wish to pursue negotiations in Vietnam, and

I sincerely hope you do, please stop the bombing of North Vietnam. At least stop it for a specified time.

We voted for you because we were afraid that Goldwater would do the very things you are doing now. This is not a popular war with the American people in spite of the incessant war propaganda we hear from our Government.

Sincerely,

EMILY H. NAWALINSKI.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: The section about Vietnam in your March report is excellent. Thank God for your voice in the Senate.

EMILY H. NAWALINSKI.

PALMETTO, FLA.,

April 28, 1965.

DEAR MR. WAYNE MORSE: Keep up the good work. We are behind you and need a leader. May the Lord bless you.

ALFRED DARLING.

BERKELEY, CALIF.,

May 1, 1965.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: Thank you for your courageous efforts to be about a peaceful solution of the Vietnamese problem.

Sincerely yours,

Dr. and Mrs. W. J. LOSSOW.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.,

May 2, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I extend to you a spiritual handshake for your courageous opposition to President Johnson's foreign policies. His continued aggression in regard to South Vietnam will ultimately result in world destruction. Only through dissenting voices such as yours have we any hope for a future, especially as a democratic society. Thank you for your intrepidity and foresight.

PEGGY FARLEY.

CHICAGO, ILL.,

May 3, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: More power to you in your efforts to get the United States out of its impossible situation in Vietnam. And now along comes Santo Domingo. The way our country plays as God would be comical if it were not tragic.

Thank you for your splendid work in Washington.

Sincerely,

ARTHUR L. MYSLAND.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: I wish to express my deepest appreciation for the stand you have taken on the Vietnam war and I also want to inform you of my full support for your position.

The official expressions of the Johnson administration concerning our actions in Vietnam are both hypocritical and fraudulent.

President Johnson should be reminded that the only clear-cut issue of major importance in the last election was the extension of the war and bombing in Vietnam. The people voted overwhelmingly in favor of what they thought was a rational and sincere desire by Johnson to curtail and eventually end our intervention in that country's civil war.

And now our marines are occupying the Dominican Republic.

We have made a mockery of the Geneva agreements of 1954 concerning Vietnam, of the Atlantic Charter signed in 1943 (self-determination), and of the very basic principles of democracy.

Please keep up your good work.

Very truly yours,

IRVING RICHMAN.

SAN ANTONIO, TEX.,

April 29, 1965.

President LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: I am writing this letter to you without prejudice toward any person or party, but strictly as an American that was born in this wonderful country some 61 years ago. In my time as in yours, many changes have taken place. Some good, some bad, but today in my opinion we are witnessing the dissolution of a once great Republic into the quagmire of internationalism.

Why do we fight a war halfway around the world from our land yet tolerate a Communist buildup 90 miles from our shores. A war we possibly could lose at a cost of thousands of American lives and untold millions of dollars, all this while our so-called allies and friends send shiploads of supplies to North Vietnam. This Vietnam war is one of the biggest political blunders of our time. Why must we alone try to save Asia from the Communists while other nations that would be affected do not see fit to join us?

Unless we drastically restrict our foreign, military, and financial commitments we will destroy our own country. One of the greatest generals this country has ever had, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, warned this country to keep our soldiers out of the rice paddies, swamps, and jungles or suffer defeat.

Sir, if we must fight the Chinese as we probably will have to, let us choose the place and type war, not with 5,000 miles of supply lines and ground troops.

I might add, sir, I am getting damn well fed up with working to pay taxes to support giveaway, throwaway aid programs all over the world, which for the most part go to people who hate us. Yankee come home while you still have a home to come to.

Very truly yours,

CLAUDE C. WHITE.

P.S.—Believe all loyal Americans will support you in your decision to send U.S. marines to the Dominican Republic to protect and evacuate Americans, and if necessary, prevent the Castro Communists from taking over the government of that country.

PORTLAND, OREG.,

April 27, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I find it very reassuring to know that there is at least one sane person in Washington who is giving the President some opposition on his present stand in Vietnam. I have yet to see peace found through war. The threat of war at present to me is simply a threat of destruction, and I am not as yet willing to die or to watch my fellowman be slaughtered.

I just wanted to let you know that I am behind you in your opposition and will continue to back you in any and every way that I can. It is people like you who have managed to keep this world livable.

Sincerely,

SUSAN J. SCOTT.

P.S.—I'd appreciate being placed on your mailing list.

REED COLLEGE,

Portland, Oreg., April 26, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Capitol Hill,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: It is not principally your independence of judgment that I respect in your current stand on the Administration's policy in Vietnam. It is the complete rightness of that stand.

I was shocked to hear the abusive language of Senator LONG ("beatniks," "student demonstrators") and the implication he made that everyone who opposes the Johnson (McNamara-Rusk) policy deserves such

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deprecatory labels. I am shocked that a man of RUSSELL LONG's obvious intelligence should stoop to such rhetorical stupidities.

One wonders if, by Longian logic it does not follow that, since Bogalusa and the KKK are prominent phenomena in the headlines these days related to Louisiana, and since Senator LONG is also associated with Louisiana, that he is a Bogalusa member of the KKK. (The principle of the Longian logic I am relying on is: every part of everything that makes the newspapers is fully and accurately represented in the headlines about the same.)

You and I will not invariably agree on other important matters, but we certainly agree perfectly on this one, and I am very grateful that I and many who think like me have such an able and clear-thinking spokesman on Capitol Hill. Next year, when I move to Missouri, I will still be a strong backer of your stand (and a strong opponent of Senator LONG) despite the fact that my vote will not count for or against either of you. My vote in 1968 may very well count against the bunch Johnson, McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and company, however.

Yours very truly,

MALCOLM BROWN,
Assistant Professor of Philosophy.

EUGENE, OREG.,
April 29, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: We continue to support your policy concerning Vietnam. We hope that you will continue to speak out as courageously as you have been.

Sincerely yours,

VIRGINIA LAKE KENNEL.
E. FINLEY KENNEL.

THE METHODIST CHURCH,
Springfield, Oreg., May 5, 1965.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I am writing to say that I stand solidly behind you in the things you are saying relative to our Vietnam policy. Keep it up. The matter is urgent.

Sincerely,

ROSS KNOTS,
Minister.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
April 27, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE.

DEAR SIR: I'm writing in support of your courageous stand in opposition to the Government's policy in Vietnam. Being a Democrat of long standing, I cannot help but feel concern over our actions which are promoted by our President and his Cabinet. Mr. Johnson speaks so nice about his dreams, but I and many, many people are beginning to have nightmares. We have two sons. Each one at 18 years went to separate wars at the end of high school. We were then hoping it would not have to happen again. But it seems dreams are just that. Should we dream our way through Vietnam? I'm sure we will wake up having lost not only Asia but a good deal of the rest of the friends we now have.

Sincerely yours,

NILS KARLSON.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
April 10, 1965.

DEAR MR. MORSE: When you came to Portland to debate on Vietnam, I was there to see you. I want you to know that I support you 100 percent on every view you hold on Vietnam. I was so engrossed with your speech I sent a registered to President Johnson expressing my views fully. Why can't there be some harsh action taken quickly to stop his war? I will keep protesting the administration's policy on Vietnam as long as we have a "warmonger President in the White

House." Well, I must close now. Keep up the good work.

Sincerely yours,

TYRONE BUSCH.

EUGENE, OREG.,
April 26, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I was greatly in agreement with your speech at the University of Oregon. I hope your views that we should cease fire in Vietnam will reach as many as possible.

I should like to protest the war in Vietnam on the following grounds:

1. Brutality: The war seems to be carried out against the people. I feel morally responsible for this cruelty and should like to end it. There seems to be a parallel between the United States in 1965 and Germany in 1939.

2. Effectiveness: We cannot justify our actions on this ground. The majority of the people there hate America. With some justification. The strategies of Mao seem to be more effective, and yet we refuse to learn from him.

3. Opinions of others: The majority of the world does not share our perspective in Indochina. To be seen as an aggressor by a large part of the world is surely of some importance. We are continually losing face.

4. Coexistence: We must face the fact that we must share this planet with others who are different in religion, government, and belief. This elementary fact must be accepted by those who would turn to aggression. Warfare is no longer a solution to these differences.

Very truly yours,

JAMES C. KEESEY.

LAKE OSWEGO, OREG.,
April 9, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I want to tell you how impressed and gratified I was with your part in the debate with PROXMIER on Vietnam. You succeeded in converting to your point of view everyone in our party, including some who had voted for Goldwater in the last election. It's a tribute to your powers of persuasion as well as to the justness of your cause. It's a pity and a disgrace that the Oregonian can't do the public the favor of adequately reporting your statements.

Sincerely,

LAURIE MALARKEY RAHR.

EUGENE, OREG.,
April 25, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: This letter is to let you know that I greatly appreciate your courage to make your views clear on our policy in Vietnam. I am completely behind an immediate ceasefire in Vietnam. I also appreciate your part in the protest held at the University of Oregon last Friday night and hope that your optimism about the degree to which the President will heed the growing concern and protest of our policy and action in Vietnam will prove justified.

I would like one or more copies of the speeches to the Senate by MANSFIELD, yourself, and others. I regret to admit that these speeches were not covered by the Register Guard and were mentioned, to the best of my knowledge, only very briefly for the first time in today's paper.

Sincerely yours,

DEEANNE DOZIER,
Rehabilitation Counselor, State of Oregon.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
April 14, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I have felt for some time that we were straying from one of the

basic premises of our country—namely, that the people, if given the facts, are capable of reaching sound conclusions. The lack of distribution of such facts and the misrepresentation of information given us, as seems so common in Washington these days, is greatly disturbing. If our governmental leaders have assumed this premise to be partially or totally false then we are living in something other than a free country.

It was gratifying to hear you during your recent appearance in Portland for many reasons, the above included. I, in general, support your views on the Vietnam situation and appreciate your honesty in discussing the various aspects involved. A valid conclusion cannot possibly be drawn from incorrect information. I find it easier to accept your statements than those of our present administration.

Sincerely yours,

DENNIS GOULD.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
April 14, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: We want to thank you for sending us your news reports these past few years.

Your stand on the Vietnam situation is to be commended. We have no business being involved there; it would be better to "lose face" and get out of there before we stir up more trouble & promote an all-out war.

We have always admired your great statesmanship & will continue to support you with our votes & prayers. Keep up the good work.

Our new mailing address is above. Our last address was 1108 S. Pine St., Newport, Oreg.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD B. BAKER.
VIOLET I. BAKER.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
April 22, 1965.

HON. WAYNE L. MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

My DEAR SENATOR: I should like to express to you my personal support and admiration for your stand on our U.S. policy in Vietnam.

What can yet be done, and how can we citizens help?

Sincerely,

ANDRE DIACONOFF,
Minister of Cherry Park Community
Church (Sweden-Corgian).

PORTLAND, OREG.,
April 28, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.

Deeply concerned about unrealistic attempted explanation South Vietnam war. Using methods that have consistently brought us into former wars. Our great President gave courageous speech and action in civil rights. Why directly contradictory principles in South Asia?

H. W. HEBBLETHWAITE.

EUGENE, OREG.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: We heard your marvelous speech Friday April 23 in the Erb Student Union. For once I was proud of my country—after so much mlsh-mosh on radio and TV. It was a real relief to my soul to hear plain talk, blunt talk and hard talk about our U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Such fairy tales are presented in our papers that I just don't buy the paper any more. But I will buy today's and see if the all night vigil and its many fine participants won't get Eugene on the move.

Yours with thanks for the fine job you are doing for us.

Mrs. JEANNE KENYON.

May 7, 1965

EUGENE, OREG.,
April 25, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I want to congratulate you on the excellent speech you gave at the University of Oregon on Friday. Though generally favorable to your point of view on Vietnam, I had not understood the whole structure of your arguments until then. You are to be commended for speaking up on this issue before the rest of us, and I hope you continue to do so.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR E. CURTIS,
Graduate Student in History.

P.S.—And thanks for coming to Eugene just for our meeting.

WALTEVILLE, OREG.,
April 26, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: We wish to let you know we are with you in your protests against our action in Vietnam. We do not like the brain-washing President Johnson and his aids are trying to give the people. Anyone with any sense at all would know this is all wrong and can only lead to a world disaster.

Please advise me if there is anything we can do to try to stop this before it is too late. I can get many, many signatures on a letter of protest if you think it would do any good. To whom would I address it?

We are Democrats, but I don't think Goldwater could have done much worse.

Sincerely,

MARGARET RAE JONES.

P.S.—The following people who live close occur in this: Mr. and Mrs. Carl V. Wilson, Walteville; Rose Wilson, Walteville; Jim E. Jones, Walteville; Mr. and Mrs. William C. La Shot, Walteville; Carl Wilson, Sr., Walteville; and Mr. and Mrs. Ted D. Phibbs, Myrtle Creek.

HAROLD J. SCHULMAN ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Chicago, Ill., April 30, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

HONORABLE SEN: Just a word of encouragement and heartfelt thanks for courageous actions you are taking in trying to bring this country back to a path of peace and justice.

We were searching for the name of the man who could be the fit subject for a "Profile in Courage" in a future TV program. And your name is the only one we could think of.

Our thanks and prayers go with you.

Sincerely,

HAROLD J. SCHULMAN.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
April 27, 1965.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I am a Republican who voted for Rockefeller in our primary and then cast my vote for President Johnson, although not with any strong conviction. You might rather say I voted against Goldwater (not as a man but as a puppet of the radical right).

I want you to know that I support your position in our war against Vietnam. I also believe it is illegal, unmoral, and reflects godlessness. I go a bit further. I fear it reflects military thinking based on training which has exulted Prussian (or Nazi or whatsoever) military tactics.

I am not a letter writer but today I feel impelled to give you a bit of disheartening news. The Birch Society groups, I have been

told, are now urging all members to write to the President in his support.

A local newspaper column, conducted by George Todt in the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, today comes out for support of the President. I am enclosing the article for your reference. It was clipped from page C-3, issue of April 27. Todt has consistently supported all Birch candidates and has praised the patriotism of Birch members. He favors Joe Shell (a defeated Republican candidate) on all issues. He opposes Senator KUCHEL. He attacked Rockefeller day after day for his leftwing radicalism. He hopes to elect Ronald Reagan as U.S. Senator in place of Senator KUCHEL. I cite this since you may have not way of placing Todt. I am sending a copy to Senator KUCHEL who knows Todt's work and can read the column for himself.

While it would be an oversimplification to say that what the Birch Society wants is automatically wrong, there is enough truth in such an idea to give some of us courage to speak up in the Vietnam situation.

As you well know, Americans are very unpopular around the world. It hurts to have one's foreign host explain to other guests that although you are an American, you are not typical—that you are in fact reasonable. This is what our present policies (supposedly based on the Truman doctrine) have done for us.

I believe with Walter Lippmann that we can oppose any popular uprising anywhere on the grounds that we do so for the containment of communism—whether such is the case or not—and end up being right. For, as he says, wherever we move in force we shall attract Communist opposition.

Even more unpopular than Americans in Asia are the Chinese. This is nothing new. Any half-educated person knows that the Chinese have been hated for generations. No Vietnam government would dare (up until now) to invite the Chinese in. Our conduct in Vietnam promises, however, to change all this.

Secretary Rusk in attempting to strengthen his position spoke of the Ethiopian war and the Japanese war in Manchuria—apparently for the purpose of getting across the idea that we should have intervened. However, it did not come out that way in our press. Instead it reminded persons of my age of the aggression and made us think of our own position in such terms. I cannot, as an American put on paper what I truly mean. It is too humiliating.

The Rusk position that to end the war would invite the loss of all Asia to the Communists is of course wrong. The opposite is true. Our warlike posture will throw one country after another into the hands of those who oppose us. If we would take to helping countries throw out their crooked leaders and with neutral help offer guidance (not a carrot in one hand and a stick in the other), we could be heroes and not villains.

I beseech you to keep up your good work and I pray that you will find the health and energy to do so.

Yours very truly,

FRED INGALLS.

[From the Los Angeles (Calif.) Herald-Examiner, Apr. 27, 1965]

L.B.J. NEEDS OUR HELP

(By George Todt)

"Light is the task when many share the toil."—Homer, "Iliad."

Whether we are Democrats or Republicans is not nearly so important as to rise above party considerations and stand for what is best where our beleaguered Republic of the United States may be concerned.

Recently I addressed the San Fernando Valley Republican Business & Professional Women's Club in Sherman Oaks at Bullock's

Fashion Square. This is a live wire group headed by attractive Mrs. Lee Gregory.

In the process of my talk before the GOP ladies, I made it clear that in my opinion President Lyndon B. Johnson (a Democrat) is eminently correct regarding his present policy of carrying the war home to North Vietnam, via aerial bombing.

There is no absolute guarantee of success in any conceivable form of action in this area. But the bombing raids ordered by L.B.J. are proving costly to the instigators of aggression in the north. What will they do?

That much remains to be seen—but we are no longer a "paper tiger."

A LAUGHINGSTOCK

If we back down now, as many perhaps-well-intentioned appeasers and pacifists would have us do, we would become quickly the laughingstock of Asia. And likely ultimately, the whole world, too. Why give away our marbles?

Another interesting question might be as to why all these weird marches and student sitdowns are directed monotonously at our Government, instead of the offensive Reds? They are to blame for the present trouble. Aren't they?

Why are such voices of protest aimed only at the Government of the one nation which bears the brunt of championing the cause of the free world against the ominous threat of Communist global slavery? Why us? Hmm?

NOT ORGANIZED

I believe that what has happened in the American Republic today is simply a case of excessive leftwing organization and not enough organization of those people who believe thoroughly in our libertarian cause.

The overwhelming percentage of our citizenry, including students, is in the later camp, although they have largely been outshouted by organized militant minorities exploited by leaders out in left field. Apathy can be extremely dangerous.

What we must do soon in our country is organize countermovements against those launched by questionable or Red-tinged sources. It will take time and hard work. But the decent and truly moderate people must be heard from, too.

As an example, what could be done on a down-to-earth scale to counteract the harmful influence of 15,000 "beat the draft" student types that besieged the White House recently in a vain and disgraceful effort to cause L.B.J. to withdraw from Vietnam?

The Republican ladies I mentioned earlier in the column took an exemplary action after I finished talking to them in Sherman Oaks.

They unanimously passed a resolution to send President Johnson a telegram, with all their names attached as Republicans, letting him know they were 100 percent behind him in his Vietnamese policy and to keep up his courageous fight.

Let me suggest that my readers take pen in hand now and complete the same kind of action to L.B.J. White House, Washington, D.C.

Let us encourage him for doing what is difficult—but right—in Vietnam.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
May 5, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

As active members in the democratic and as firm believers in democracy we support your stand and your statement on the foreign policy of the United States.

MR. and MRS. SAM SHAIM.

CAPITOLA, CALIF.,
May 5, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE.

DEAR SENATOR: I wish to highly commend you for your long and consistent stand

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for negotiation, withdrawal, and peace in Vietnam.

In the recent call for an international conference which failed to materialize, the NLF of South Vietnam was not included. It seems to me that could be the chief reason why the proposed conference did not meet. The evidence shows that only recently any substantial support in men and arms have been received by the NLF of South Vietnam. These are the people we are fighting and should be represented in any conference.

The rightful experiences of the Vietnamese people as a whole for an interminable time should spur us to the conference table if we have any humanity left.

Copy of this letter has been sent to the President.

Yours sincerely,

DUNCAN MCINTYRE.

MAY 2, 1965.

Subject: Vietnam.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: What's the use. I've written my Senators and Representatives in Washington protesting against our presence in Vietnam but what happens? Nothing. Yourself, Senator GRUENING, of Alaska, CHURCH, of Idaho and a few others have the courage to speak out. I've followed a good many of your speeches which are reprinted in the Post-Dispatch and agree with everything you say. The attached letter could just as well have been written by myself. I too, voted for L.B.J. but am I ever sorry. What is left for the voter? We are asked to do our duty and vote but a deal such as this is no encouragement.

Now it's the Dominican Republic. Who next? Are we supposed to force our politics down the throats of people all over the world?

Perhaps if you receive many letters like mine it may do some good but I doubt it.

Sincerely,

ALBERT J. MILLER.

GAINESVILLE, MO.

P.S.—World War II veteran.

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch,
Apr. 29, 1965]

A READER DISENCHANTED

May I propose the formation of the Legion of the Disenchanted? Membership requirements: Simply a sense of betrayal and some nausea among those who voted with some enthusiasm for L.B.J. He betrayed those of us when he promised: "No war," and who can help a feeling of nausea when reading or hearing those mealy-mouthed, sanctimonious, Bible-quoting statements of "love," "justice," "brotherhood," etc., by a man who unleashes escalation of a war in which we have no business and no just cause?

And behold this humble, God-fearing man. He gets piqued at the Prime Minister of Canada, piqued at Shastri, piqued at Pakistan, and rudely brushes aside the advice of J. Thant. Get out of the way, you little critics; we have the planes, the bombs, the hips, and the napalm, so don't butt in while we settle this our way. Later, we can talk of among nations, of the importance of the N., of the sanctity of treaties, of the horrors of war, of our unalterable devotion to peace; ter, boys, later—now we are too busy showing how mighty we are.

Could Goldwater have been a little right? He did call L.B.J. a "faker." Likely, he knew it better than we did. My son came of voting age last September. He asked my advice: I said: "Do not vote for the man who ties the saber." So he voted for the man who is now dropping the bombs around the ark and is headed in the direction of war

with China. Could Goldwater have done worse?

DISENCHANTED.

SACRAMENTO, CALIF.,

April 30, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: I wish to express my appreciation as an American citizen who believes in the rule of the Constitution rather than decree for your fearless stand on Vietnam.

No occidental can understand the mind of the oriental. We cannot buy friendship and we are wrong in trying to force these oriental primitives into our form of government. They have not evolved of this point yet.

Your stand on this matter and your courage in speaking out deserves praise.

All of your remarks are true.

Take care of yourself and may God bless you and guide you always.

Yours truly,

G. W. CANDISH.

LEXINGTON, S.C.,

May 4, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Please get out of Vietnam and stop that bombing before World War III gets started.

Sincerely,

Mr. and Mrs. THOMAS E. SOX.

SYDNEY, N.S.W., AUSTRALIA,

April 30, 1965.

DEAR SIR: May I, as a British subject, temporarily residing in Australia, say thank goodness there are such men as you, and Senators FULBRIGHT, MANSFIELD, GORE, and GRUENING, in the United States.

It is men like you who help restore one's flagging faith in the basic goodness of your great country.

I utterly deplore the Australian Government's decision to send troops to Vietnam. But I'm not Australian.

Nevertheless, that is not to say that I'm at all happy about my own Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson's role, regarding Vietnam. I admire the man greatly, supporting many of his policies, but not the one on Vietnam.

At least, he has sent no troops in. Let us hope he keeps it that way.

Good luck, and God support you and the above-mentioned Senators.

Yours faithfully,

G. A. ATHANS.

EAST HAVEN, CONN.,

May 3, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: You have done a valiant job of alerting the American people to the dangers of their Government's policy in southeast Asia. At a time when very few people were concerned with this problem, you spoke out. Your action was in the finest tradition of an elected representative: you led rather than followed at a time when it was far from popular to do so. Nor that your position is yet popular, for we are still in great danger—but you are no longer alone. A great many people, including myself, have come to see the futility of continued war in Vietnam—and we applaud your continued dedication to finding solutions for this problem.

DANIEL W. CROFTS.

BOSTON, MASS.,

May 3, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Please keep up your efforts to bring legitimacy to our foreign

policy in southeast Asia. In addition, I look forward to hearing what you will have to say about the administration's current adventures in the Dominican Republic.

You will surely be remembered as a voice of candor in an era when real debate is being snuffed out by consensus.

Yours gratefully,

P. W. ANDERSON.

WATERTOWN HIGH SCHOOL,
Watertown, N.Y., May 2, 1965.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I wholeheartedly support your admirable effort to clarify the facts and reveal the dangers of our present policy concerning Vietnam. It seems apparent that the American public has been misinformed and even purposely deceived by most of the mass media. Certainly both the State and Defense Departments must shoulder much of the blame for this. The inevitable consequences of this practice of self-delusion can lead only to the slow erosion of our vitality as a free nation. It is regretful that only a few other Senators have had the courage to speak out against such an unjustifiable misuse of power.

The current involvement of the United States in Santo Domingo is also appalling and entirely inconsistent with the ideals for which this country stands. I hope you will point out that U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of any Latin American country beyond protecting the lives of our citizens in time of danger is both contrary to international law and Pan American relations.

Sincerely yours,

J. BRUCE DUDLEY.

STONY POINT, N.Y.,

May 2, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: We wish to make known to you our admiration, our gratitude, and our continued support for your position on Vietnam.

It is our belief that our foreign policy is fast becoming as ludicrous and unpopular at home as it is abroad. We trust that you will continue to voice your logical and humane opposition, even though you may at the present time be isolated.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

LEO F. and MARY W. KOCH.

Copies to: President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, and Ambassador Stevenson.

SARASOTA, FLA.,

May 2, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: My strong feeling is that you are entitled to all the moral support you can be given in your stand on the war in Vietnam. I have again written the President and Dean Rusk in a way that respects them, and their good intentions; but finding them wrong. Perhaps I may have felt too strongly over too much of time recent. This is partly for confession to you. For one, I have never seen any future in fighting ideas with a stick, feel that after the war we waited before an anti-Communist barrage, and that this has made enemies for us among distant peoples where it may have been unnecessary to do that.

It seems to go back to the time when we continued support of Chiang Kai-shek after it became clear that he could not lead China.

Of course I feel very contrary to fighting communism without U.N. support, and beginning it at the antipodes. I feel that our

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present policy overlooks the tendency of Communists, when left alone, to become somewhat livable with or at least less fiery in criticism of us and more aware of the simple needs of their own people—including in those needs not only more consumer goods and a certain amount of the common freedoms but some "capitalistic country" features in their system. I might possibly go too far for you on some of this. I don't know.

I feel sure we have been wrong in keeping real China out of the U.N. No other place for them to go to school with others. It seems as if we might be immensely better off right now if they could be reached as members. The sooner they get to fighting their natural problems at home and nearby, instead of having us for a foreign devil, the better—one feels. I am of course very particularly and anxiously behind you now in the effort to keep from extending the war in Vietnam. You awakened me to the point about using gas in war.

An old schoolteacher, more or less like yourself.

SIDNEY S. ROBINS.

OCCIDENTAL LIFE INSURANCE CO.,
OF CALIFORNIA,
May 3 1965.

Senator W. MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: It is not usual for me to be stirred sufficiently to write to anyone about the world situation, but I consider the problem in Vietnam so grave that I have taken the liberty of writing the President.

I would like you to know that in spite of the lukewarm appearance of the Canadian Government in this regard there are Canadians who care very much about the survival of the human race and we wish you well on your stand on Vietnam.

I sincerely hope that enough voices will be raised in the United States and elsewhere to persuade the administration that its foreign policy should be radically altered and that the only hope for the survival of the world is negotiation and the belief in the reasonableness of all men.

Yours truly,

DENIS KALMAN,
Branch Manager.

MAY 3, 1965.

President L. B. JOHNSON,
White House, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I know that I am only one voice among millions, but I hope that I am one of millions to express to you the following views:

The human race has never before possessed the power to completely destroy itself and its environment. Therefore, the waging of even a limited war is no longer a feasible answer to present to those whose ideas and ideals may conflict with ours. Our only path has to be negotiation. Our only hope is the belief in the reasonableness of all men.

I urge you to put an end to the Vietnam conflict by withdrawing now before the whole thing escalates into a disaster where nothing will matter anymore. This is the only sane solution to the problem, and I am moved all the more strongly to write because I am extremely disappointed in the lack of clear voice from the Canadian Government.

I know that Senators MORSE, GRUENING, and CHURCH are urging you to do the same as this letter and I am also writing them to encourage them to continue their attempt to influence you in this matter.

In closing I would like to emphasize that this is the first time that I have ever been moved sufficiently to write to a head of state. I sincerely believe that today's world situ-

ation may be more complex and serious than your advisers realize.

Yours truly,

DENIS KALMAN.

Copy to: Senators W. MORSE, E. GRUENING, and F. CHURCH.

WAYLAND, MASS.,
May 4, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I send you once again my congratulations for your continuing stand on Vietnam. You have my every good wish.

Also, I wish to register my protest for U.S. actions in the Dominican Republic. Such ill-advised unilateral action reveals the lack of maturity in foreign policy that has plagued our country and the world for so many years.

I urge you to do all in your power to reinstate the U.S. Senate as an active partner in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. I am unhappy, as I am sure you are, with the current arrangement wherein the Senate is presented a fait accompli and then has the uncomfortable task of supporting an unfortunate position merely because a crisis situation seems to offer no alternatives. This unsatisfactory arrangement could not continue without passive Senate approval.

I maintain that many of our international problems stem in large part from this Government's internal structure as operative today.

I commend this area to your attention.

Yours truly,

WILLIAM C. MOYER.

EAST LANSING, MICH.,
May 3, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I fully agree with your attitude toward the conflict in Vietnam, and believe a peaceful settlement should and could be worked out, possibly in conformity with the Geneva agreement of 1954.

It is of the utmost importance, I feel, at this crisis-ridden time that our country respond with political maturity rather than force to those peoples of the world who may not share our views, but are as inhibited to their own as we are to ours.

Sincerely yours,

MRS. THOMAS WALLACE.

MONTEREY, CALIF.,
May 1, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: May I please tell you how much my wife and I agree with your sensemaking proposals regarding Vietnam.

I thought the enclosed advertisement, taken out by the Friends Committee on Legislation, might interest you.

Respectfully yours,

SCOTT A. HEATH.

MR. PRESIDENT: THE WAR CONTINUES

Though we approve your excellent proposal of a billion dollars for the development of the Mekong River Valley, your words are made meaningless by each raid that sends our jets with tons of bombs and napalm spilling over North and South Vietnam.

You have said, "It is a war of unparalleled brutality * * * small and helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks, large raids are conducted on towns and terror strikes in the hearts of cities."

You have said you will negotiate unconconditionally with any government.

You have said, "The guns and bombs, the rockets and warships are all symbols of hu-

man failure. * * * They are witnesses to human folly."

Why continue the bombing, the use of napalm, the indiscriminate killing of women and children?

Why exclude the National Liberation Front which is fighting the "governments" we support in South Vietnam and which is the de facto government of more than one-half of South Vietnam's territory and people?

We agree, it is tragic folly.

Why continue a war and a policy which sinks us in ever deeper and tends to create an atmosphere which precludes negotiations?

When so many experts (among them U Thant, Hans Morgenthau, Walter Lippmann) have pointed out that the military approach produces results exactly opposite to those we wish, why continue and intensify the war?

Secretary General U Thant, speaking of insurgency in Burma in 1948, recently stated:

"The Burmese Government dealt with this internal problem by its own means, without asking for any outside military assistance * * * [and] there has not been a single instance of outside help to the Burmese Communists * * * In the last 17 years * * * Burma has over 1,000 miles of land frontier with mainland China. If only the Burmese Government had decided at some stage to seek outside military assistance to suppress the internal insurrections and revolts, then I am sure that Burma would have experienced one of the two alternatives: either the country would be divided into two parts or the whole country would have become Communist long ago * * *. Not one American life has been lost in Burma. Not one American dollar has been spent in the form of military assistance * * *. We must ask the great question: Why?"

Are you committing our young men to murderous attrition in a ground war which may last a generation? Are you going to make the fatal mistake of bombing China?

The Religious Society of Friends have traditionally rejected war for any reason. A modern expression of this position is found in the United Nations Charter which says, "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

And yet the war still goes on. You can stop it.

We respectfully recommend:

1. An immediate end to the bombing.
2. No more U.S. troops be sent to South Vietnam.
3. The United States call for a 4-week truce and an invitation to all concerned to bring about negotiations for a peaceful settlement.

4. Negotiations which include:

(a) Provisions for peaceful settlement of future differences in Asia by establishing working relationships which include the United States, all Asian nations and the U.N.

(b) A phased withdrawal of United States and all other outside forces from South Vietnam with full recognition and willingness to accept the results of free election

5. The immediate implementation of your proposal for a billion-dollar U.S. grant of economic aid to southeast Asia under U.S. auspices.

6. No withdrawal of aid, even if the vote should go against us.

We can win with aid and peace what cannot win by war.

Write a letter to President Johnson a to Senators KUCHEL and MURPHY, and to y

May 7, 1965

Approved For Release 2003/10/14 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300150003-0
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Congressmen expressing your concern about the Vietnam war.

FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION,
ROBERT GRUNSTED, Chairman,
ROBERT MANIG, Executive Secretary.
2160 Lake Street,
San Francisco, Calif.

- ☐ I wish additional copies of this ad at:
10 copies 25 cents; 50 copies \$1.
☐ I enclose \$—— to cover the cost of this ad.

Name _____
Address _____
City _____ State _____
Submitted as a public service by the
Friends Committee on Legislation.

MONTREAL,
April 1, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
The Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: The eyes of the people of 99 nations look upon you, their ears listen to your eloquence, and their hopes rise for the survival of the human race and the alleviation of the suffering of the peasants of Vietnam.

Many must be the pressures brought to bear on you to toe the line of the present administration; constancy and a great courage must be yours to withstand them. May you somehow feel the desire of thousands of humble people around the world—although of less courage and eloquence—to be by your side to give you added strength to uphold those principles, which you have so ably fought for.

May your voice and those of your courageous compatriots (Senators GRUENING, FULBRIGHT, JAVITS, McGOVERN, and CHURCH) be persuasive enough to turn President Johnson away from the course set by such evil counselors as McNamara, Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, General Taylor, and their like in the Pentagon.

There must be much sadness in the hearts of many young Americans who have been shipped off to Vietnam to fight in a war of which they understand little, and to be called upon to commit acts of barbarism with the horrible weapons that modern science has fabricated.

Robbie Burns' poem "Man Was Made to Mourn" comes to mind:

"And man, whose heaven-erected face
The smiles of love adorn—
Man's inhumanity to man
Makes countless thousands mourn!"

The respect and gratitude of many thousands around the world must be yours. May your efforts and those of your friends divert the course of events away from a path that could eventually lead to the extinction of mankind, and upward to the day,

"When man to man the world o'er
Shall brothers be for a' that."

With deep admiration,
ALLAN FINDLAY.

MEDFORD, WIS.,
April 29, 1965.

9 Vietnam.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Congratulations on your wonderful and courageous demand for the ouster of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

I support you all the way on this. A copy of my latest letter to the Vice President is lost.

Don't stop. Give em hell, more hell and a some more hell.

Yours truly,

ROY T. TRAYNOR.

MEDFORD, WIS.,
April 29, 1965.

Re Vietnam.

Vice President HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,
Capitol Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: An old warrior, Senator WAYNE MORSE, spoke very true words when he criticized the Secretaries of Defense and State and demanded their ouster.

I agree with that old warrior because I have become alarmed at the dangerous growth of the power of the military in the United States.

I agree too because, as the old warrior pointed out, McNamara is consistently wrong. As far as Secretary Rusk is concerned—who cares? He is virtually ineffectual and has abdicated to the Secretary of Defense anyway.

I call for the ouster of Secretaries McNamara and Rusk. I call for the appointment of J. W. FULBRIGHT as Secretary of State and Clark Kerr as Secretary of Defense.

I call for the removal of General Taylor from his position as Ambassador (a misnomer for a post more akin to Governor General) and the appointment of a prominent nonmilitary Hawaiian of oriental heritage to that position.

And just in case you or your office staff are going to send me another release which, in effect, tells me to be more loyal to my country, I just want to point out that I am a paratrooper veteran of the 82d Airborne Division, U.S. Army, and no public official is going to insinuate, directly or indirectly, that I am of doubtful loyalty more than once and get my vote the next time around.

I will continue to support Johnson and HUMPHREY, but Taylor, Rusk, and McNamara must go. This trio of tragic efficiency experts has been so consistently wrong on Vietnam that I cannot for the life of me understand how they continue to have weight as Presidential advisers.

And last but not least, I should point out, as a makeweight, that I am the only Democratic attorney in this county of 19,000 in north-central Wisconsin. I don't think the administration realizes how the tide of public opinion is moving on Vietnam.

Yours truly,

ROY T. TRAYNOR.

MAY 3, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Please, please, please, don't allow your voice and conscience to be silenced as concerns Vietnam. There must be some sane voices left to speak out against the mad policies that our President and his policymakers are forcing upon the public. As it is, the press seems to have fallen directly in line behind the "hawk" propagandists.

Sincerely,

Mrs. OLGA MARTIN.

PALO ALTO, CALIF.,
May 2, 1965.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: Even without the facts supposedly held by the Departments of Defense and State, it is obvious that our foreign policy as to Vietnam is bankrupt. The course being followed is one of mistake compounded by tragedy. How long can we afford to continue?

I urge you, as a courageous Senator, who has demonstrated in the past the courage to dissent from prevailing political opinion, to continue to speak out in thoughtful opposition to the present course of events. Your voice is needed if the current policy is to be reevaluated. The crisis is now. Wise men cannot remain silent.

Respectfully,

JAMES J. NOVELLI.

LAB INDUSTRIES,

Berkeley, Calif., May 3, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. MORSE: We deplore our immoral military invasions of Vietnam and of the Dominican Republic, entered into in the name of anticommunism. Our Nation is becoming the most hated nation on the face of this earth. In our evangelical zeal for democracy—or is it power—we are sacrificing all devotion to human principles. We are sacrificing the lives of thousands in a false crusade.

We urge you to continue your campaign in the name of all human decency and to use your influence to get us out of Vietnam and to abandon military intervention in the Dominican Republic.

Very truly yours,

MARION H. SHAPIRO, Coowner.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.,
May 2, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

We want to let you know that we support your fight for an end to the war in Vietnam. We wish that more of our leaders felt like you.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. and Mrs. MICHAEL SHOLEN.

SAN DIEGO, CALIF.,
May 3, 1965.

President LYNDON JOHNSON,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR PRESIDENT JOHNSON: A little more than a week ago I wrote to you and said, in part, "I protest in the strongest way possible the escalation of the war in Vietnam. I advocate the immediate cessation of hostilities. The weapons of war being used by our troops and airmen are inhuman. Phosphorus and napalm and dart-scattering bombs are bringing down upon us hatred and contempt. They are not winning the war; they are losing us the world." I continued, asking for an immediate cease-fire and actual, active opening of negotiations, a difficult task but one we cannot put off.

I deleted from that letter most of the following statements, which I now send, for I cannot in conscience refrain from voicing the sentiments the deleted sentences contain. "Most of my friends and acquaintances feel as I do. You are losing the trust and support of the one group that is essential to your continuance as an effective President, the liberals, the presidentmakers in many a past election. I would not have voted for you had I known you were a warmonger. I will not vote for you again unless you show that the Christianity you profess is a reality to you. The Vietnam war is canceling every wonderful accomplishment of your remarkable and productive term as President of the United States."

Since that earlier letter you have invaded the Dominican Republic in order to crush the successful and democratic revolution in progress there. Juan Bosch is not and never was a Communist. Most of his revolutionaries are not and never were Communists. You are using this civil strife, in my opinion, as an excuse to restore to power the military and economically powerful reactionaries who, 2 years ago, overthrew the first democratically elected government the Dominican Republic has had since the United States last invaded their country and forcibly upheld a repulsive dictatorship.

I repeat from my last letter: I am a white, 53-year-old woman, a lifelong Democrat, and up to now, proud of it. I am more sorry than ever that President Kennedy was murdered. Unless something brings you to the realization that your actions are endangering the

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world and destroying the good name of the United States, we are in terrible danger indeed.

Sincerely,

ROBERTA N. GOODRICH.

MANHATTAN, KANS.,
May 3, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE.
Bravo. How desperately we need your voice of sanity. Keep it up.

Sincerely,

Mr. and Mrs. ERNEST GOERTZEN.

ITHACA, N.Y.,
May 2, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: This is to express to you my gratitude and admiration for the honest and courageous position you have taken on the recent turn of events in the Vietnam war. It has been practically your voice alone out of all those emerging from Washington which has left me with the feeling that there is anybody at all left in the Government with any decency, honor, or commonsense.

I want to assure you of my warm and admiring support, and to express my confident hope that you will continue to act as the voice of good sense until the administration regains theirs.

Sincerely yours,

N. DAVID MERMIN.

CHARLESTON, W. VA.,
May 1, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR: Your address on the floor of the Senate last week was very impressive. We are deeply concerned about Johnson's present policy on Vietnam. Your thinking as expressed on TV last week with reference to southeast Asia makes sense. Your party crucified Goldwater with the appellation of "trigger happy." And as he stated in Paris a few days ago: "Now you're a statesman when you do that." Add to our southeast Asia headaches we are fighting in the Dominican Republic. Why must we try to keep peace in every country in the world? We are afraid your party is leading us down the road to destruction.

Sincerely,

W. S. BEECHART.

EVANSVILLE, IND.,
May 3, 1965.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I feel sure I speak as one among many when I say that your efforts in behalf of world peace are appreciated.

May you continue to receive courage and strength for the great work you are doing.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. and Mrs. GEORGE HESSENAUER.

RIDLEY PARK, PA.,
May 3, 1965.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I'm with you all the way on this Vietnam bit. If there was some way of getting Rusk and McNamara to resign, it would be the best thing for our country.

Sincerely,

H. D. LECONRIGHT.

NEWPORT BEACH, CALIF.,
May 2, 1965.

MY DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I told my son, 22, attending the University of California, to go to jail before being drafted for war in Vietnam.

I have been in two wars in the Pacific. I volunteered for Korea, where as a forward observer during the actions of 1951 I was instrumental in killing more Chinese than

any U.S. soldier. But I can't stomach Vietnam; it's not worth a single soldier's life.

It's ideological, not a vital U.S. interest. Playing footsie with Goldwaterites is no way for the administration to hold my loyalty, a loyalty to the Democratic Party of 30 years.

What's happened to the President? Now Santo Domingo. It's nuts, plain nuts. I can't understand it—interfering with other people's rights, including the right of revolution, a right proclaimed in our Declaration of Independence.

Please keep sounding off.

Sincerely,

WALTER V. BREM.

BERKELEY, CALIF.,
May 4, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: We want you to know we fully support you in the stand you have taken in the Senate protesting the role of the United States in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic. It takes great courage to be in such a minority and to stand up for the things you believe in.

We believe you will go down in history as a true patriot and that time will show you were right and that President Johnson and his administration are doing incalculable harm to this country and the world.

Our best wishes go to you in your courageous fight and we hope many new voices will be added to yours.

Sincerely,

Mr. and Mrs. GILBERT MINES.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.,
May 5, 1965.

Senator WAYNE L. MORSE,
The Capitol,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Dismayed by the recent course of American foreign policy, I have written a letter to the President today, a copy of which is enclosed. You may use it for any purposes you see fit. If nothing else, take it as an expression of support for your courageous and forthright opposition to those policies. History will certainly remember you well for the position you now take. You have my deepest respect.

Sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. GRABILL,
University of Pennsylvania Law School.

HON. LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been deeply concerned for some time over the way in which you have been conducting the foreign affairs of my country. I believe the course you are pursuing in Vietnam is completely unjustifiable either from the standpoint of international morality, which the United States as the richest and most powerful nation in the world is obligated to uphold, or from the standpoint of sheer "Machtpolitik." You have, in the brief span of 6 months since you no longer had to worry about popular support for your policies, completely undone all the good will and respect for this country which your far more worthy predecessor had diligently cultivated. You have completely abandoned the noble idea that my country must work to further freedom and social justice around the world, and substituted a policy of gunboat diplomacy and military missile-rattling. I am ashamed of you, Mr. President, and you can not write me off as simply another of those "beatnik-pacifists." I am a graduate of Yale University and presently a student at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Last fall I spent many hours working for your election as a member of the Young Democrats here at Penn and as a member of

the Democratic lawyers committee. I gave you and other Democratic candidates my time because I believed what you were saying in your campaign speeches about the role of the United States in world affairs. I believed you when you condemned your opponent for his willingness to go to war, and commit American troops to fight for what were at best dubious causes. Now it is he who is gloating, and I and many like me who are disillusioned and apprehensive. Perhaps, Mr. President, instead of insulting the memory of your late and beloved predecessor by oblique references to his rocking chair, you would do well to sit in a rocking chair awhile yourself and ponder where you are leading this great Nation of ours. Ponder, Mr. President, just what has happened in the last 6 months. The great "detente" has been shattered and the cold war rages hotter than in the darkest days of Duiles and Vishinsky. Our military leaders in Hawaii blithely talk of using nuclear weapons against North Vietnam and China. "Lazy Dog" bombs and napalm obliterate the lives of those we claim to be saving in the name of "freedom." In Latin America, the hopes and aspirations of a continent which were aroused by the Alliance for Progress have been dashed by our brutal suppression of the Bosch rebellion. Students are dying in the streets down there, students like myself, whose only crime was to take arms in the defense of democracy. Why are we killing them, Mr. President? Must people die because someone in the State Department or CIA says if Bosch returns to power he'll be soft on leftist elements in the country? A little reflection would have told you that nothing would help Castro more than our sending in the Marines. Will we send the Marines into Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, and Argentina in the name of freedom, too?

So I would ask you to sit in your rocking chair with your hands crossed awhile and ponder. Because the students in the Dominican Republic and the peasants in Vietnam don't have the votes to return you to office, they're as much human beings and their aspirations as noble as those poor farmers in the Pedernales Valley you're so fond of.

Sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. GRABILL.

DETROIT, MICH.,
May 4, 1965.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
Senator From Oregon.

SIR: I have no reason to hurt the President's feelings, but he classifies the war in Indochina as a bully in a schoolyard. Well, that sounds well enough for simple-minded people and he may be one himself.

But it is purely a race war. The little yellow men do not want white man's military power in their own country.

President Johnson is leading our country into a mess that can end up to be worse than Truman's Korea.

There seems to be no reaction from our military men. Are they even more simple minded than Johnson?

It has now, after his death, it has been proven that General MacArthur was real and willing to have all our boys slaughtered if he could bring military prestige to himself. How different he was from General Washington or General Pershing.

We do not want any Hitlers or Napoleons in our country and the Congress better waken up, as what Johnson talks about and what he thinks about are very different deals.

President Johnson is not a man of great experience, as he has been tied down in Washington, D.C., almost his whole life.

His success, while it has given him a great title, his own experience has been very low and it surely has shown he has overestimated himself a great deal.

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And as I said before, he looks at it as a bully in a schoolyard. I had in my years as a boy much experience with these bullies, but I would not use that know-how in Indochina.

General de Gaulle well knows we are a bunch of fools trying to be a world policeman. But, of course, he doesn't use tough words for us. He just says we will go it alone. I like any (swellhead, the White House) believes it, getting a bum deal.

President Wilson, no one knows just what his deal would have been like, if he had got it, but it would surely been a world policeman's deal as time went by.

There is so much loose talk about Chamberlain Act, well those countries except Poland, were easy 50-percent German. They were already in Hitler's pocket. Chamberlain gave him nothing that he did not already have. But the dishonest story is great stuff for the U.S. warmongers, the name Chamberlain appear with our General Washington at Valley Forge and also in Civil War of 1860. I can prove it. In this world police idea, the great profits go to du Pont Corp. and other warmongers. And whenever Johnson orders a shot fired, he does only one thing make warmongers rich.

This country can do no trading with Indochina, as long as shooting is going on, and it won't stop until we get out our military bases in the yellow man's country.

What's going to happen when our businessmen wake up to our bum-steer Johnson has cooked up for us.

Mr. Rusk talks school-boy stuff no business-man is going to believe his talk—except warmongers.

I think Johnson is like old Bill Bryan, he talked too much never did any real thinking.

Yours,

AN OLD TIMER.

STATE COLLEGE, PA.

May 4, 1965.

DEAR MR. MORSE: I am enclosing a copy of a recent open letter to President Johnson which appeared in our local paper. I trust that it will confirm what I am sure is very apparent to you; namely, that in your stand on Vietnam you speak for many Americans throughout this land.

Sincerely yours,

MARVIN E. ROZEN.

AN OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON VIETNAM

We wish to commend and support those parts of your recent speech on Vietnam in which you expressed a willingness to undertake unconditional discussions toward a peaceful settlement while engaging in a bold program, through the United Nations, of economic development. We are troubled, however, by other views in your speech which, unchanged, will surely jeopardize the accomplishment of these ends.

We do not believe that the history of the Vietnamese war begins in 1956 with the creation of a sovereign and independent state South Vietnam. Does not the present conflict have its roots in the efforts of a subjugated people to overthrow their French colonial rulers? Does it not draw sustenance in the failure to hold, and our complicity therein, free elections in all of Vietnam, as provided by the Geneva accords of 1954. Sesssed with the threat of communism, did not intervene in a fundamentally civil conflict in support of a repressive and unocratic government? Must we persist in attempting to retrieve unwise political comments by ever-stronger military action? tressing the independence of South Vietnam do we mean to deny the eventual political unification of Vietnam?

I believe, Mr. President, that your movision of peace and prosperity in south Asia is likely to be fatally compromised by oversimplified and misleading charac-

terization of the conflict that rages in South Vietnam. To insist that the war in Vietnam is simply an instance of a greedy Communist nation attacking its freedom-loving neighbor—that the Vietcong are no more than agents of the North—is to preclude the possibility of meaningful negotiations. This view of the Vietnamese conflict may provide a rationale for our present policy of military bombardment of North Vietnam, but it does not enhance the likelihood of a satisfactory settlement at the conference table. Nor does bombing set an example of responsible international action we would expect other nations to follow. In the past some in the United States have criticized the Chinese Communist Government for attempting to "shoot its way into the U.N." Are we now attempting to shoot our way into a Vietnam conference? We oppose the violent tactics adopted by all parties—acts of terrorism, torture, napalm, and other bombings. Mass violence must be forewarned by all parties so as to achieve the objective of protection of the Vietnamese people.

Mr. President, we urge you to follow up your recent speech with unequivocal actions in the interests of peace. The negative Communist response to your proposals should not dissuade you from this course. There are definite indications that negotiations may be possible if the United States matches its expressions of willingness to negotiate with concrete manifestations of its desire to achieve an honorable and realistic settlement.

Senator FULBRIGHT has suggested breaking the present statement by a brief pause in the aerial bombings of North Vietnam, challenging the Communists to reciprocate by agreeing to a conference while the Vietcong halts its military action in South Vietnam. This suggestion, which we commend to your attention, is only one of several alternatives available to us if we are determined to maintain the initiative for peace. We urge you, Mr. President, to:

1. Initiate actions leading to an immediate cease-fire and an eventual end to the hostilities in Vietnam.
2. Support the establishment within South Vietnam of a government that is truly and fairly representative of all the people.
3. Support the establishment of a united Vietnam through free elections, to be held under the auspices of the United Nations within a reasonable time period.
4. Help convene, upon the successful resolution of the Vietnamese problem, a further conference to settle other international issues in Asia.

To do all this, Mr. President, will not indicate weakness but rather the strength that flows from doing what is right and just. Can this ingenuity we now lavish on waging war be put at the disposal of peace? Is it too late to begin to change in Vietnam?

Viola Flores and William H. Adams, John M. Anderson, Alice and Elton Atwater, Christins and Raymond Ayoub, Joseph D. Ban, David S. Bell, John Bellanti, Mrs. E. L. Bergman, Mrs. Lillis Berry, Cynthia and Robert Boyer, Jan and Fred Brown, Ed and Margaret Budd, Barry Clemson, Alan R. and Gloria Cleeton, Irene L. and Paul Cutler, Carl G. Davidson, Chloe and Louis Della-port, Peter Dooley, John Downey, Lydia and Sam Dubin, Frank and Julie Ehrenthal, Trudy and Alfred Engel, Miriam and Herbert Ershkowitz, George A. Etzweiler, Grant Farr, Irwin Feller, Joseph Flay, Margaret and Ernest Ferund, James Fritz, Karen Gellen, Heinz and Liza Gewing, Helmut J. Goltz, Bruce Goldberg, Leon and Avia Goriow.

Joe Graedon, Lowell K. Haynes, Jim Grant, Philip Henning, Alice and Howard S. Hoffman, Olive and Ari Hoogenboom, Paul Hornack, David

Houston, Mr. and Mrs. Merwin Humphrey, Barton L. Jenks, Shirley and Wells Keddle, Emil Kazes, Margaret and Philip A. Klein, Joe Kransdorf, Elizabeth and Charles Marsh, Mr. and Mrs. J. D. McAulay, Carol McClure, Betty McCorkel, Herbert A. McKinstry, Gerald and Ingeborg Moser, Helene and Frank Mulvey, Kathy and Gary Noll, Janet and Richard Olson, Hans Panofsky, Margaret Ann Panofsky, Ruth Panofsky, Warren D. Parbour, August L. Peastrel, Elizabeth and Roger Pen-nock, Jr., Antoinette Peters, Martha and William Rabinowitz, Anne and Robert Radlow, Jeffrey Reiman, Maria Pilar, and Hugo Ribeiro.

Jane Richey, Richard Rosenberg, Frieda and Marvin Rozen, Sam Sabean, Michael A. Santulli, Owen Sauerlander, Cythia Schein, Marcia and Robert Schoiten, Mrs. Caroline Seitz, Carol and Jeffrey Shapiro, Mary D. Shaw, Dorothy P. Shemick, Rosemary Shraer, Rose Marie and Charles J. Slonicka, Mae and Warren Smith, Lotte Steele, Anne Straus, Helen Striedieck, David B. Tanner, B. J. Thompson, Laurence I. Thompson, Thomas and Barbara Thwaites, Rosalind and Robert R. Tompkins, Arthur Townsend, Betty and Alan Trachtenberg, Mr. and Mrs. K. Vadam, Katherine and Joseph VanDerKar, Deborah Ward, Jose W. Ward, Lynn and John Withall, Kenneth Wodthke, Florence Yarnall, Gladys and Wilbur Zelinsky, Rima Zimmerman.

This open letter has been sponsored and paid for by the signers. It was written shortly after President Johnson's speech at John Hopkins University. Subsequent events indicate that all the parties involved in Vietnam are maintaining their collision course. Let us do all that we can to avert disaster.

CARMEL, CALIF.,

May 6, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: It is with a grateful heart that I thank you for lifting a voice against the duplicity and evil that stems from the White House and State Department these days. Vietnam is but one disgraces against all of us who live in this land, because of their machinations.

Now we are faced with the disgrace of the Dominican Republic. And the President uses the same disguise used by the Kluxers, George Wallace, the Birchers, et al.: "The Communists are taking over." Shades of Joe McCarthy.

I'm not dumb and know there are Communists there, of course, and I know there are Communists and Fascists right here in this holy land of ours. But I didn't think the President would stoop to the gutter to brainwash us with this idiosyncrasy.

So we went down to protect our nationals. Then came the denouement: we're digging in deep for munitions; not to be used against the criminals who have caused increased suffering to the poor after Trujillo was dumped, but against the poor themselves who are seeking to cast off their very heavy and painful yoke.

Thank you, Senator. Most of us fear that some cruel actions might again be taken against us for not approving of the evils from Washington.

Sincerely,

M. J. Kosty.

WOODLAWN, N.Y.

May 5.

Senator WAYNE MORSE.

DEAR SIR: I read with much interest your article in Daily News today headed "Johnson

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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Violates Constitution" and am glad there are a couple of Senators who know the true story. I always thought that the Senate and Congress were the only ones who could declare war and no matter what anyone says we certainly are at war now in Asia. It seems that three men, Johnson, Rusk, and McNamara, are taking too much leeway in sending our boys around the world in great numbers without the consent of Congress and the people.

As it is now, about 90 percent of our Senate and Congress are just puppets pulled on strings and having their arms twisted, not using their own thoughts and minds, or the will of those who they represent, and follow these men, by being called to the White House for a breakfast or a dinner. Surely America is in a bad way on account of this situation and we are being hurried fast as Khrushchev said they would do. It is about time America woke up and instead of just destroying parts of railroads and bridges in North Vietnam, the bombs should be wiping out Hanoi, Red China, and North Vietnam. Believe me the Reds, China and Russia are in no position now to fight back on account of economic conditions in those countries. They are buying their food now all over the world. They could not engage in a war at this time. If we wait too long it will be too late, as we saw in Cuba, and seeing now in Santo Domingo.

Our Supreme Court, that has gone soft on communism, is the fault of our trouble in the South, on our college campuses, and in our labor organizations, and unless you who are leaders and representatives don't do something soon, not only will New York and other larger cities, that are becoming jungles because of the Great Society (great giveaway), America will see the Red takeover, rioting, and unrest that we as citizens have never seen. As a world war vet when we fought for peace and democracy we sure are not going to have it.

I am sending a copy of this to Senator DIRKSEN. (I wrote him some time ago but never received an answer or acknowledgement. Also sending copy to New York News. "Let's have America for Americans.")

Very truly yours,
A. J. SCHOUDERMEIER.

MAY 5, 1965.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Millions of Americans thank you and look to you to represent them as one of the few legislators who try to keep America's conscience.

As little evidence as exists to indicate that some of the Vietnamese people may desire our presence. I see absolutely no justification for our invasion of the Dominican Republic. Yet I feel unrepresented and inarticulate in the current climate of conformity and hysteria, except for your lone voice.

Respectfully yours,

NORMAN E. HENKIN.

NEW YORK, N.Y.
May 5, 1965.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senator,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. MORSE: You and one or two of your colleagues in the U.S. Senate are the only men of vision, courage, and self-reliance in an abysmal collection of rubber stamps.

I thank you for defending the Constitution by reminding the President, the so-called legislators of the Senate and House, and the people at large, that it is in the Congress that the right to make or declare war is vested.

Coming while we are engaged in the brutal and bloody violation of North Vietnam, and at a time while we keep telling the world that we are solely concerned with

the defense and preservation of liberty, the invasion of the Dominican Republic to defend a military junta which usurped power by ousting the legitimately elected government of Juan Bosch, is without doubt the most egregious piece of official stupidity that could have been perpetrated at this juncture.

Latin America, and the uncommitted nations of the world, cannot possibly fail to grasp the full meaning of this action.

Please accept by profound respect and warm admiration.

Yours very truly,

EDWARD SCHINDELER.

ALHAMBRA, CALIF.

Re immoral and godless war.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,

U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Thank you for supplying me with such appropriate descriptive adjectives, in describing the present U.S. military action in Vietnam.

Newspapers print the following, "Sweat-Soaked Marine Kills His First Red Guerrilla."

By Gen. Wallace Greene, Jr.: "The Job I want them (marines) to do is to find the Vietcong and kill them."

So American boys are taught the fine arts of murder. Though the administration is using all the wily devices to whitewash and brainwash, the American public will not be fooled forever.

It is good to know that at least, in our Congress of the United States there are still American citizens who dare to give out with the truth.

For the American way of life,

Yours very truly,

PAUL M. SMITH.

[From the Alhambra (Calif.) Post Advocate,
Apr. 30, 1965]

"I FELT KIND OF SORRY FOR HIM"—SWEAT-SOAKED YOUNG MARINE KILLS HIS FIRST RED GUERRILLA

(By Peter Arnett)

HOI VUC, SOUTH VIETNAM.—The sweat-soaked young marine stood over the torn body of a Vietcong guerrilla with mixed emotions flitting across his face.

For Cpl. Fleas David, of Tuscaloosa, Ala., it was a day he would never forget. David had just killed his first man.

"I felt kind of sorry for him as I stood there," said David, a lanky 19-year-old who entered the Marine Corps after he left high school last year.

"And he didn't even have a weapon," he added.

[From the Los Angeles (Calif.) Times, Apr. 29, 1965]

MODERATE DAMAGE

U.S. officials reported "moderate damage" had been inflicted on the bridge, located about 100 miles north of the 17th parallel in a narrow valley running up the center of the country.

The size of the Marine force which struck out from the Da Nang missile and air base was not known, but it was believed several companies were involved.

Gen. Wallace Greene, Jr., Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, declared the Leathernecks would extend their operations out of the Da Nang base as far as necessary to insure its protection.

"The one job I want them to do is to find the Vietcong and kill them," Greene said at a Da Nang news conference before his departure for Hawaii.

The marines were moving out into an area 10 to 15 miles west of the Da Nang complex. There were reports, unconfirmed by Marine officials, that more Leathernecks soon would join the 10,000 stationed at Da Nang, situated 350 miles northeast of Saigon.

The attack was carried out by two A-4 Skyhawks and two F-8 Crusaders. The

American planes drew light weapons fire, and pilots reported seeing black puffs of smoke indicating antiaircraft fire.

U.S. military officials in Saigon reported Wednesday that government forces last week compiled one of their best marks of the war, killing 605 Vietcong while losing only 100 of their own troops.

But 18 Americans died during the week, 8 of them when 2 helicopters were hit by bullets and collided while airborne. Twenty-three other Americans were wounded, and a pilot was missing on a raid over North Vietnam.

(A Cambodian communique monitored in Tokyo said Cambodia charged that four South Vietnamese planes violated airspace Wednesday and bombed the village of An Long.)

DANVILLE, ILL.,
May 5, 1965.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: Thank you for your constancy on the Vietnam situation.

To me we are embarked on a Deutschland Uber Alles route and have bypassed the United Nations concept.

As a Democratic Party precinct captain I am all but speechless at the role of President Johnson. I guess he is so determined to "facsimile" F.D.R. who truly had a problem on his hands pre the exposing of Hitler, that he is trying to rewrite the facts.

What a terrible thing. What a terrible tragedy for humankind.

But one more thing bears mention: In seeking national solidarity President Johnson has allowed the southern U.S. concept to betray the commonsense we so desperately need just now. The southern U.S. concept sees all the North as Communist-inspired.

What a terrible thing. What a terrible tragedy for our democracy.

Sincerely,

MRS. JOHN T. RAUSCH.

P.S.—In my opinion President Johnson threw away the United Nations concept to appease the thinking of men like Senator RUSSELL LONG.

HARTSDALE, N.Y.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I just had to sit down and write this note of praise and encouragement on your recent stand in re South Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.

Yours is truly the voice of America. Please do not stop. I know it must be terribly lonely in the Senate; but truly great men fight for principles—not for popularity.

Yours, for a successful campaign for peace.

MATTHEW CHAVES.

MINTON CO.,

Mountain View, Calif., May 3, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I want you to know that you have my support in your outspoken and courageous criticism of the Johnson-McNamara-Rusk war policy in Vietnam. Keep it up.

Sincerely yours,

OWENS MINTON.

HAYWARD, CALIF.,
May 3, 1965.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I write to give you a qualified support for what you have been recently saying on the Vietnam issue.

It is, to me, almost unbelievable that should be so grossly deceived by our high leader. I rejoice every time I hear you say what it is.

The pity seems to be that—while there millions who feel as I, and millions who

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even march, enough certainly to bury the war mongers in a landslide—there is no one to get them together and make them articulate.

I would gladly see such a movement organized around you. I thought it was lacking in courage to see the French philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre, refuse to come to Cornell to speak, because he thinks it would be futile.

The current step in the President's well-Madisonized campaign seems to be getting big names to endorse his product. Can't we get out the little people?

I remember with joy and pride, Senator MORSE, coming to know you in Sacramento, Calif., several years ago. So I send personal greetings, if I may.

Very sincerely,

CORRELL M. JULIAN.

APRIL 29, 1965.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You have appealed for the people to follow you in the Vietnam situation.

I am writing to say that I am not following you. And of course I join millions whom you do not seem to recognize.

The constant deceit of the people, first concerning the very reasons for the situation, then regarding the number and functions of men whom you sent in, then concerning your methods—poison gas, brutality, etc.—has but increased with your new and recent stepup.

It was all too apparent to the discerning, however, that you were preparing a good segment of the press for mass deceit. Then came a picture campaign, in which two or three Americans were pictured being brought home as casualties, with never a word about the hundreds of other casualties. Then came the white paper. Probably an occasional proposition in it could be believed. Then came private correspondence. I wrote you, but the State Department stepped in and answered the letter, with a little white paper, which was no more successful than the big one. I understand this method is being widely used.

So I make one more appeal to my President, that you embrace the opportunities which are still open—for deeds, not just words—to arrive at understandings, and pull out.

Sincerely yours,

CORRELL M. JULIAN.

WAYNE, MICH.,
May 5, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I understand the President is asking the Congress for a "vote of confidence" on his Vietnam and Dominican policies. I further understand you plan to vote against his request for \$700 million.

I support your position. As you are well aware, this is unpopular, at the moment, but it is the right position.

It seems to me we have violated international law and the whole tradition of the past in our Dominican intervention. It is interesting that Bolivia and Uruguay have opposed our intervention.

Our position in Vietnam is somewhat similar except that here we originally went in on an advice and training basis. Now, since an election in which Mr. Johnson posed as the opposite of a trigger-happy candidate, Mr. Goldwater, we suddenly find ourselves bombing North Vietnam.

It seems to me we have embarked on a dangerous and tragic course since January 1, 1965. It further seems to me that the 1964 residential winner waged a completely dishonest campaign. Barry Goldwater may be wrong but, at least, he was honest.

I have little confidence, although one can ways hope, that this Congress will become anything more than a subservient agent of

an all-powerful President, but one can hope that reason and observance of international law will eventually return as a basis for American policy.

Yours truly,

JOHN R. RYAN.

MAY 1, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: May I applaud you for your vigorous and courageous speech attacking U.S. policy in Vietnam and denouncing Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara and the President for their efforts in escalating the war there? American policy in Vietnam is indeed godless and immoral, as you point out, for it is causing untold suffering in that unhappy country and grave anxiety everywhere else in the world. This reckless fanning of the flames of war will at best lose America the friendship of Japan, and at the worst spark a world conflagration that will incinerate us all.

The day after your speech appeared on page 1 of the Asahi Evening News, an excellent English language newspaper in Japan, there appeared in this same paper the censored testimony of Undersecretary of State George Ball and Douglas MacArthur II before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (a clipping which I am enclosing) in which they claimed that the reason why Japanese newspapers are so critical of U.S. policies in Vietnam is that there is a large number of Communists on their editorial staffs.

What is amazing about the statements of Ball and MacArthur, and even the subsequent interrogations by Chairman FULBRIGHT, is the ignorance they reveal of the state of mind of the Japanese, and these persons total inability to comprehend how anybody, least of all the Japanese, could be critical of American policy in Vietnam.

The Asahi Shimbun (the Japanese language paper) and the Mainichi, the two papers accused of Communist infiltration, vigorously denied the charges of Ball and MacArthur, as you will see from the clippings which I am enclosing, and responsible Japanese with whom I have spoken likewise agree that the editorial policies of these newspapers are free from Communist influence. Indeed, the extensive coverage of the Vietnam war in Japan includes magazines, TV, and radio, as well as the daily newspapers. These media are on the whole critical of U.S. policy in Vietnam, and in this, I think it is fair to say, they reflect the feelings of the average thoughtful Japanese.

As an American Buddhist priest who has been living in Japan for almost 15 years, I can honestly say that in all that period this is the first time I have been able to discern strong anti-American Government feelings among the Japanese. But they have good reason to oppose present American policy in Vietnam. They themselves have been bombed, so they know the suffering and destruction it causes. But they are also fearful that if either China or Russia or both enter the war, as is very likely if the war continues to escalate, they will be targets for attack by these powers.

Dear Senator MORSE, I pray that you be granted the strength to continue to oppose, with all your forensic skill, the madness of our Government's policies in Vietnam, not only for the sake of the decency and self-respect of the United States, but for the sake of the suffering Vietnamese and peoples everywhere who are worried and anxious lest Vietnam erupt into the third world war.

Respectfully yours,

PHILIP KAPLEAU.

KAMAKURA, JAPAN.

[From the Asahi Evening News, Apr. 30, 1965]

ASAHI SHIMBUN DENIES INFILTRATION BY REDS

The Asahi Shimbun issued a statement today denying charges made in the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the

newspaper is infiltrated and influenced in its editorial policies by Communists.

A censored transcript of the testimony of Undersecretary of State George Ball and Douglas MacArthur II, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, in closed-door hearings in the committee April 7 was made public in Washington Wednesday.

Mr. Ball was quoted as saying that the Mainichi Shimbun has on its staff "quite a number of Communists * * * and has taken a critical attitude" toward U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Mr. MacArthur, former American ambassador to Japan, was reported to have said, "They both are infiltrated. Asahi had over 200 members of the Communist Party on the editorial staff."

The Asahi Shimbun issued a denial in the form of a statement by managing editor Isami Suzukawa, which said the charges were utterly untrue.

"It is extremely regrettable that high officials of the U.S. State Department gave testimony in the Senate implying that there are Communists on the editorial staff of the Asahi Shimbun and that the editorial policy of the Asahi Shimbun is influenced by these Communists. This testimony is absolutely contrary to the truth," Mr. Suzukawa's statement read.

"The Asahi Shimbun is published on the basis of its traditional policy of impartiality and nonpartisanship. It maintains its own viewpoint of fair reporting and editorializing and is not influenced by Communists or any other outside pressures.

"The Asahi Shimbun reflects public opinion and has always criticized and will continue to criticize, when necessary, the policies, not only of the United States, but of other countries as well.

"However, these criticisms have always been made from a spirit of friendship and there are no ulterior motives. We especially hope that the American Government and people will listen frankly to our friendly criticism," the statement concluded.

[From the Asahi Evening News, Apr. 29, 1965]

BALL, MACARTHUR SAY PRESS HERE
"INFILTRATED"

WASHINGTON, April 28.—Two high-ranking State Department officials have told Congress one reason Japanese newspapers are so critical of U.S. policies is that there is a large number of Communists on the editorial staffs.

Under Secretary of State George Ball and Douglas MacArthur II, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, testified on the subject recently in closed-door hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A censored transcript of their testimony was made public today.

Committee Chairman J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT asked why the newspapers of Japan were so critical of the United States despite the fact that Japan is "supposed to be our strongest ally in that area."

He quoted a story in the Tokyo Mainichi about an interview with a special envoy, Shunichi Matsumoto, who had been sent by Premier Sato to survey the situation in Vietnam.

Mr. Ball replied: "That Mainichi, which is the largest newspaper in Japan—in fact I think it is the largest newspaper in the world—has on its staff quite a number of Communists and has taken a critical attitude."

Mr. FULBRIGHT remarked that Asahi had also been critical, and Mr. MacArthur said: "They both are infiltrated. Asahi had over 200 members of the Communist Party on the editorial staff."

Mr. FULBRIGHT remarked that Mr. Matsumoto is not a Communist, and Mr. MacArthur agreed that he was not. "He is a former

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diplomat turned politician," Mr. MacArthur said.

"What has happened here is not an expression of the view of the Japanese Government," Mr. Ball said. "This is an expression of a man who went on a factfinding mission and has come back."

He added that it was "not clear" whether the mission was an official one.

AMERICAN BAPTIST CAMPUS MINISTRY IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA,
Berkeley, Calif., March 30, 1965.

President LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: During this month a number of us have engaged in fasting, each for 48 hours, as (1) in repentance for our share, unwilling though it is, in the brutal, barbarous, illegal, and immoral war in Vietnam; and (2) as a deep expression of our concern that negotiation and economic and social aid may take the place of military escalation there.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE L. COLLINS.

LOS ALTOS, CALIF.,
April 23, 1965.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. MORSE: After seeing you on today's newscast; I am thankful that we still have a few statesmen in Congress who are ready to stand up to be counted. When the executive branch of our Government delegates the enormous powers to Cabinet head men like Wirtz, McNamara, and Katzenbach; who are immune to constructive criticism but are willing to gamble with our citizens' lives; we at home wonder why we have a Congress.

Mr. McNamara estimated that this tab for our interference in South Vietnam, will cost us about \$1½ billion in the 1965 fiscal year. Just how did Congress face up to accept this decision of the Pentagon? We are in war. Yet, who declared this war; without the sole decision of you, the representatives of the people?

On February 11, 1963, I had written your colleague Senator MARGARET CHASE SMITH. I was much disturbed because a son of my friend in southern California was killed in Vietnam. I asked her two questions:

1. For what cause has this man and others given up his life?

2. What is the Government telling the unfortunate parents and relatives? She sent my letter to the Defense Department and returned a two page brief from Mr. Arthur Sylvester in which he states:

"U.S. assistance to the Republic of Vietnam is of limited nature. This is a Vietnamese war. They are fighting it, and they are directing it. In February of last year, President Kennedy noted that we have not sent combat troops to Vietnam. That is still true. Our role is limited to furnishing the Vietnamese with advisory, logistical, and technical support." This is the excerpt from the Assistant Secretary of Defense in his letter of February 23, 1963. This morning a reporter at a news conference referred our present fracas in South Vietnam, a McNamara's war. He apparently was not abashed at accepting this label. We now have perhaps 30,000 men in Vietnam.

Again today, it is reported that the Government will sanction (?) raises in steel prices, I suppose if they grant labor's demands. This will mean another snowballing of increased costs of living. Being a retired individual, not destitute, but feeling the pinch that has affected those of us who must live on a static income and continue to pay our way; I feel that the Government has let us down in not stabilizing the dollar purchasing power. It has permitted inflation and in many cases we are creating a Great Society out of those who haven't tried to create wealth through production.

This is why many folks today are questioning the function of a Congress, that rubber-stamps laws dictated by the executive department. So, I want to thank you when you fight for a principle regarding the Vietnamese affair. Those of us who fought in the First World War have learned how wrong we were when we believed we were fighting to end all wars.

Yours very truly,

FRANK J. KRACHA.

WARSON WOODS, MO.,
May 5, 1965.

Senator STUART SYMINGTON,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SYMINGTON: I want to register a strong protest against the \$700 million war-appropriation measure, and the steam-roller tactics by which it is proposed to rush it through Congress. In the name of heaven, let Congress stop and consider the significance of what it is being asked to do. The President admits the money itself is not needed and announces that he wants the measure passed as evidence of popular support of his policy in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic. Then why the haste? Why not take time to debate his policy? The fact is that millions of Americans think that Johnson is pursuing a terribly wrong and dangerous course of action. If the President wants Congress to endorse his policy, he should not use this devious device but should ask for a vote directed to the policy itself. Moreover, before Congress gives such an endorsement it should be extremely careful to define precisely what policy it is approving. As I understand him, Johnson has stated that he wants to tell the world that we are determined to pursue his new policy no matter what the cost and no matter what the risk. I, for one, would give him no such blank check. The new policy appears to be this: to intervene with military force to whatever extent deemed appropriate by the Defense Department, wherever there is a revolutionary outbreak which the President's inner circle of advisers—presumably including the Secretary of State—concludes is or might be "Communist dominated."

To what ridiculous and suicidal end will this new policy lead us? Suppose China decides to intervene in Vietnam? Will the President then approve the use of nuclear weapons? He may well do so, relying on Congress overwhelming approval of an appropriation measure. Suppose the Soviet Union then is impelled to resort to its nuclear arsenal. Who will accept the awful responsibility for pushing the red button? The President of the United States—or Congress?

I urge you and the other Members of the Congress at the very least to somehow limit the appropriation measure so that its passage would seem inevitable and not fairly be treated as a blanket endorsement of the President's policy as it has developed to date, or certainly not as a blanket endorsement of what other steps in the process of escalation his advisers may see fit to recommend in the immediate or remote future.

Very truly yours,

OWEN T. ARMSTRONG.

(Copies to Senators LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, HENRY M. JACKSON, MARGARET C. SMITH, J. W. FULBRIGHT, MICHAEL J. MANSFIELD, WAYNE MORSE, ALBERT GORE, FRANK J. LAUSCHE, FRANK CHURCH, GEORGE D. AIKEN, CLIFFORD P. CASE, and editor, Post-Dispatch.)

HOOD RIVER, OREG.,
May 3, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE.

DEAR SIR: I have been intending to write to you for some time to commend you for your stand about fighting in southeast Asia. It seems absolutely criminal for our Government to go in and shoot up that country, leaving it in a shambles like Korea, I sup-

pose, after killing off a lot of the American soldiers and others.

I cannot understand why President Johnson didn't accept the offer Secretary General U Thant to let the U.N. mediate the trouble and build up southeast Asia with the Mekong project. Though I really do believe it was the military-industrial combine insisted that their stockpile of weapons should be used so they could say they needed more.

Our WSCS had a study "The United States and the New Nations," by Vera Micheles Dean, and in that book she stated that 80 percent of the money for foreign aid stayed in this country. And a pamphlet came at the same time telling how much the AID organization was going to do for needy nations, and it made the same statement that 80 percent of the money would stay in this country—implying that because of that more people in our country were in favor of the foreign aid program. At the same time this clipping was sent to me which I intended to send you. For I have heard you advocating less aid for the military and more for the people.

Several years ago I wrote you a very explosive letter to which you replied kindly that if you had a chance to get acquainted with me you could make me change my opinion. So I must tell you that I admire your courage in standing for the right things on so many issues. Of course, one of the main ones is on the liquor question. If you visited Jack Travis' cattle when you were in Oregon, you were right across the road from my house.

I wonder how long it will take President Johnson to bankrupt this country.

Very truly yours,

MRS. H. A. SYLVESTER.

DENVER, COLO.,
May 4, 1965.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I want you to know that my wife and I agree wholeheartedly with your stand on Vietnam.

This bombing of North Vietnam seems senseless, immoral, and cruel—yes and costly.

We had no business getting mixed up in this Vietnam situation in the first place.

Sincerely yours,

SHERLEY N. BURCH.

ALBERTA, CANADA,
May 2, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: I am sending a copy of my recent letter to our Prime Minister, Hon. Lester Pearson, for your interest, to which I received a friendly reply.

The 1954 Vietnam agreements have not been lived up to by Britain, the United States of America, and but feebly by Canada.

President Eisenhower's words (August 1953): "Indochina and the whole of southeast Asia are essential to the United States, both for strategic and political reasons," to which I would add material reasons, provide no valid excuse for interference in internal strife in other countries with which you will surely agree.

Now 2 years later, the United States of America seems to have assumed—or arrogated to itself—the responsibility of policing the world (3 days ago U.S. marine landed in the Dominican Republic in support of another puppet government). While the U.S. President under pressure from the military, is now trying to achieve is nothing less than a new form of colonialism which must be utterly rejected.

A withdrawal from Vietnam would indicate the acceptance of the facts of international life, leaving non-Western peoples to work out their own destiny, and this would be the way for a more realistic and beneficial ordering of their politicoeconomic life. As for the National Liberation Front—cal

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Vietcong by the U.S. advisers—far from being a group of Communist terrorists, it was a broad organization including almost all political and religious opponents of the Diem dictatorship. Its 31 members central committee is headed by a non-Communist lawyer who had spent years in Saigon prisons for his defense of civil rights. Represented are leading Buddhist priests, Catholic priests, Protestant clergymen as well as businessmen and representatives of the three leading opposition parties. Its program is far from Communist in tone; it calls for peace, withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces, democratic elections and eventual reunification for the whole country—prevented from taking place in 1956 by none other than the democratic United States of America and its puppet Diem.

Please use your influence in restoring the good name of the United States by helping to bring an end to this cruel and unjust war. I read heartening things about you.

Sincerely and deeply concerned,

Mrs. Reta G. M. Rowan.

(Copy to President Johnson, Senators Ernest Gruening, and Frank Church.)

ALBERTA, CANADA,

April 6, 1965.

Hon. Lester Pearson,
Prime Minister of Canada,
House of Commons,
Ottawa.

DEAR MR. PEARSON: It was indeed heartening to know that you had received the World Peace Award of Temple University in Philadelphia, and that in accepting it you spoke for the majority of Canadian people in your proposals to President Johnson regarding Vietnam.

In my view it is a case of the old quotation: "For what is a man profited if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" and that the very existence of the whole world as we know it is risked at the present time for political reasons. It is true that through very efficient mass communications media we are made aware that something in the nature of a world revolution is taking place today, but it is also true that the United Nations Charter, in article 2, No. 7, states that there shall be no intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state—and surely this holds good as a moral precept for any member state.

That the United States intervention in South Vietnam was (or is) on behalf of the Vietnamese people is sheer sham, for we all know that those governing that small country at the time were not democratically elected, nor even popular with the masses of the people (as is also the case with the three subsequent coups).

We have to accept that change is synonymous with life itself, and we have seen great changes even in a life time, as for instance in our powerful neighbor, the U.S.S.R., and we surely have no moral right or excuse to try to impose our will by killing, upon other experimenting nations. We have only to put ourselves in their place to sense the resulting outrage for any such action.

I would like to thank you for having the Under Secretary of State reply to my last letter to you, of February 13, and for sending me your addresses to the Ottawa Canadian Club and the United Church Board of Evangelism. I trust you will use your influence as Prime Minister Wilson toward ending the war in Vietnam.

Respectfully and sincerely,

RETA G. M. ROMAN.

SLINGERLANDS, N.Y.,

May 4, 1965.

Senator Wayne Morse,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Please accept my very warm thanks for your efforts to extricate us from

our blunders in Vietnam. It was this kind of foreign policy I thought I was rejecting when I preferred Mr. Johnson over Mr. Goldwater last November.

I am particularly incensed by the superior tone of the Secretary of State in referring to dissenters in the academic community. The State Department has become the purveyors of myths to support an indefensible intrusion into the internal affairs of an unfortunately divided country.

Our actions cannot but deal a heavy blow to the U.N. as well as to our own image everywhere. I hope and pray that you will continue your struggle for sanity to a successful conclusion. I shall urge my representatives in Congress to give you their full support.

Respectfully yours,

ALBERT MORRISON.

P.S.—Enclosing copy of recent letter to the President.

SLINGERLANDS, N.Y.,

May 3, 1965.

President LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: This is to inform you of my profound distress over our military intervention in the Vietnamese civil war. The white paper which purports to justify this intervention has been described as "a dismal failure" by an eminent historian and political scientist, Prof. H. G. Morgenthau, of the University of Chicago. On the contrary, this document tends rather to support the earlier official view of the civil nature of the military struggle wracking the Vietnamese people.

We have thus violated the Geneva Pact of 1954 in support of a dubious South Vietnam Government which not only failed to carry out the election mandate of the pact but instituted the reign of repression which provoked the present rebellion. I, therefore, take my stand with Senators MORSE, GRUENING, CHURCH, MCGOVERN, FULBRIGHT, and others in their sharp dissent with our present harsh military venture in Vietnam. I am appalled by the bombing, burning, chemical, and other weapons with which our military have been experimenting in that unhappy land. I plead, nay, demand an end to such barbarities for so they are no matter who unleashes them. I ask that you convene forthwith an assembly of the Geneva Pact powers to fashion a viable, representative Vietnamese state. Once a cease-fire is established, it should be maintained by a U.N. military force and American troops withdrawn.

Mr. President, you must lead, not follow on the way to the conference table if we are to regain our role as the leader of the democratic way.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT MORRISON.

EDMONTON, ALBERTA, CANADA,

May 5, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
The Senate,
Washington D. C., U.S.A.

SIR: About a month ago, when events in the Vietnamese war began to be escalated to a new high pitch, I wrote a letter to Prime Minister Pearson, the substance of which is given in the enclosed duplicated letter. (This letter is a copy of the one I sent to Canadian newspapers and others to try to get support for the idea contained in it.) I felt that some practical method had to be worked out to replace the vacuum left when the United Nations Assembly was paralyzed last session. This method would need to bypass both the positions of the Soviet Union, France, and the other nonpaying nations, and that of the United States, so that neither side would "lose face" or pride, and paralyze the new

move. The aim should be to revitalize the United Nations, so that it could stop the escalation of the Vietnamese war before it reached the point of no return. My plan had to be initiated by the smaller nations; I proposed that Canada take the lead.

During the last 2 weeks or so, the names of Santo Domingo, India and Pakistan, and Southern Rhodesia have been added to the list of those nations where war, or threatened war is going on. The world is increasingly full of nations whose boundaries are guarded by military forces under cease-fire agreements, some with peace-keeping forces under the United Nations to try to prevent open war. Some nations, such as Indonesia, are on the edge of open war. The widespread sale or gift of modern military weapons by the older industrial powers to the new nations for the purpose of security, has not produced security, but is producing the opposite. War is no longer formally declared against a nation, but is suddenly used to gain some advantage when a nation can supposedly get away with it. Very few peace treaties have been made since 1945 to end these local wars; instead, these wars end only in cease-fire agreements (or in no agreements) which can be broken at any time to continue the wars. The whole situation is fast growing in unstable equilibrium, or in no equilibrium.

The longer these "brush-fire" wars are allowed to simmer away, according to my observation, the more difficult will be the efforts required to settle them, and the more likely they will involve other nations. The fear of atomic weapons seems to have little effect on preventing war. It may even encourage the smaller nations to use the war method, since they can probably get away with no intervention from the atomic nations, on the assumption that they dare not use their atomic weapons. Even the civil war, which began locally (perhaps?), and up by being in fact wars between the atomic nations.

The one organization that should be available at such a time as this is the United Nations. But it is paralyzed by the promise of the United States to challenge the defaulting nations on their right to vote in the Assembly. This paralysis has lasted a whole session, creating an enormous power vacuum. The longer the United Nations stays paralyzed, the greater this power vacuum will become. The more chance the People's Republic of China will have to woo the nations of Africa and southeast Asia from the present defunct United Nations into the counter "united nations" it has recently proposed.

Communist China should have been taken into the United Nations in 1960-61, during the time of the food shortage, when the country had lost much of its aggressiveness. It would be much better to fight by words in the United Nations than by bullets, or bombs. This does not ignore the intransigence of the days of Vishinsky. Delegates could be trained for that as Dr. Martin Luther King's followers have been trained to meet the savage onslaughts of the police in Alabama by nonviolent methods.

Until the United Nations is restored as the power center of the world, based essentially on moral power, the huge and growing forces of disintegration will continue to grab control, with the growing threat of escalating war into world war III, with the use of atomic weapons to destroy mankind. I trust this letter will be of some real use to you in trying to stop this escalation.

Yours sincerely,

LEWIS V. SMITH.

MARION, IOWA,

May 4, 1965.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Have just finished reading Drew Pearson's article "Sees Big War

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Danger Intensifying." As a result I sent the following telegram to President Johnson: "Do not drag us into world war. Get rid of Rusk and McNamara." I write regularly to Johnson every week and occasionally to Rusk and McNamara. It is most discouraging. Thanks for all you are doing. Why can't America wake up? Best wishes.

Sincerely,

IRENE G. COOMBS.

EVANSTON, ILL.,
May 4, 1965.

Senator FRANK CHURCH,
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

GENTLEMEN: I have just heard the news that President Johnson has asked Congress for an immediate appropriation of \$700 million, to show American determination to remain in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. He went on to indicate that the Government of the United States is determined to put down any revolution anywhere which it does not like. Thus our country has come full circle—from being the first successful anticolonial revolution and champion of the self-determination of people, to being—if Johnson has his way—the main suppressor of revolution, and the right of self-determination of people.

It seems clear to us that President Johnson, by word and deed, has announced a new foreign policy for the United States—precisely the Goldwater policy which he pretended to oppose during the recent presidential campaign. He has announced a policy of putting down any revolution which he does not like, justifying this by labeling it "Communist," thus in effect saying that only the United States has the right to determine the legitimacy of any revolution. We thereby become judge, jury, prosecutor, policeman, and jailer for the world. This tears up the Atlantic Charter, which recognizes the right of people to self-determination, and substitutes a right of U.S. determination for all countries of the world—a policy akin to Hitler's in concept and similar in result, flies in the face of the United Nations Charter, which does not recognize the right of any nation to interfere in the internal affairs of another country, and tramples on international law. Such a policy can have only disastrous consequences, at the very best bringing about universal hatred of our country, killing, and maiming of untold persons, both American and foreign, the vast destruction of property (which we would presumably rebuild, according to Johnson's southeast Asia plan), greatly increased arms expenditures, all of this resulting in leading the United States downward toward becoming a second-rate power by squandering our natural resources and what remains of our good name. At worst, this policy could lead to the total disaster of thermonuclear war.

You have been providing splendid leadership in opposition to the administration's policy in Vietnam. Now that the underlying logic of the U.S. position there has been made the basis of American policy everywhere, we look to you to take the lead in opposing this appropriation and in exposing the logic of President Johnson's position.

The President, undoubtedly realizing the strong opposition of a major segment of the American people to this policy, has adopted the tactic of presenting us with an accomplished fact, then giving his "explanation" as to why, which he clearly thinks no one has the right to question. (This reminds me of McCarthy.) He then demands blind acceptance—indeed, automatic support—from Congress and the American people. If we are to preserve world peace and the good name of our country, if we are to build a great society at home and maintain the freedom our forefathers brought forth at great

cost of work, struggle and blood, President Johnson's new foreign policy must be vigorously and successfully opposed.

To prevent the ramming through of this appropriation before the people have had time to realize what is happening and to express their opposition, we ask that you and your colleagues who have done such noble work on Vietnam lead an extensive and intensive debate on the appropriation and the policy behind it. If it is necessary to prevent this measure from being rammed through, I would even suggest a filibuster. Though I dislike filibusters, it would be justified in this case to prevent an unpopular and disastrous course from being forced on our country.

Yours for a decent foreign policy,
ARNOLD F. BECCHETTI.

NORTHAMPTON, MASS., May 5, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Although not your constituent, I write you knowing that our views on the military adventures of the administration are similar. I am sure you will do everything you can to avoid in the Senate the haste with which the House had apparently given the President the money he requested. There is no emergency, no crisis, no Pearl Harbor here. You owe it to the large number of Americans who share your views to see that hearings and a full debate are held.

Secretary Rusk has answered me and my academic colleagues with insults. Can it be that he does not think his own arguments sufficiently good to answer us with reason? Keep up the good fight.

Sincerely,

BRUCE HAWKINS.

SEATTLE, WASH.,
May 5, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,

DEAR SIR: Do appreciate your strong statements and the position you are taking on both South Vietnam and on the Dominican Republic.

We must prevent the military and the CIA from taking over complete control of our Government. Your statements and actions are most important.

Please keep up your battle.

Thank you.

JOHN E. MAGRAW.

TOLEDO, OREG.,
May 5, 1965.

Senator MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

What you say makes good sense to me and I'm writing Johnson to this effect.

J. E. WRIGHT.

FLINT, MICH.,
April 26, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE.

DEAR SIR: This is to advise you. I am flatly against our procedure in Vietnam.

I feel it is time for the conference table, rather than bombing that small country, before we lose the opportunity.

Your truly,

MRS. KARIN THORNGREN.

P.S.—I have written my Senators my feelings.

MILWAUKIE, OREG.,
May 5, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: As ardent supporters of your views on foreign policy in the past, we would like to commend your opposition to the war being waged by President Johnson in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnam. We earnestly hope that you will speak for ra-

tional people in Oregon, as well as in the rest of the United States, by voting against the President's request for more funds to support these acts of outright aggression by our "peace-loving Government." Please do your part to stop our Nation from rushing headlong into war under the pretense of "saving the world from communism," or soon other nations will be waging war to save themselves from us. We wish you Godspeed in your courageous endeavor.

Sincerely,

Mr. and Mrs. COLEMAN BECHTOL.

THE FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH,
Scottsdale, Pa., May 5, 1965.

Hon. Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I thank God for your "voice crying in the wilderness" opposing the senseless foreign policy of our Government in Vietnam and now in the Dominican Republic. I am with you 100 percent in crusading for peace—not for war.

Several weeks ago a Canadian newspaperman raised the following questions about Vietnam:

1. Where do we stand on the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam in violation of the 1954 truce accord?

2. How much of a civil war is going on in South Vietnam?

3. If the Chinese and North Vietnamese are guilty, why not an all-out U.N. action?

Similar questions can now be raised about our intervention in the Dominican.

During the election campaign, Senator Goldwater was caricatured as being "trigger happy." Many of us are raising the question, "Who is trigger happy now?"

You may be assured of my continued interest and support. And may your tribe increase in the days ahead that we may be spared the horrors of another Korea.

Cordially yours,

GORDON S. WILSON.

OLDCASTLE, ONTARIO, CANADA,
May 3, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: This small item on your stand on peace was in our "Windsor Star":

"SENATOR URGES TOP MEN GO

"WASHINGTON.—Senator WAYNE MORSE, Democrat, of Oregon, wants Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk to resign to help bring an end to 'this Nation's outlawry in southeast Asia.'"

"In a Senate speech Monday, MORSE bitterly attacked U.S. policy in South Vietnam and said if a change is not made 'a couple of months from now there will be hundreds of thousands fighting and dying in Asia.'"

"The Senator singled out the two Cabinet members for the brunt of his criticism. He said he was shocked by Rusk's speech Saturday night in which he said the Secretary of State called administration critics modern-day appeasers."

We also saw and heard Secretary of State Dean Rusk on his Saturday night speech and could hardly believe our ears.

We commend you for your courage in speaking out for peaceful negotiations, and all the rest.

Yours sincerely,

MYRTLE CUSHMAN BROWN.

P.S. We have also written to Senator WILLIAM FULLERIGHT and Senator GEORGE Aiken.

WICHITA, KANS.,
May 5, 1965

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I uneasily remember that in their fear of communism, the people of Germany turned to a dictatorial and nationalist Hitler. I am deeply concerned

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my country is backing military junta in South Vietnam and Dominican Republic. I am also disturbed that it is being hinted that mounting military spending could offset an economic recession caused by added medical care costs. Like you, I wonder that the President can go ahead and start wars without advice and consent of Congress. I also worry about alienating India, Pakistan, Cambodia, and now countries in our hemisphere; about going against U.N. and O.A.S.

I also feel that those who voted against Goldwater, fearing his views on foreign policy, have been ironically betrayed by our present militaristic foreign policy.

Sincerely,

MARGARET BANGS.

YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO,
May 5, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

ESTEEMED SENATOR: I support your Vietnam stand. My only regret is that you do not represent my State.

Yours truly,

ANDREW SCHWEFEL.

EUGENE, OREG.,
April 25, 1965.

President LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR PRESIDENT JOHNSON: I am a professor at the University of Oregon, one of the organizers of the all-night protest session against the war in Vietnam held here last Friday. I think you should know some things about this protest movement that do not show in newspaper reports or in official statements. In the first place, the students who took part here were among the most able that we have. A disproportionate number are graduate students, highly selected for intelligence and intellectual achievement, and many of the undergraduates are of equal ability. They are persons whose contributions are essential to the continued progress of our society. In contrast, the supporters of the present Vietnam policy who showed up at Friday night's meeting gave no evidence of such intellectual quality either in the somewhat naive questions they asked or in the boisterous heckling in which they indulged at times. Only a few of them were enough interested to stay through the after-midnight discussions and express their views.

The second factor to which your attention may not have been drawn is the character of these all-night sessions. They are not simply protests, but a very concentrated form of education. By the time the participants have spent 12 hours listening to speeches, asking and answering questions, and examining prepared discussion materials, they know a great deal about such things as the Geneva 1954 agreements, the history of our involvement in southeast Asia, and other relevant matters. The plan announced last week by the State Department to step up their public information activities is not likely to have much influence on this group. They know why we are in Vietnam, they are convinced that our presence there has no legal or ethical justification, and they will be impressed only by policies that are directed toward extricating us rather than involving us more deeply. Statements like the one in this morning's paper that the United States is "retaining the option of using small nuclear weapons" solidify the opposition in that they serve to confirm our worst fears—namely, that forces in the administration are trying to provoke a preventive war with China.

The third point I wish to make is that the opposition to present policy is extremely intense and serious. It grows out of a profound moral conviction similar in quality to that expressed in the civil rights movement. If

our protests do not produce a change in policy, we will not subside, but rather find new ways of expression. I personally am considering nonpayment of income tax as one such possibility. There are undoubtedly many others. The ingenuity and resourcefulness with which dedicated young people can develop new ways of dramatizing their views have become apparent during the struggle over civil rights. They will demonstrate the same sort of creativity in this cause.

Sincerely yours,

LEONA E. TYLER, Ph. D.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES,
Los Angeles, Calif., April 28, 1965.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I think every earnest citizen in the United States owes you a vote of confidence and support in your dedicated efforts to sustain the integrity of this country in matters of fiscal solvency and from present foreign military intervention in southeast Asia.

The suggestion often made that by some divine ordinance this country must undertake the responsibility to engage continually in global fighting and military intervention in foreign countries rests upon emotional, irresponsible propaganda, and appeal that is befogging the American public with the thought that "An aggressive war is wicked, but a defensive war is righteous."

To suggest that a man is an isolationist because he opposes this type of global military intervention is both irresponsible, unprincipled, and vicious.

I am sure there is a great bloc of the American people who are in back of you 100 percent.

May I congratulate you upon your emphatic and gainful efforts.

Very sincerely yours,

JOSEPH L. CALL,
Judge.

LAMONT, CALIF.,
May 1, 1965.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

You are to be commended for your efforts in trying to bring peace to southeast Asia. Maybe there are those who are trying to solve the difficult problem of population explosion; but perpetual war is a poor solution.

Sincerely yours,

EARL BENHAM.

[From the Bakersville Californian, Apr. 26, 1965]

CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC COUNCIL LEADERS
VOTE TO QUIT VIETNAM WAR

Directors of the California Democratic Council, at its closing session of its 2-day conference Sunday at the newly opened Holiday Inn, passed a resolution reaffirming a stand in favor of a negotiated peace in Vietnam. The resolution also commended the view of Senator WILLIAM J. FULBRIGHT and Senator GEORGE Aiken which called for a cease-fire in Vietnam in order to enhance the possibility of discussions for settlement.

The board turned down a more radical resolution on Vietnam which called for street demonstrations and political action.

The California Democratic Council convention in Sacramento in March also passed a resolution concerning the settlement of the conflict in Vietnam in which it urged the President of the United States to stop the widening of the war by ordering a halt to further bombing of North Vietnam. It also asked that the United States seek a cease-fire through the United Nations or an international body preliminary to negotiating a diplomatic settlement, with guarantees

against foreign intervention for an internationally supported economic and social program of reconstruction and development.

The board also passed a civil rights resolution in support of "the people fighting for their recognition of basic rights and human dignity in Alabama."

In another resolution the board voiced support of the AFL-CIO farm labor organization.

The board also went on record as "opposing nondisloyalty oaths for candidates." The California Assembly recently passed a measure requiring a loyalty oath of candidates and the bill is now before the State senate, it was reported.

In the discussion on this resolution, the directors said they did not object to loyalty oaths but did object to one that called for declarations from a candidate or others "that they had never been connected with an organization or movement deemed disloyal."

Another resolution called for the restoration of the proposed 10-percent cut in salaries of State college teachers; and another calling for the legislature to reduce the vote required for the passage of a school bond measure in a school district from a present two-thirds majority to one of a simple majority.

Another resolution called for an investigation into the decline of the fishing industry in the State and to check into water pollution problems.

Simon Casady, of El Cajon, near San Diego, a retired publisher and newspaperman, told a reporter of the Bakersfield Californian, that "any division within the Democratic Party seems to have healed over." Casady reportedly had recently attended a meeting in Sacramento in a conference with Gov. Edmund G. Brown and Assembly Speaker Jesse D. Unruh.

"At present, everything is sweetness and light and that will be the story until after the election," said Casady.

"The party will be unified and of one mind in recognizing the job for the next 2 years is to keep control and hold tight against the extreme rightists from taking over the State."

Tom Carvey, immediate past president of the CDC, in a short speech on Saturday saw the role of the CDC "as the conscience of the Democratic Party" and "its strength will lie in its idealism and practical purposes in politics."

Carvey was presented with a large brass-banded gavel as a memento for his longtime service as State leader.

Horace D. Massey, of Bakersfield, region III vice president, who arranged for the board meeting invited the directors to look over the facilities of the civic auditorium late Saturday as a preparation for the 1966 convention.

The convention which will bring an estimated 8,000 CDC members to Bakersfield, February 18, 19, and 20, 1966, will be one at which all endorsements for State offices will be made preliminary to the June primary election.

The directors voted Sunday also to hold the 1967 convention in Fresno bypassing a bid of San Diego for the convention. Long Beach had also bid for the 1967 meeting.

Bakersfield Attorney Gabriel Solomon was named as State legal counsel for the CDC. Solomon just returned from Sacramento where he also was appointed vice chairman for Northern California Negroes for Political Action.

Solomon was also named by George Simpson, of Tulare, 18th Congressional District director, for CDC, to the post 18th Congressional District chairman for CDC.

VIETNAM EXPERTS PETITION PRESIDENT

Hundreds of the country's leading experts on Vietnam, China, and Asia attending the national meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, in San Francisco, petitioned

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President Johnson to take the lead in calling for peace in southeast Asia. The petition reached the White House during a 3-day intensive deliberation on Vietnam policy.

The petitioners fear that the present policy of escalation will cause the U.S.S.R. to abandon its policy of peaceful coexistence and (to) reassume its nuclear shield over China. Other points in the petition to the President stressed:

Current U.S. policy is forcing Hanoi (North Vietnam) to depend increasingly on Communist China;

The Vietcong in the south benefit from the cruelty, impotence, and selfishness of the so-called governments in South Vietnam that have alienated the peasantry;

There are both doves and hawks in policy circles in Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow. Arguments of their doves are weakened by fear of America's implacable hostility.

The petitioners conclude that a strong gesture from President Johnson for a peaceful resolution in Vietnam could establish that ours is the just cause and thereby win for us the allegiance of the poor countries of the world.

Prominent among the signers are:

From University of California: Gerald Berreman, Delmer M. Brown, George De Vos, Joseph R. Levenson, Herbert M. Phillips, Henry Rosovsky, Franz Schurmann, James H. Townsend.

From Harvard University: Robert Bellah, Jerome A. Cohen, John K. Fairbank, Ezra Vogel.

From University of Michigan: Albert Feuerwerker, Rhoades Murphy, David Sternberg.

From Yale University: Harry Benda, Robert J. Lifton, Mary Wright.

Jackson H. Bailey, Earlham College.

Robert A. Burton, University of Kansas.

Claude A. Buss, Stanford University.

Paul A. Cohen, Amherst College.

Stanley Lubman, Columbia University.

H. Y. Tien, University of Illinois.

G. William Skinner, Cornell University.

Stanley K. Sheinbaum, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

PETITION

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. We, the undersigned, professional scholars in the field of Asian studies attending a conference concurrent with your White House deliberations on Vietnam policy, respectfully call upon you to use the awesome power and responsibility that rest in your hands to decide whether our country will be the world leader for peace and progress, or for war and destruction. Politics is the work of individual men, not the production of the forces of history. In every crisis, a great leader of men, by his decision alone, determines the fate of the world. Whatever the outcome of that decision, he bears full responsibility for it.

2. When a decision involves war or peace, the moral leader only opts for war because he believes that an ultimate greater good will be attained, or because he sincerely believes that his country's enemies are undeniably determined to have war. We, as students of Asian affairs, firmly believe that neither of these is the case. We believe that all three great powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China, in one way or another, use both the sword and the olive branch to protect and to extend their interests. It is not the force of history but single events produced by individual decisions which determine which shall be used.

We have taken a dangerous step forward through our policy of increasing escalation of the war, one which puts us on a direct collision course with China. This could be the ultimate tragedy in Sino-American relations. War with China would not win the predominantly guerrilla war in South Vietnam. It would wreak vast destruction in eastern Asia

with only the prospect that Communist China, like the Soviet Union in the wake of World War II, would emerge stronger than before. It would run the grave risk that the Soviet Union would abandon its policy of peaceful coexistence and reassume its nuclear shield of China. This would not only once again pose the issue of total war, but undo those laborious steps toward world peace that have been achieved over the past years.

3. The present policy of increasing escalation rests on three questionable assumptions. First, it assumes that the Soviet Union will, in a showdown, not support Communist China, and that, therefore, American power can punish China with impunity. The Sino-Soviet dispute has gone through many fluctuations. The Soviet leaders are individual men making decisions. No one can predict what they will be. No expert can state flatly that they will abandon China in the moment of extreme crisis.

Second, it assumes that China and North Vietnam, when confronted with punishing destruction, will surrender to force. The history of these two nations indicates just the opposite. When attacked by the Japanese and the French respectively, the Chinese and the Vietnamese struck back fiercely, made opportunity of the war to strengthen their social organization, and finally triumphed stronger than ever before.

Third, it assumes that the existence of the war will create conditions for stability in South Vietnam, strengthen the South Vietnam army, and create better conditions for winning the war in the South. The Vietcong are powerful because of broad support from the Vietnamese peasantry, and because the latter have been alienated from the government by cruelty, impotence, and selfishness. The succession of governments in Saigon promises to further widen the chasm between it and the people. That if anything, will strengthen, rather than weaken, the Vietcong.

4. We firmly believe that a further escalation can only lead to an even greater catastrophe in eastern Asia. America will then be enmeshed in a land war on the Asian mainland with the prospect of short-term success and long-term defeat. America's inevitable withdrawal from eastern Asia would occur in a context of defeat and hatred, just as was the case with imperial Japan.

5. We firmly believe that there is an alternative decision for peace which is more than just a negative decision against war. There are "doves" and "hawks" in Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow, just as in our own country. There are men in Hanoi who fear Chinese domination as a consequence of war. There are men in Peiping who fear loss of China's painful recovery in the wake of its great economic crisis 4 years ago. There are men in Moscow who would go a long way to prevent a recurrence of the disaster that befell Russia in the last war. What weakens the argument of these men is the fear of America's implacable hostility against them. We believe that an open declaration of America's determination for peace in eastern Asia would increase the chances of a favorable response from the other sides and from third parties. We respectfully call upon you to express this determination by calling off the bombing of North Vietnam and taking the lead in convening the Geneva Conference or the appropriate meeting you deem best. We call upon you to declare to Peiping and Hanoi our fundamental willingness to coexist peacefully with them as we are trying to do with the Soviet Union. We do not believe that such a magnanimous declaration would be regarded as a sign of American weakness. Peiping and Hanoi are well aware of the immense power that America commands, can use, and has used. We believe that such a declaration of peaceful

intent would help create the conditions for terminating the insurgency in the south on terms satisfactory to the south. Above all, we believe that such a declaration will make possible steps toward peace in Asia such as already have been achieved in Europe.

6. The course of events is in your hands. We ask you to use the great power for moral good, political justice, and economic progress which America has, and for which, because it has always used that power, it is respected throughout the world, to attack for peace rather than for war. Power comes from bombs, but greater power comes from a just cause. Like all men, the men of Peiping and Hanoi feel that theirs is the latter. It is in your hands to take that from them and so give America access to the allegiance of the poor countries of the world.

7. With all respect we stand ready at any time and in any number to consult and advise if you believe we can make a contribution toward the resolution of this critical problem.

THE CRISIS IN VIETNAM

(Remarks of Senator WAYNE MORSE, Joint University Forum Chicago, Ill., January 15, 1965)

The title of my remarks would indicate that I came here to talk about our problems in Vietnam. But events of recent hours make it evident that the problems in Vietnam are really those of the entire peninsula of Indochina, now divided into North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Refusal of the Administration to explain what our planes are doing in Laos means that the American people are getting a foreign policy of concealment in that part of the world. They are entitled to know what is being done in their name in Laos and Vietnam. They are entitled to know whether the United States is escalating the war in Asia, and if so to what extent and for what purpose. They are entitled to know whether this violation by us of the Laotian agreement of 1962 means we have junked that agreement as the basis of our policy in Laos and what is being substituted for it.

If they do not demand and receive such an explanation, they could wake up some morning and find that their Great Society has dissolved in an Asian war.

That is how seriously I view our situation in Asia. What little we in Congress are told about the activities of our Armed Forces in Asia is told in confidence. But it is you the people, who fight, and you the people who pay the bill. Today, neither you nor I know what the Administration is doing in Asia, to what it has committed us, what its objectives are, and how much it is risking to achieve them.

On one point there is much agreement among members of Congress and Administration officials—that getting involved in Indochina after the French got out was a great mistake. Yet they are now undertaking to compound that error by increasing our involvement and commitment. Where it will end and how much it will cost the American nation they have not discussed with the people nor with the Congress.

That is why I say we have a foreign policy of concealment in southeast Asia.

But I would like to go back to the end of World War II and examine the history of American relations with southeast Asia to see just how our policy led us to the present perilous situation.

Twenty years ago almost to the very month, the subject of postwar American policy in southeast Asia came in for study in the high levels of Government. A State Department memorandum to President Roosevelt suggested that positive announcements should be made of American policy toward the former colonial areas of southeast Asia being liberated from Japanese occupation. It sug-

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gested that specific dates for their self-government be set as objectives of American policy.

We know from Cordell Hull's memoirs that President Roosevelt heartily endorsed that policy. He believed that French dominion over Indochina should not be restored. At the Cairo and Teheran Conferences he urged that it be placed under an international trusteeship as a final step toward independence.

Cordell Hull records that only Prime Minister Churchill disagreed, and he quotes Roosevelt as saying:

"The only reason [the British] seem to oppose it is that they fear the effect it would have on their possessions and those of the Dutch. They have never liked the idea of a trusteeship because it is, in some instances, aimed at future independence.

"Each case must, of course, stand on its own feet, but the case of Indochina is perfectly clear. France has milked it for 100 years. The people of Indochina are entitled to something better than that."

Today we are paying the price for our failure to carry out that policy. Within 10 years of the end of the war, the British, the Dutch, and the French largely recognized, after years of war and the expenditure of billions of dollars, that colonialism is a thing of the past. It is the United States that has failed to recognize what Mr. Roosevelt knew to be true: the era of white rule in Asia is finished, whether it takes the form of economic exploration through direct rule or the form of manipulating governments to protect what we regard to be our interest—the postwar American form of colonialism.

Roosevelt's policy died with him. Our primary interest became one of bowing to French wishes in all international matters to guarantee her support and participation in NATO, and we began financing the French effort to recapture Indochina. We put over \$1½ billion into that futile struggle. And when the French finally gave up, we took it over ourselves.

WANTED: A WESTERN FOOTHOLD

All in all, it has cost American taxpayers \$5½ billion, exclusive of the cost of our own forces, to try to keep a Western foothold in southeast Asia. Some writers are working hard to convince the American people that all we are doing is maintaining a historic American policy. Journalistic spokesmen for the Defense Department are vehement in declaring that to lose our foothold in Vietnam is to lose all we fought for in the Pacific in World War II.

Nothing is further from the truth. Never in our history have we had any kind of foothold on the mainland of Asia. Before World War II, the most we ever had was the Philippines, which we voluntarily relinquished in 1935 and formally freed in 1945. Since 1945, we have maintained base rights in the Philippines, as in Japan; and we have kept a base in Okinawa, won by conquest. Our present foothold in South Korea is a legacy of World War II, not its objective.

What these Defense Department spokesmen really have in mind are not the strictly American footholds and bases in that part of the world but the whole network of French, Dutch, and British possessions that in World War II were freely used by Americans in the prosecution of the war against Japan. The possibility that these staging areas should no longer be available for use at our pleasure vis-a-vis China is for many of them so unthinkable that they believe it is worth a war to retain at least one of them.

When France finally gave up the struggle in Indochina, the United States refused to sign the Geneva Accord of 1954, which ended the war. And we prevailed upon a new government we had chosen to back in South Vietnam not to sign it either. We began to send military aid early in 1955, and we, long with South and North Vietnam, were

found by the International Control Commission to be in violation of the treaty.

The sad truth is that the threats by leading American officials to make war on China and the present war crisis, are the logical end of the dismal road in Indochina that John Foster Dulles set us upon in 1954. After failing in his efforts to keep the French fighting on in Indochina, despite American aid to their war effort and the promise of direct U.S. military action, Dulles refused to put the signature of the United States on the Geneva agreement of 1954 which marked the end of French rule there. South Vietnam also declined to sign. The most the United States said about the 1954 agreement was that we would recognize it as international law and regard violations with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

Among the provisions of the 1954 accords was article 16: "With effect from the date of entry into force of the present agreement, the introduction into Vietnam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited."

An exception was made for rotation of personnel, meaning French, already there.

Article 17 provided: "(a) With effect from the date of entry into force of the present agreement, the introduction into Vietnam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions, and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines, and jet weapons and armored vehicles is prohibited."

Again, an exception was made for replacement on the basis of piece for piece of the same type and with similar characteristics.

Article 18: "With effect from the date of entry into force of the present agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited through Vietnam territory."

For 10 years we have claimed that North Vietnam was violating the accord by sending in help to the rebels against the South Vietnamese Government. But our solution was, not to go to the parties who signed the agreement and who were responsible for its enforcement. Nor did we go to the United Nations, the sole international body with jurisdiction over threats to the peace.

Instead we multiplied our own violations by joining in the fighting. Each time we increase the number of American boys sent to that country to advise the local troops we violate the Geneva Agreement of 1954. Every jetplane, every helicopter, every naval vessel we furnish South Vietnam or man with American servicemen is a violation, and so is every military base and airstrip we have constructed there.

Yet we hypocritically proclaim to ourselves and the world that we are there only to enforce the Geneva agreement.

Part of the 1954 agreement established an International Control Commission of Poland, India, and Canada to investigate complaints of violations. As early as its report covering 1956, this Commission found both North and South Vietnam had violated the accords of 1954, the latter in conjunction with the U.S. military aid activities.

Immediately upon the signing of the 1954 agreement, the United States began to support the new government of South Vietnam in a big way. In the letter President Eisenhower wrote President Diem, a letter still serving as the basis for our policy in 1964, aid was pledged to Diem, and in turn, "the Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in undertaking needed reforms."

NO FREEDOM OR DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

In 1965, President Johnson refers to that letter as the basis for our aid, but the part about reforms has long since been forgotten.

In the decade following 1954, the United

States for all practical purposes made a protectorate out of South Vietnam. Its new government immediately became financially dependent upon us; as rebellion against it grew, our level of aid was stepped up. By 1961, we had to send 15,000 American troops as "advisers" to the local military forces. Today, the figure is 23,000.

When the Diem government diverted itself from fighting rebels to fighting Buddhists, a coup by military proteges of the United States overthrew it. Within a few weeks, another coup replaced the Minh junta with what American advisers considered a more efficient military junta under General Khanh. In turn, the Khanh government has been succeeded by a series of coalitions, the current one being headed by Tran Van Huong.

At no time have the people of this unfortunate country had a government of their own choosing. In fact, the Khanh junta justified its coup with the excuse that some Minh officers were pro-French, and might seek some way of neutralizing the country. Just how these various creations of the U.S. Government differ from the old Bao Dai government which served as the French puppet, I have never been able to see. Yet American leaders talk piously of defending freedom in South Vietnam.

We say that one of our objectives is the enforcement of the 1954 agreement. But it has never been explained why we have any business enforcing by force of arms an agreement to which neither we nor our client country is a signatory.

Nor is it explained why enforcement can only take the form of massive violations by ourselves of articles 16, 17, and 18 of that agreement.

SIMILAR PROVISIONS GOVERN LAOS

In the case of Laos, we did sign the Geneva accord of 1962, along with 13 other nations, which sought to neutralize that country. Hence, we claim that the violations we have committed ourselves were undertaken only after North Vietnam violated the accord first. Our violations have taken the form first, of sending armed planes flown by American pilots over Laos for reconnaissance purposes and more recently to carry out armed attacks within the country.

The 1962 agreement permits military equipment to be brought into the country at the request of the Laotian Government. But article 4 of the Loatian accord reads: "The introduction of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign paramilitary formations and foreign military personnel into Laos is prohibited."

Today, we know the United States has violated article 4 by sending our military personnel into Laos. That they fly over the country and bomb it from the air rather than from the ground does not alter the case. Our air raids in Laos are every bit as much a violation of the agreement as the violations we believe North Vietnam has committed.

That is why I said at the outset that neither you nor I know whether this country considers itself bound by that agreement; nor do we know what policy in Laos may have replaced it.

One of the speculations in Washington—and speculation is the most we have to go on about our policy in Asia—is to the effect that the raids were undertaken to convince North Vietnam and ultimately China that we would not be pushed out of southeast Asia and were prepared to expand the war if North Vietnam did not stop her alleged encouragement of rebels in South Vietnam.

If this is in fact the purpose of the raids, which have been going on since last June, what have they accomplished?

Has anyone heard North Vietnam ask to negotiate? Has anyone heard of a Vietcong surrender? To the contrary. The Vietcong raids have become more daring and more successful in the last 6 months than

at any time since the French underwent very much the same experiences we are now undergoing.

BRINKMANSHIP IN ASIA

The air raids are a brinkmanship fully as dangerous as John Foster Dulles ever practiced anywhere in the world.

We are trying to bluff China. But we overlook the fact that the rebellion in South Vietnam is carried out by South Vietnamese people primarily with weapons captured and obtained from Government forces.

Not once have I heard an official advocate of this "put pressure on North Vietnam and China" policy state that the Vietcong would collapse without outside support. All the evidence presented to the Foreign Relations Committee is exactly to the contrary. The State Department and the Pentagon continue to admit up to this very minute that the body and muscle and weapons of the Vietcong are local and not foreign.

The result is that we are not going to make any progress in South Vietnam by bluffing China. We only run the terrible risk that the decision of how far to go will be taken out of our hands as it was in Korea, when we believed we could engage in acts of war a few miles from Chinese borders without her doing anything about it. The massive intervention by China in Korea took place only 2 or 3 years after the Communists had taken control of the country. Thirteen years later they are much better prepared to fight a land war in Indochina than they were in Korea.

Our brinkmanship with China files in the face of one of the facts of life we have long since recognized as regards the Soviet Union. It is that a great power will not tolerate hostile governments or the bases of hostile nations on its immediate borders. Is there any doubt that the United States will not tolerate a Soviet base in Cuba? Or that we would take whatever steps were necessary to evict such a base? Or that we will use all the economic, political, and covert means at our disposal to get rid of that hostile government just 90 miles away? Perhaps it is not worth war to us to get rid of it; but we mean to limit the extent of threat it poses and to work for its downfall.

The Soviet Union accepted that premise, just as we had accepted it in 1956 when the Soviet Union took what steps it considered necessary to prevent a hostile regime from coming to power in Hungary. We deplored their action and we wrung our hands. But we have conceded that Russia will not tolerate hostile governments on her borders and we have accepted the premise as part of our policy in Europe.

It is hard for us to apply that premise to China, not only because it is a Communist nation more virulent in its aggressive policies than the Soviet Union of today. We have the additional emotional and historic ballast of generations of American domination of whatever part of Asia we cared to dominate. It is as hard for many Americans to see Asia emerge into full industrial nationhood as it was for Sir Winston Churchill to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.

It was we who opened Japan to the west against her wishes; it was we who insisted upon an "open door" for all western nations to exploit China equally; it was we who seized and eventually released the Philippines from colonialism; and it was we who bore the battle against Japan when she undertook to make Asia a Japanese colony instead of a white colony.

The Pacific has historically been an American lake. While other Western nations controlled large reaches of it, we were satisfied with their presence. But never have we experienced a Western Pacific controlled by the people who lived there, except for the brief period of Japanese supremacy.

Within a very few years, however, the United States is going to find it cannot call

the shots in all the Pacific without involving itself in war, this time not against only an island outpost of Asia, but against a third of the world's population.

I am satisfied that this would be true if communism had never been invented. There never has been a time since 1954 when it was possible for this country to impose a government upon the people of South Vietnam without constant fighting to keep it in power. The war there will never end on our terms because our very presence and our domination of its affairs is a target for rebellion.

IGNORING THE U.N. CHARTER

If we expand the war into Laos, North Vietnam, or China, in the name of protecting our investment in South Vietnam, it will be an outright American aggrandizement of the kind we have not embarked upon since the Mexican War. We will not only be inviting disaster but will be flouting every principle of international policy we have espoused since World War II.

Not the least of these is our signature on the U.N. Charter and our support of its activities. If our signature means anything, it requires us to observe article 2, section 4: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

Other charter provisions are specific as to the duty of nations when they find themselves involved in a dispute. Article 33 states:

"Section 1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

Notice that the controlling verb is "shall." This is not an option but a directive. So far, it has been ignored by the United States.

It is commonly said both in and out of government that the U.N. is a waste of time and that the Communists understand nothing but force. However, the line continues; maybe at some future date we will find it to our interest to go to the U.N. This supposedly sophisticated argument ignores several points.

First, it may not be left to us to decide whether and when the issue should go to that body. Article 35 provides that "any member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in article 34 (threats to international peace), to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly." This means that if we wait for another country to invoke article 35, we can be sure it will not be under conditions most favorable to us.

Second, the assumption by administration spokesmen that someday, sometime, somehow and under some other circumstances we will seek U.N. action is an admission that the issue is really one of U.N. jurisdiction. What they are saying is that to adhere to the Charter now would not serve American interests: The time to negotiate is when we dominate the battlefield.

This amounts to saying that any treaty obligation that does not serve our national interest is just a scrap of paper. These officials take the view that we may one day resurrect the Charter from the wastebasket but not until we think it serves our interests.

If this is to be our policy, then we are helping to destroy the United Nations and all the advances in the rule of law in world affairs that it represents. This will undermine our moral position and seriously compromise our capacity for calling others to account for breaches of the peace. This is already the

case in connection with Mr. Sukarno's aggressions against Malaysia.

Third, the "fight now, negotiate later" line is based on the wholly illusory assumption that Red China and North Vietnam will do what we refuse to do—negotiate when they are losing. Can we really expect that when China is in the same situation in which she was in Korea, she will negotiate instead of pouring her hordes into the fray? I know no reason to justify either this wishful thinking or the head-in-the-sand attitude that if we kill enough and bomb enough, North Vietnam and Red China will yield.

UNITED STATES ISOLATED IN ASIA

There is yet another element to this problem that has largely been ignored. That is the isolation we would create for ourselves in Asia.

There is no evidence that any other nation would join us in expansion of the war into Laos or North Vietnam. Although a spokesman for Thailand recently proposed that military forces from other Far Eastern nations join the United States in the fighting, not even Thailand has actually sent any. There are no British, New Zealand, French, Filipino or Pakistani forces in Vietnam, either, yet all are members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, under whose terms we claim we are acting in South Vietnam.

Prime Minister Wilson has rejected a request by President Johnson that Britain send troops to join ours. But so did the President reject Wilson's request that the United States help fry Britain's fish in Malaysia. Apparently each country will act unilaterally in those places with a moratorium on criticism of any illegalities or threats to world peace that may result.

Or SEATO members, only Australia has sent a token force. It now amounts to perhaps 60 to 70 men, with a few air transport planes and crews promised for the future.

That is the measure of how our SEATO allies feel about fighting in Vietnam.

The SEATO organization, in the first meeting of its foreign ministers in 1955, adopted what amounts to a bylaw requiring that all action taken by the treaty organization shall be by unanimous agreement. Flat opposition by France and Pakistan has foreclosed any formal military action in Vietnam by SEATO.

Indeed, the largest newspaper in Pakistan, Jang, recently editorialized:

"As long as the United States is allowed to remain in the area she will continue to involve countries of the area in war. This is because the United States is out to encircle and destroy the People's Republic of China."

Even Australia is expressing alarm about the possible escalation of the war. The Daily Mirror of Sydney, a relatively conservative Australian paper, said on November 26:

"DON'T BOMB HANOI"

"There are ominous signs that renewed efforts are about to be made in Washington to stampede the Johnson administration into agreeing to bomb North Vietnam."

"This would be the last throw in an effort to end the civil war that has racked South Vietnam for so long."

"Any such reckless action could well prove to be disastrous. At the best it is not likely to achieve its objective. At its worst, it could start a Korea-type war, with Chinese intervention, which might spread nobody knows where."

"Two of the most influential British newspapers, the Guardian and the Times, condemn the proposal to extend the war. The Guardian says that even if the present propaganda campaign is merely designed to put the United States in a better bargaining position, it still does not seem a good idea."

"The Times says that the dangers 'scarcely need pointing out.' One of the risks, it says, is of Chinese intervention, and it adds: 'Of the fallacies of the past 5 years in South Vietnam has been that the guerrillas in

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south were a creation of the north and not a genuine revolt against misgovernment."

"The French, who have bitter cause to know more about the situation in Indochina than anybody else, also oppose bombing North Vietnam.

"After 16 years of ruinous civil war surely commonsense would dictate to Washington that a political, not a military solution, is the answer."

Although India is the one country of Asia most threatened by China, even India has no desire to see a war break out, because in conditions of war between the United States and anyone in Asia, nuclear weapons would be used sooner or later. Moreover, like Australia, India knows that in war, nations lose control of events. Nations are controlled by wars, and not the other way around.

Prime Minister Shastri of India has just recently renewed his request that the United States seek a negotiated and not a military solution. And Prime Minister Sato of Japan has closed his talks with President Johnson without committing his country to an endorsement or condemnation of anyone in southeast Asia. That is the most sympathetic view of our position among any of the leading nations of Asia.

How much further do we want to dig ourselves into this pit, started by the Eisenhower administration and deepened by the Kennedy administration?

FUTURE OF UNITED STATES IN ASIA UP TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON

That question is going to have to be answered by President Johnson alone. It is too bad that all these chickens have all come home to roost on his doorstep; but there they are.

The resolution passed last August by Congress gave the President a blank check to use force in Asia. As a legal statement it means little; but it was sought and given as a political backstop. On two other occasions, similar resolutions authorizing a President to use armed force in given areas led right straight to war. One was with Mexico in 1846 and a second was with Spain in 1898. Those resolutions, like the current one, were supposed to prevent war by warning an adversary of our intentions. But both had to be followed by declarations of war.

The question now is whether President Johnson can bring himself to do the only thing that can be done in Asia to escape an expanded war: to bring other interested parties into a multilateral political agreement for southeast Asia.

This could take the form of a United Nations jurisdiction along the lines proposed so wisely by President Roosevelt; or it could take the form of seeking a SEATO action that would police South Vietnam while a political solution is developed; or it could take the form of a new 14-nation conference among the same nations that arranged the 1954 Geneva accord.

The further we go in expanding the war—the more agreements we violate and the more people we kill in the name of peace—the more military opposition we harden against us in North Vietnam and China—the more we alienate ourselves from the now-Communist nations in that part of the world—the more impossible any peaceful solution becomes.

In the last 10 years, we have learned that we are not masters of events in Vietnam, despite our billions of dollars and our thousands of troops on the scene. It has not been shown that any stepped-up investment of blood or money will make us masters.

It still is not too late for President Johnson to lead the American people out of this morass. Whether he leads us out or further in, will be the first great test of his administration.

IDEA FOR SEA-GRANT COLLEGES

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, this Nation is convinced that going to the moon is a worthwhile objective and the Federal Government is spending billions of dollars for this purpose. As it should have been, this decision was reached after considerable public and private study and debate. Now, I think it is time that national recognition be given to a relatively unexplored frontier right here on earth which holds countless riches and the key to solving many of the problems posed by a mushrooming population. I speak of the oceans, which many scientists claim we know relatively less about than the surface of the moon. In view of the recent camera probes of the moon's surface, these scientists may be right.

Yet, the oceans cover two-thirds of the globe's surface. In a world where at least 500 million humans suffer from extreme critical deficiencies of animal proteins, the seas contain untapped supplies of fish, shellfish, and crustaceans. The oceans also contain most of the earth's minerals. Many of the nations—faced with searing droughts—are washed by these same mineral-saturated waters.

In connection with problems of the scope of the oceans and our mastery of them on an international basis, I well recall how much we have yet to learn from my experience as an American delegate to the initial meeting of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization—IMCO—in London in 1959.

The seas also present some unique problems to us as a nation. Marine pollution in terms of chemicals, sewage, water temperatures, and—in some case—radioactive materials is a growing threat to the fishing, shellfishing, and recreation industries. As the population expands and new industrial complexes rise, these problems will become more pressing.

Meanwhile, our fishing fleets face the prospect of being forced from the high seas because of economic pressures and unnecessary technological lags. Once the second largest fishing nation in the world, we now stand fifth after Peru, Japan, Red China, and Russia.

Other leading nations of the world are becoming increasingly conscious of the oceans and their potentials of research and development in food supply, mineral resources, and military application.

President Johnson, in his idea for the Great Society, I am sure, thinks in terms of the contribution to be made in the years ahead by the mighty seas. President Kennedy stated in a message to Congress:

Knowledge of the oceans is more than a matter of curiosity. Our very survival may hinge upon it.

These are some of the problems and challenges, but what are we doing about them? As a nation, are we doing enough? What should we be doing that we are not? Specifically what benefits can be realized from greater efforts in the marine sciences? I would like to try and answer some of these questions today, not only because of Rhode Island's

long heritage as a marine-oriented State, but also because of the benefits that the Nation and the world can realize.

Fortunately, the economic potential of developing our marine resources has been documented very carefully by a distinguished committee of the National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council. This group reported that within the next 10 to 15 years oceanographic research could bring benefits—either in annual savings or new annual production—worth \$5.7 billion. The areas where these benefits could be realized are in fisheries, the development of ocean-floor mineral deposits, improved long-range weather forecasting, improved near-shore sewage disposal methods, expansion of near-shore recreational opportunities, and lower shipping costs to the United States. These benefits are in addition to those that would accrue to our national defense effort. This factor should not be overlooked, since past experience has shown that ocean conditions and processes influence all phases of naval activities.

There is also every indication that given the proper assistance and the right atmosphere, many private companies will step up their marine research and development activities, creating significant new industries and jobs.

Keeping what I have said in mind, it is apparent that steps toward tapping these vast ocean resources depend—at least initially—on Federal and State support of research in the marine sciences. The Federal Government has partially recognized its responsibilities in this respect with sharply increased budgets for oceanographic research. In fiscal 1958, the first time the Government surveyed its spending in this field, it was determined that \$23 million was being spent. In 1963, the total had climbed to \$124 million. The projections for 1972 are that the Federal oceanographic effort may have a \$350 million budget or more.

The Federal plans are fine as far as they go, but I believe there are some big gaps in our thinking. Let me explain.

Some interesting parallels have been drawn between the state of agriculture in our country and the slow decline in the fishing industry.

I am particularly conscious of the role that fish and ocean products can have in fulfilling human protein requirements from my role as Coast Guard officer in charge of the restoration of the Sicilian fishing industry at the end of World War II, when our objective was to feed the hungry Sicilian people as quickly as possible.

In 1820 one American farmer was producing enough food, fiber, and related products for himself and four other people. Today, this farmer's descendants produce enough food to feed himself and 31 others, including 5 persons in foreign countries.

On the other hand, fishermen—particularly in this country—are hunters in an environment they don't understand too well. Seventy-two percent of the American fishing fleet was from 11 to 50 years old in 1962, according to statistics

gathered by the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries. This agency reported that the average medium-sized trawler fishing North Atlantic waters was built in 1941. Small trawlers are even older—the average vessel having been built in 1938.

Meanwhile, we are faced by increased foreign competition. In April 1964 the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries reported that for the first time imports provided over half the U.S. supply of fishery products. Nevertheless, the fishing industry employs—either directly or indirectly—over 500,000 people and fishermen received, according to the latest available statistics, over \$370 million for their catch. It can be conservatively estimated that you should multiply the latter figure by three or four to get the true value of the catch to the American economy. In this case, we are talking about an industry worth in excess of \$1 billion which is slowly being eroded away by foreign competition and lagging technological progress.

The answer, I believe, is something that has been called sea-grant colleges, similar in concept to the land-grant colleges which have done so much for American agriculture. Within the sea-grant universities could be colleges of aquaculture, marine aquacultural experiment stations, fishery extension services, and seagoing fishing port agents.

At first glance, this whole idea may be a bit startling, but it has been advanced by serious and knowing marine scientists. I think the Congress should do its part in advancing the idea, and I intend to explore this concept further. It is evident that this idea is already evolving and taking form because it makes sense and is in reality a necessity for the survival of the fishing industry.

I am happy to report that Rhode Island has already taken the leadership in this direction. The nucleus for this leadership is at the University of Rhode Island which has been doing basic research in oceanography and the marine sciences since 1937, when it established a small laboratory at the mouth of Narragansett Bay.

In the short span of less than three decades, this small laboratory has grown into a \$7 million marine research complex that includes Federal, State, and university facilities. It is also the headquarters for the University of Rhode Island Graduate School of Oceanography, one of the finest in the Nation, and the home port for the 180-foot research vessel, *Trident*. Here within a few years at least 400 persons will be working in the marine sciences. Here too will be trained a significant number of the new generation of oceanographers, since the university is one of only six in the country that trains scientists in all aspects of oceanography.

This brief background and a bit more bears on the point I want to make.

During the decades that Rhode Island was rising to prominence in oceanography, the role of agriculture in the State was declining. As a result the University of Rhode Island's College of Agriculture shifted its emphasis. I am not going to go into the details of the many

ways this was done, but significantly the college has directed some of its attention to the fishermen who were very obviously in desperate need of help.

Today, the university has a department of food and resource economics in the college of agriculture that works closely with fishermen and other marine interests. A universitywide marine sciences program has promoted research in waterfront development, shore stabilization, sand dune control, fishery marketing, the production of pharmaceuticals from marine organisms, fishery populations and management, pollution, and radioactive contamination of the marine environment to name a few areas.

In addition, the faculty members involved in this work have sought to make their knowledge and findings available by serving as consultants to industry and government agencies, by speaking before interested groups, by articles and papers, and by a series of annual forums for New England fishermen.

The university is now studying the idea too of initiating a program in fisheries technology to train novice fishermen.

In my office, there are two maps depicting the last physical frontier on our planet. One shows the ocean depths of the North Atlantic, the other Narragansett Bay and the bordering ocean. In my State, we have for generations been sea and navy minded—from early colonial days.

I have cited what is happening in Rhode Island because I am excited about the future possibilities and the events give some inkling of what "sea grant" universities might accomplish on a national scale.

If nothing else, I believe the Congress should take steps to initiate a Federal extension program in fisheries and related areas of marine sciences. We need people who can review the extensive research that has already been done and take steps to put it into practical use. We need people to bridge the gap between the researchers and the people who can benefit from this research. The place for these people is in the universities. Fishermen who are already operating on a narrow profit margin cannot be expected to take time out to adapt experimental gear to their own uses, even though in the long run it might be the most profitable thing to do. These men cannot be expected to try and catch new species of marine organisms, even though this might open up vast new markets.

Let us take note of two very specific instances where a fisheries extension program would be of benefit.

Right now North Atlantic fishermen traditionally trawl along the bottom to fill their holds with fish. Yet—as any biological oceanographer will tell you—many valuable species are found in mid-water depths. These fish escape bottom nets. The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries has done pioneering work in developing midwater trawl methods on the west coast. Hearing about this, some fishermen at Point Judith, R.I., have said they would like to try and adapt these techniques to local conditions and boats. But this requires technical assistance, time away from the fishing banks,

and tying up a boat and crew for days. How many fishermen can afford this? Where do they turn for help?

Another illustration involves the so-called deep sea red crab which is found in abundance along the continental shelf from Nova Scotia to Cuba. Catches of 3,000 to 4,000 pounds of these crabs have been obtained by deep-sea lobstermen in 1-hour tow. However, these crabs are considered a nuisance and are dumped back into the sea.

Scientists at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute have known about these crabs for years. A Bureau of Commercial Fisheries taste panel said the quality, texture, and palatability of crabs cooked at sea and frozen was "good."

Although you can't purchase these crabs in your grocery store, you can find plenty of similar frozen and canned products from Japan and other foreign nations. Yet successful marketing of the American red crab, is a definite possibility, according to a University of Rhode Island scientist. The problems of how to preserve the crab catch and how to process it cheaply—once it gets ashore—are being investigated.

There is considerable room for expansion of imaginative university-based programs of this nature, but I don't believe we can ask the States alone to assume the burden of a nationwide system of sea-grant universities. Nor should there be as many sea-grant universities as there are land-grant institutions of higher learning.

Improved communications techniques and new modes of transportation make a State-by-State system of sea-grant universities unnecessary. I envision possibly a dozen or more such centers serving various regions in the country. These should also be centers of excellence for the entire broad range of oceanographic studies. The universities could be the focal point for vast research and development complexes involving the Federal Government, private industry, and fishing interests.

These centers of excellence in the marine sciences should be fostered and developed in those areas that have made a beginning and have the capabilities and resources for such an undertaking. Obviously, geography too is an important consideration.

I believe such a marine science complex is well on its way toward development in the region stretching from New London, Conn., through Rhode Island to Woods Hole, Mass.

Within the 75-mile span from Electric Boat in New London to the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution are major fishing ports, companies like Raytheon, Electric Boat and United Nuclear, several important Navy installations, including the U.S. Naval Underwater Ordnance Station at Newport, universities, Federal research laboratories, a research reactor, and most importantly a considerable number of people with experience and advanced degrees in the marine science.

Working together with the proper assistance and encouragement, these people can make outstanding contributions to the national welfare and the advancement of science.

At this time in our history, I believe this Nation is on the threshold of a new, bold, and imaginative era in which the Science of Oceanography will play an immense role. Within the next decade, I foresee we will take giant steps forward in this area to keep our Nation strong in the leadership of the free world.

Already there are a number of bills before the Congress to advance our society through the potentials of the great oceans that wash our shores. I am happy to be cosponsor of the Magnuson bill in the Senate which would provide among other things for expanded research in the oceans and the Great Lakes, establish a National Oceanographic Council and preserve the role of the United States as a leader in oceanographic and marine science and technology.

It is very possible, I believe, we will someday in the not too distant future embark on a great program comparable perhaps even to our effort in space and perhaps equally as important, if not more so, in exploring, developing, and harvesting the seas. And, I believe, my own State of Rhode Island, already endowed with the advantages of geography and scientific facilities and know-how, will make a significant contribution in this vital, progressive and perhaps even survival endeavor.

MEDICARE TESTIMONY, MAY 7

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the Finance Committee today continued its hearing on H.R. 6675. Five witnesses presented testimony dealing with what we have commonly come to call medicare. I offer once more, and ask unanimous consent that it may appear in the Record, a brief summary digest, prepared by my staff and entirely unofficial, of the testimony of the day.

There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

AMERICAN NURSING HOME ASSOCIATION

Dr. Carl E. Becker, clergyman of the American Lutheran Church and administrator of the Lincoln Lutheran Home, Racine, Wis., president since 1960 of the Wisconsin Nursing Home Association. American Nursing Home Association comprises over 5,000 nursing homes, including 10 to 15 percent non-profit homes.

1. Proposes amendment to allow conversion of home health visits to additional nursing home days at 2 for 1, allowing a maximum of 25 added nursing home days instead of 50 home visits (out of the 100 available). This would parallel (in section 1832) provisions for converting unused hospital days into nursing home days (section 1812).

2. Proposes deletion of "listing" (section 1863) as inappropriate in a standards section, leaving the secretary to consult with "national (listing or) accrediting bodies." Section 1865 on accreditation should specify the National Council for the Accreditation of Nursing Homes, whose chairman is also a member of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.

3. Proposes additional specification (section 1867) of membership in the Health Insurance Benefits Advisory Council by at least representative of nonprofit and one of

proprietary nursing homes among the 16 members.

4. Nursing home provisions should take effect at the same time as hospital provisions, not 6 months later. Otherwise nursing home patients will seek transfer to hospitals at greater cost in order to receive benefits. The 3-day hospital stay for nursing home eligibility should likewise be eliminated to avoid "caravans of ambulances" shifting patients to secure eligibility.

5. Proposes added standards: Fire-resistant building; disaster plan; a planned program of nursing care; uniform accounting system (section 1861(j)).

KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC.

Dr. Clifford H. Keene, general manager. Plan "provides most of the hospital and medical care services for over 1,200,000 persons through 14 hospital-based medical centers and 29 outpatient clinics."

1. Supports health care provisions of the bill, but believes they can be improved to give (a) better health care and (b) incentives for controlling costs.

2. Choice of plans should be furnished comparable to the choice offered in the Federal employees health benefits program.

3. Direct service plans (Kaiser, Health Insurance Plan of New York, etc.) have direct responsibility for their own facilities and staff. This provides "a built-in incentive for economy of operation not present in the 'fee-for-service' method of payment for medical care," since increased treatment or hospitalization does not increase income. "Fee-for-service" plans should be provided as "the dominant pattern in this country" but should not be exclusive.

4. There should be a financial incentive for effective utilization controls.

RICHARD S. WILBUR, M.D.

Internist, partner in Palo Alto Medical Clinic, Palo Alto, Calif.

1. Protection should be against medical catastrophe, but the proposed coverage goes "well beyond" this. "Total health care" programs encourage increased utilization, increased costs of administration without comparable health values. Result will be depletion of benefits fund.

2. The program should be restricted "to those people who must have help now."

3. "Ordinary working doctors" should be consultants in rewriting the bill.

4. A separate "health oriented" agency should administer the plan.

SHIRLEY POWELL MARLOW

Mrs. Marlow is "a southern housewife," Virginia Beach, Va.

1. Strongly opposes the bill.

2. Main objection: It tries to shift a basic personal moral obligation to Government.

3. "Medicare" is already "a pretty cruel hoax," not doing what many expect.

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNAL MEDICINE

Dr. Malcolm S. M. Watts, San Francisco. Society has 8,000 members.

1. All diagnostic services ordinarily supervised by physicians should be in the voluntary rather than basic coverage.

2. Diagnostic service should not be tied to hospital controlled facilities only; should include physicians' offices and laboratories as well.

3. A choice of programs comparable to that of the Federal Employees' Health Benefit Plan should be included.

4. Benefits "should be extended to include truly catastrophic illness for the perhaps 2 to 4 percent of beneficiaries who will really need it."

5. Administration should be by "a quasi-independent governmental board or commission."

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL MONDAY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, that it stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon on Monday.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

VOTING RIGHTS OF 1965

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 1564) to enforce the 15th amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], on behalf of himself and other Senators, numbered 162, to the amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, numbered 124, offered by the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] and the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN].

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. I ask unanimous consent that the time for the quorum call be charged to the time allotted to my side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

How much time does the Senator yield to himself?

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 hour.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. President, this amendment deals with a subject that has been the concern of Congress for almost 30 years. In 1942, 1943, 1945, 1947, and 1949 the House of Representatives passed statutes abolishing poll taxes in Federal elections, while, in the Senate, this issue was not allowed to come to a vote. In 1942, and again in 1950, the poll tax requirement for voting was abolished by act of Congress for men in the Armed Forces. Just 3 years ago, under the very able leadership of the Senator from Florida, we passed the 24th amendment.

We have debated this matter for so many years because the overwhelming majority of the Members of the Senate know in their hearts that, used as a prerequisite to voting, the poll tax is not right. It is not logical. It is not in keeping with the principles of our form of free government to tell a man that, in order to vote, he must pay a tax.

Who are we protecting by abolishing the poll tax? We are protecting the Negro farmworker in Greenville, Miss., whose average income is \$12 a week, and to whom the family poll tax is the equivalent of 1 day's pay. We are protecting the sharecropper in Alabama who earns \$2 a day and does not get paid until the cotton comes in, but who nevertheless must pay his poll tax in November and December. We are saying to these hundreds of thousands of people: "We will not stand by and see your right to vote taken away because you are poor and have had no economic opportunity. We will not single you out of all the other citizens of the United States and place an economic hardship on your right to vote."

The voting rights bill before us, which the President of the United States presented to us so eloquently, as we all remember, at the time of the crisis in Selma, Ala., will have its greatest effect in State elections. It is designed to give Negro citizens the right to participate in the choice of their sheriffs, their mayors, their State legislators, and their Governor—all the State and local officeholders whose activities have such an impact on their lives—including the officeholders who have been so prominent in discriminatory practices against Negro citizens. Because of the importance of these offices to the lives of these people, I believe that the overwhelming majority of the Members of the Senate know in their hearts that it is neither right, nor logical, nor in keeping with the principles of our form of free government to tell a man that in order to vote in a State or local election he must pay a tax.

All of us who are cosponsoring this amendment believe that the leadership, in its bill, has recognized these principles just as the great majority of Senators recognize it.

I commend the distinguished majority leader and the distinguished minority leader for the interest they have shown in this subject.

First, the leadership undertook to put in a provision, which is the present section 9, stating that there was evidence that poll taxes denied the right to vote, and directing the Attorney General to forthwith make a test of the constitutionality of poll taxes in the four States that still have them.

This is extremely significant. It shows that the leadership and the Senators who sponsored this amendment have the same strong feeling about poll taxes and are working toward the same end.

I also commend the Attorney General for the interest he has shown in this issue. The Department of Justice has been concerned with developing ways and means of insuring the abolition of poll taxes in State elections. This is typical of the leadership in the cause of equal

rights that the Attorney General has given this country, both in his present position and before.

We are all agreed on purpose. We disagree only on how to accomplish that purpose. The nine members of the Judiciary Committee who introduced the original ban on the poll tax have been joined in cosponsorship of the amendment we are now considering by 30 other Senators of both parties. With all due respect for both the ability and sincerity of the authors of the substitute, we believe that:

Our methods will work and theirs may not.

Our method will work quickly while theirs will work slowly.

Ours clearly expresses the policy of Congress in this area while theirs leaves the making of policy to the courts.

First, let me state what our amendment does. It does not outlaw the poll tax, it merely says that the right to vote cannot be conditioned on its payment. Many States have poll taxes today, but collect them in other ways than by denying people the right to vote. Only Alabama, Mississippi, Virginia, and Texas make payment a precondition of voting in all State and local elections. It is to the people in these States that our amendment is directed.

First, our amendment makes a strong congressional declaration that the prohibition of the poll tax requirement for voting is necessary to secure the rights guaranteed by the 14th and 15th amendments to the Constitution against denial or abridgement.

Secondly, our bill forbids the collection of such a tax as a precondition of voting. It orders the Attorney General to sue forthwith against any State or local voting official who threatens to enforce such a tax. In this we have tried to stay as close as possible to the procedure laid down by the Mansfield-Dirkens bill. They seek a court test of constitutionality. We seek a court test of constitutionality. But we sincerely believe that the chance of a favorable decision by the Court will be immensely strengthened under our version. That is why I hope all who feel strongly about abolition of the poll tax will vote with us.

Let me explain why we believe our version will do better in court:

First, we make a strong congressional declaration that the prohibition of the poll tax as a voting requirement is necessary. The courts always give a great weight to such declarations by Congress. The courts have said that they do this because Congress does have the ability to review the whole situation and gather all the evidence, while the courts can only look at the facts of the case before them. Congress can declare a national policy, while the courts can only decide the pending cases.

The bill we are seeking to amend does not have a declaration of national policy. It merely says that evidence has been presented to Congress. But what does it do with this evidence? It does not take any action on it. It merely passes it on to the courts. A great deal of evidence is presented to Congress on many subjects. But if Congress does not do

anything with it the evidence certainly loses persuasiveness.

Our amendment does take action on the evidence. It does so by prohibiting States and political subdivisions from enforcing the poll tax as a requirement for voting. And that action, in our judgment, is going to be crucial to the court test. Until Congress acts—and this is a very important point—until Congress acts, all the courts can do is decide whether existing State poll tax voting requirements are constitutional. The courts have never outlawed such a statute even though cases have been before the courts in varying postures on four or five occasions. But once Congress acts, the only question then before the courts is whether the act of Congress is reasonable. Under our version all the Attorney General has to do when he goes into court is show that Congress could reasonably arrive at the declaration that prohibition of the poll tax was necessary to secure constitutional rights.

Mr. President, the Nation's leading authority on constitutional law is Prof. Paul Freund, of the Harvard School of Law. He is universally recognized as such. It was he who spoke at the funeral of Mr. Justice Frankfurter. It is he who is editing the history of the Supreme Court that Congress has authorized and funded. He says on this subject, and I quote:

Congress has the responsibility under the 14th and 15th amendments that cannot be avoided by forcing issues of voting rights into the courts without the benefit of congressional declarations of policy, experience and judgment.

He does not say evidence. He says declarations of policy. This is what our amendment has and the present bill does not have.

We have received expressions of support for the constitutionality of our amendment from experts all over the country. They include the dean of the Yale Law School, the associate dean of the St. Louis University Law School, professors at the University of Alabama Law School and many others. But no one has stated the issue more succinctly than Professor Freund. And with all respect to the distinguished constitutional lawyers in this Chamber, I think his views are entitled to the most careful consideration.

What the question really gets down to is this:

We all want a quick Court determination of constitutionality. We all want the Attorney General to go into court as soon as he can.

Are we going to send him in there with the strongest possible case? Are we going to give him a strong declaration and action by Congress so he will be in the best possible position? Are we going to give him the tools to do the job?

Three times in the last 8 years we have passed bills that allowed the Attorney General to sue to protect voting rights. But these bills did not have the tools. They did not do the job, so each time we had to come back and pass a new one. Now the President has asked us to stop

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Mr. MANSFIELD. May the number increase. I withdraw my reservation of objection.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the name of the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH] be added as a cosponsor of S. 1796, a bill to amend the Small Business Act to provide additional assistance for disaster victims.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

NOTICE OF HEARINGS ON THE BANK MERGER ACT

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I should like to announce that the Financial Institutions Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency will begin hearings on Wednesday, May 19, 1965, on the bill, S. 1698, to amend the Bank Merger Act so as to provide that bank mergers, whether accomplished by acquisition of stock or assets or in any other way, are subject exclusively to the provisions of the Bank Merger Act. The hearings will be held at 10 a.m., in room 5302, New Senate Office Building.

Any persons who wish to appear and testify in connection with this nomination are requested to notify Matthew Hale, chief of staff, Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, room 5300, New Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., telephone 225-3921.

HEARINGS ON U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, in accordance with expectations, which I reported to the Senate a few days ago, printed copies are now available of the hearings conducted by the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Banking and Currency Committee on the continuing deficits in our balance of payments and the resulting outflow of gold. Several distinguished officials of the Government, a number of outstanding economists expert in this field, and representatives of business and banking appeared before the committee. The purpose of the hearings was stated to educate the members of the committee, the Congress, and the general public as to the nature and causes of the problem and as to proposed measures for dealing with it.

Hearings began with statements by the Government officials—Mr. Dillon, the then Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Connor, the Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Martin, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Mr. Murphy, then Under Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Hitch, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. Bell, Administrator of AID, and Mr. Linder, President and Chairman of the Export-Import Bank. These officials described the general nature of the problem, explained the existing governmental programs that affect it, and discussed the new administration programs for dealing with it.

Economists then discussed the basic elements and principles involved and set forth views as to means of handling the problem of the deficit. The representatives of banking and business also presented their views as to the nature of the problem and measures for dealing with it.

Following statements of the witnesses, significant points were further developed in question by members of the subcommittee. In addition, the record of the hearings contains a number of statements, studies, and data developing particular points, as well as various public statements bearing on the subject by distinguished public officials and experts.

It is contemplated that hearings will be resumed in the near future. As I announced in the Senate earlier, Dr. Edward M. Bernstein, who has been chairman of a committee of experts which has recently completed a review of balance-of-payments statistics and prepared a report recommending improvements, and who is an outstanding expert on international financial economics, is scheduled to appear on May 17. Other businessmen, bankers, and other experts in this field will be requested to appear when the schedule of the committee permits.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. RANDOLPH:

AFL-CIO will present Murray-Green Award to Henry J. Kaiser in recognition of his accomplishments in the field of voluntary medical care, housing, and labor-management relations.

Editorial in the May 3, 1965, issue of the Herald-Dispatch, of Huntington, W. Va.

By Mr. CHURCH:

Editorial tribute to Hon. William E. Dreyer, Lieutenant Governor of Idaho, published in the Lewiston, Idaho, Morning Tribune of May 1, 1965.

By Mr. JAVITS:

Resolutions requesting elimination of the Federal excise tax on new passenger cars, adopted by the Greater New York, Long Island & Westchester Automobile Dealers Association.

TRIBUTE TO SENATOR FANNIN OF ARIZONA

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, my friend, Willard Edwards, who is one of the outstanding representatives of the Chicago Tribune and who covers the Senate Press Gallery very diligently, has done an excellent portrayal of our colleague, Senator PAUL FANNIN, of Arizona. Not only is it an excellent article but I might add that it is richly deserved and I am delighted indeed to ask consent for its insertion in the Record as a part of my remarks so that it might have wider currency and be frequently quoted in all areas of the country.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, May 2, 1965]

ARIZONA'S SENATOR FANNIN EARNS LABEL OF "MAN WHO SUCCEEDS"—1 TO 100 SHOT FOR GOVERNOR, BUT HE WINS

(By Willard Edwards)

WASHINGTON, May 1.—When political leaders gather to pick a slate of candidates for a forthcoming campaign, an embarrassing silence sometimes falls when volunteers are sought in a virtually hopeless cause.

The problem arises when someone must be found to seek a political office which has always been won by the opposition party with no indication that the voters are inclined to disturb this precedent.

NEED FOR SACRIFICE

If the chief of the party is a diplomat, he may inquire, not without a note of sarcasm, along this line:

"Is some loyal member of the party available to sacrifice himself in this effort?"

On a somewhat lower level, he might ask:

"Have we got a sucker for this spot?"

Such was the situation in 1958 in Arizona when Republican Party leaders began considering the selection of a candidate for Governor of the State. They had been encouraged in 1952 by the astonishing victory of their candidate for the U.S. Senate, a Phoenix department store owner named Barry Goldwater. He had ousted a veteran Democratic incumbent, Senator Ernest McFarland, Senate major leader.

STATEHOUSE HOPES DIM

Goldwater now was running for a second term and GOP hopes were high for his reelection. However, registered Democrats still outnumbered Republicans in the State by 3 to 1 and the widest hopes of the party leaders did not extend to capturing the statehouse.

Arizona had never had a Republican governor and the experts could detect no popular surge to elect one. The need was for a willing victim to endure the hardships of a campaign without the slightest hope of victory.

Goldwater's brother, Robert, had roomed at Stanford University 30 years earlier with PAUL J. FANNIN, son of a transplanted Kentuckian who had come to Arizona in 1907 for his health. The friendship had remained firm as FANNIN and his brother, Ernest, converted a small hardware store into a prosperous distributing business which stretched into several States.

FANNIN, then 51, had never been active in politics. He was a poor speaker and unversed in the strategy of wooing votes. However, he was highly respected, possessed of the necessary means, and widely known in the State through his business activities.

BARRY STUDIES CHANCES

When FANNIN was suggested as a candidate for governor and proved not unwilling to make the sacrifice, Goldwater toured the State to survey his prospects.

"Well," he reported to FANNIN, "it's possible that you might have a chance." This was accepted as polite encouragement to one willing to give his all to the party. The betting against FANNIN was 100 to 1 with no takers. The winner of the Democratic primary already was celebrating his certain victory in November.

With the temerity of the innocent who venture where angels will not, FANNIN plunged into a campaign which astonished all. He almost literally "walked" the huge State, shaking hands with thousands, invading the smallest villages, voicing his ideas about government, sometimes haltingly, but with an impressive sincerity.

On election day, the experts surveyed the results with unbelieving eyes. FANNIN had won by 35,000 in his first race for office.

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When Goldwater had upset similar odds 6 years earlier, he had won by only 6,500 votes.

Arizona's first Republican governor was reelected in 1960 by the largest majority ever given a gubernatorial candidate in the State. He was elected to a third term in 1962. In 1964, he was asked again to make a sacrifice which could remove him from politics, perhaps forever.

He was induced to file as a candidate for the Senate on a standby basis pending the outcome of Goldwater's bid for the Republican nomination for the Presidency. If Goldwater should fail in this attempt, it was understood that FANNIN would withdraw and permit Goldwater to run for a third Senate term. It would then be too late for FANNIN to file for any office.

He was relieved of this gentleman's agreement when Goldwater gained the GOP presidential nomination. FANNIN remained on the ticket as candidate for the Senate.

Again, on election day, the experts were confounded. Goldwater captured his home State's 5 electoral votes by a narrow margin of 4,000 votes. FANNIN ran ahead of him by 10,000 votes, winning the Senate seat by a comfortable 14,000 margin.

Today, the political tyro of 7 years ago sits in the seat formerly occupied by Goldwater whose political future is uncertain. The new Senator from Arizona would be the first to admit that he does not possess the quick mind, the witty personality, and the charm and gaiety which helped thrust his predecessor to the political heights. His friends say he has the dogged persistence, the capacity for study, the ambition to learn which were not easily visible as Goldwater's outstanding characteristics.

"He grows on you," an associate said. "It's hard to assess the political ingredient which makes him a winner. Perhaps it's the utter sincerity which he projects and which was Eisenhower's greatest attribute. He's no orator but people listen to him and believe him."

HALTS LIQUOR RACKET

Some measure of FANNIN's ability may be gained from his record as Governor. Facing a hostile legislature in which the senate had 27 Democrats and 1 Republican, he called 4 special sessions and made 4 recommendations, winning approval of them all, an almost unprecedented accomplishment in the State's legislative history. Among other things, he killed a thriving racket in liquor licenses which were being handled as a monopoly by a small group and being leased for as much as \$60,000 a license. He also put through a program for much needed improvements in the State's educational system.

In an interview, he disclosed the project closest to his heart—a somewhat amazing program of international cooperation between Arizona and the State of Sonora in Mexico, which lies just south of the border. He sees the beginnings of a common market of the Americas in the joint development of the two States which are the fastest growing in their respective republics.

FANNIN and the Governor of Sonora at that time, Alvaro Obregon, formed a permanent committee in 1959 to expand cultural and trade relations between the two States. The result has been greatly increased travel between them, the birth of new businesses, cooperative programs between State universities, and increased investments by Arizona banks in Sonora.

CITED BY MEXICO

Some businessmen see in this development the basis for a common market which is essential if the United States is to meet the growing competition of the European Common Market in Latin America.

In Mexico, his efforts are so highly appreciated that he was recently awarded a plaque proclaiming him the Latin American equivalent of "Man of the Year."

FANNIN is a big, rangy man—6 feet 1½ inches, 185 pounds. He keeps fit and was a famous softball pitcher in his day, playing on championship teams where he was hailed as "WINDMILL" FANNIN because of a sweeping delivery.

His seriousness matches his size. However, as he talked, losing self-consciousness in the interest of his subject, a lively imagination, a quiet sense of humor, and a sensitivity to injustice began to emerge.

INTERESTED IN INDIANS' WELFARE

He became almost eloquent about the plight of the American Indian, the ignored minority when welfare state billions are being passed out. Arizona has more Indians [83,000] than any other State. Taking the floor for the first time in connection with pending legislation last month, the Senator discussed the inadequacies of the administration's \$1.3 billion aid-to-education bill.

"I must protest," he said, "against a formula that would give the 10 wealthiest counties in the United States nearly \$9 million and 10 of the poorest counties only half that much. And I protest the implication that the Federal Office of Education can do better than what the States and local school districts have been doing since the beginning of our Republic."

"In my State, we happen to have a continuing demonstration of the Federal Government's competence in this field. Despite the solemn treaty obligation of the United States to provide thousands of Indian children with adequate education and health facilities, the government has clearly failed."

"Of 23,191 Navajo children on the Arizona portion of the reservation, virtually all from poverty stricken families, approximately 3,500 were not enrolled in any kind of school. Three-fourths of the adult population cannot speak, read, or write English."

Recently, a veteran Republican colleague found him poring over a book on the Senate's parliamentary rules, an intricate maze of rulings and precedents which few can decipher.

"Oh, Hell, Paul," said the elder. "Don't bother with that. If you do something wrong, someone will be around to tell you."

The freshman Senator went on studying. He does not appear to be the type who waits for someone to tell him he is wrong.

MAN OF THE YEAR

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, on April 29 there was published in the Chicago Tribune an editorial on the subject "Man of the Year." I believe it is quite important and deserves wider circulation. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Chicago Tribune, Apr. 29, 1965]

MAN OF THE YEAR

The Tribune today presents the real "Man of the Year."

He was not picked by the Junior Association of Commerce, or by the Senior Association of Commerce, or by the politicians, or by any association of newspaper men. You won't find his picture in the papers. You may not recognize him as you pass him on the street. But we hope you do.

Our "Man of the Year" is in the middle income brackets. He gets up every morning at 6:30 so that he can get to his job in an office or factory at 8 or 8:30. He works hard, not only because he wants advancement, but because he thinks his employer deserves a fair deal. He is honest and dependable.

Our "Man of the Year" manages to get along with one wife. They have three or four children, whom they love so much they

teach them to be respectful, law abiding, and self-reliant. They have done their best to earn and save enough money to send their children to college, but the rising costs of higher education make this goal more difficult each year.

The rising cost of everything also makes it harder to put aside money for retirement. Recent Federal income tax reductions have helped the people in high income brackets and low income brackets, but the man in the middle has got little benefit. There are no loopholes in the income tax for him, and he can't put any money into tax-exempt securities.

Social security taxes, which started at \$30 a year, are now up to \$174. Soon the medicare program will make them much higher. Local property taxes have doubled, and so have the various State taxes. Worst of all, the purchasing power of the dollar is only 42 percent of what it was when our "Man of the Year" bought his first insurance policy in 1937. The little money which he has set aside for a rainy day is worth about half of what it was when he earned it.

Our "Man of the Year" belongs to a church and works at his religion. He is no saint, but he understands the biblical meaning of neighbor and tries to be decent to men of all races and creeds. You won't find him, however, in civil disobedience demonstrations. He believes laws ought to be enforced.

Our "Man of the Year" is not ashamed to be considered a patriot. He flies the flag on national holidays. He can't understand Americans who join organizations dedicated to the destruction of America. He can't understand legislators and judges who strive to undermine law and order, or to feather their own nests.

Our "Man of the Year" believes in our system of government. He votes at every election, but he votes only once.

For all his merits, we salute him.

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE ON WAR AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION OF VIETNAM

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, Mr. Robert D. Crane, who is a member of the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University, has prepared an excellent article that involves, among other things, our problems abroad. On a previous occasion I have had printed in the RECORD an article that he has done. There is further information here that I believe is at once constructive and useful. It is a little lengthy, but it bears the title "The Sino-Soviet Dispute on War and National Liberation of Vietnam." It is extremely timely, and, notwithstanding its length, I believe it will prove extremely useful as a reference article. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE ON WAR AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION OF VIETNAM

(By R. D. Crane)

The most significant development during the past few months in the southeast Asian war has been the decision of the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders to increase their overt military support of the war in Vietnam. This new development has caused policymakers for the first time publicly to consider the risk of escalation as an important factor in determining U.S. policy toward southeast Asia. This new concern with the degree of risk involved in prosecuting the southeast Asian war has focused atten-

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tion on the alliance problems within the Communist camp, and particularly on the nature and extent of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

The fullest possible understanding of this dispute has become critical because American policymakers are concluding that the future course of events in southeast Asia will be determined not merely by North Vietnamese or Communist Chinese policy, but by Soviet policy. This important point was brought out in Secretary McNamara's annual defense posture statement to Congress on February 18, 1965, when he said: "Unless there is a change in Soviet policy, it still appears doubtful that the Chinese Communists will deliberately initiate any major overt aggression against their neighbors."

The two most critical questions for an analysis of the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the southeast Asian war therefore are: (1) What is the real issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute as it has developed during the past few years? and (2) What policy should the United States follow to prevent the adoption of a dangerously expansionist policy by the Soviet Union and to promote Soviet policies of greater moderation? The answer we give to these two questions will be important in determining the whole course of American policy in Asia during the coming decade.

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

Most of the studies on the Sino-Soviet dispute conclude that this dispute is caused basically either by nationalism or by ideology or by some combination of the two.¹ There is considerable evidence that the Sino-Soviet dispute is not caused basically by either of these two factors but rather by opposing theories of how best to control conflict, and particularly how to deter nuclear war, during the course of the world revolution.² According to this view:

1. Chinese and Soviet strategists are in complete agreement that nuclear war and even any serious risk of nuclear war must be rejected as rational instruments of policy.

2. These strategists also agree that their advanced weapons are not necessary primarily for the defensive purpose of deterring capitalist attack on their homelands, but are necessary for the offensive purpose of deterring U.S. intervention in expansionist Communist wars of national liberation.

3. The Chinese and Soviet strategists differ primarily on how best to control conflict, especially by deterring nuclear war, during the course of the world revolution.

4. The Chinese Communists believe that nuclear war can best be deterred by constant revolutionary pressure designed to promote isolationist tendencies in the United States. The Soviets believe that nuclear war can best be deterred, and revolutionary movements protected from armed U.S. opposition, if the Soviet Union can exploit an atmosphere of detente to achieve superiority over the United States in a few critical advanced weapons.

The decision of the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders to increase their overt military support of the war in Vietnam might seem superficially to indicate the convergence of Soviet and Chinese Communist theories of conflict control and, therefore, the abandonment of the Soviet strategy of detente. Further analysis, however, suggests that the Soviets and Chinese agree on the advisability of pressing for victory in the

southeast Asian war because developments during the past year both in Soviet advanced weaponry and in the national liberation struggle have caused the Soviet and Chinese Communist strategists to conclude that their diverse theories of conflict control call for a common and mutually supporting policy of revolution in southeast Asia. Some of the advances in Soviet weaponry, particularly in Soviet antiballistic missile developments, which may have influenced Soviet strategists, were discussed on February 11, 1965, before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Some of the isolationist developments in the intellectual climate in the United States, which may have influenced Chinese strategists, were presaged by Senator FULBRIGHT's speech a year ago on "Old Myths and New Realities" and were described on February 23, 1965, in a major speech by Senator THOMAS J. DODD, Democrat, of Connecticut, entitled "Vietnam and the New Isolationism."

The response of Premier Khrushchev and of his principal military supporter, the late Marshal Biryuzov, to the new developments in Soviet weaponry and in U.S. foreign policy may have been the desire to exploit the new Soviet weapons directly and dramatically in a Cuba-type gamble to intimidate the United States. The opponents of Khrushchev, including Suslov and Marshals Sokolovskiy and Malinovsky, condemned such "harebrained" scheming. The successors of Khrushchev in the Soviet power structure reportedly created instead a top-level national liberation commission composed of Presidium members. Among them may be the individual to whom the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, referred recently when he stated: "We expect nothing from Khrushchev's successors. However, we firmly believe that the Soviet people will have a great leader in the not too distant future."

Soviet strategy in the post-Khrushchev era has returned to the original Khrushchevian emphasis of the pre-Cuba crisis period on wars of national liberation, but has added two innovations: (1) a further shift toward the belief that the mere existence of the new Soviet weapons, particularly in conjunction with increases in their quality and quantity, is sufficient to limit the strategic goals of the United States and to deter any dangerous U.S. response to overt Soviet support of national liberation wars, and (2) a new emphasis on the promotion and exploitation of a continued detente with the United States both to use its threatened termination as a means of deterring U.S. intervention in national liberation wars as well as to gain the many direct advantages that detente can provide for the Soviet Union.

The main points that emerge from the above analysis of the Sino-Soviet dispute as it affects American policy on southeast Asia are the following: (1) both the Chinese and the Soviets are in complete agreement on the need to avoid any great risks of escalation to nuclear war, and (2) although they differ principally in their theories about the nature of deterrence in the modern era of national liberation war, nevertheless recent developments in Soviet weaponry and in U.S. thinking about foreign policy have caused the Chinese and Soviet strategists to proceed from their differing theories on deterrence to the conclusion that the time is now ripe to start a concerted effort finally to drive the United States and its allies off the rimland of Asia.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

The second of the two principal questions we must ask if we are meaningfully to analyze the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the war in southeast Asia is: What policy should the United States follow in order to exert a moderating influence on the Soviet Union and thereby indirectly on Communist China? This question is basic to American

foreign policy. It becomes acute only during periods of tensions such as we experienced during and after the Cuban missile crisis and are experiencing now.

Most of the recent commentary on this question has warned against the alleged danger that an overly firm U.S. policy might push the Soviets into the arms of the Communist Chinese, thereby eliminating an important moderating influence in the underdeveloped areas of the world, particularly in Asia. It has been suggested that during Premier Kosygin's visit to Vietnam in January 1965 the Chinese Communists trapped him into adopting a hardline position against his will, and that we therefore must agree to neutralize South Vietnam in order to help Kosygin extricate himself from a dilemma. Another consideration, which first became familiar during and after the Cuban missile crisis, is the alleged need to follow a conciliatory policy toward the Soviet leaders because the failure of their foreign policies, once the Soviet Union has become committed for one reason or another to these policies, would cause a succession crisis that might result in a shift toward a hardline and perhaps even a Stalinist line in Soviet domestic and foreign policy.

The behavior of the power-oriented Soviet leaders in past crises suggests, to the contrary, that the best way to bring on such an unfortunate succession crisis would be for the United States to follow a conciliatory policy in southeast Asia. Such a policy would serve merely to prove that the so-called hardliners in the Soviet Union are right in their contention that a maximum push in revolutionary warfare will inaugurate the third and final phase in the liquidation of capitalism. The only way the United States can support the moderates in the Soviet Union and the only way it can reduce the present ideological orientation of the Communist system is to combine a policy of maximum contact with Soviet individuals with a policy of maximum firmness in opposing Communist aggression. Instead of trying to support the moderates in the Soviet Union by adopting a conciliatory American foreign policy, we should try to support these moderates by frustrating and thereby undermining their hardline opponents. Only when the Soviets are forced to recognize the Utopian nature of their global ambitions can we achieve any real success in our long-range policies of peaceful engagement and peaceful cooperation with the leaders and peoples of Russia.

Specifically, in our policy toward southeast Asia, we should make it clear that we support the original goal of the Geneva agreement of 1954, which called for free elections in the country of Vietnam. We should draw the conclusion, which the Communists have forced upon us, that the Communists do not want elections except on their own fraudulent terms. If elections are to be free from Communist terrorism, the entire country of Vietnam, both north and south, must first be liberated from Communist control. National liberation has been the goal of the Vietnamese leaders. It was opposed by the French colonialists. It has been opposed by the United States on the pretext that the time was not opportune, but really because some American policymakers feared the possibility of escalation from the national liberation war that the Vietnamese people would have to fight in North Vietnam.

During 1959 and 1960 special Vietnamese guerrilla forces liberated large areas in the northern areas of Vietnam extending as far north as the Chinese border. These successful liberation efforts were forbidden by American policymakers at the time because they feared that the very success of such a liberation movement would provoke a Chinese launched invasion under a Soviet nuclear

¹ Perhaps the best such study in the recent literature is Richard Lowenthal's "The Prospects for Pluralistic Communism," dissent (winter 1965), pp. 103-143.

² See "The Sino-Soviet Dispute on War," in "Detente: Cold War Strategists in Transition" (New York and London: Praeger), 1965, eds. Eleanor Lansing Dulles and Robert D. Crane.

umbrella and therefore jeopardize the independence of all of southeast Asia.

The resulting abandonment of what promised to be the first successful national liberation movement in Communist controlled Asia had an adverse local effect on the conflict in southeast Asia because it caused bitterness and disillusionment among the Vietnamese intellectuals who had been struggling for 20 years to liberate and unify their ancient and proud country. Even more important, this forced abandonment was a milepost in the adoption of a defensive mentality among American guerrilla warfare strategists. It provided the first classic example of the power of Communist psychostrategic warfare to direct and control American strategy in the underdeveloped world.³

In order to exert a moderating influence on Soviet and Chinese Communist policy, the United States must first reverse this defensive orientation of its strategic thinking on Asia. Specifically, the United States must abandon its effort to force the Vietnamese to remain at the tremendous disadvantage which defending forces have in modern guerrilla warfare. The United States must abandon its efforts to force on the Vietnamese people the unpopular goal of containing (and thereby maintaining) communism within their own country. Events have proven that the sterile purely military policies attempted by France and the United States have failed. If present trends continue, the only real alternative, other than eventually complete Communist victory, may be to permit the Vietnamese to return to the policy which gave them victory over the French, which is giving the Communist Vietnamese victory against the Americans, and which would give the overwhelming anti-Communist majority of the Vietnamese people victory over the Vistcong "Chinese puppet" leaders. This is a policy, very simply, of guerrilla warfare directed toward the liberation of their entire country from the foreigners and foreign-dominated Vietnamese who have used Vietnam for so many years as a strategic or economic pawn. This type of warfare goes far beyond the ineffective and costly commando raids of the past which have been designed to maintain the status quo. It calls not only for a change in operations, but for a complete change in goals.

This reorientation of goals would require also a multibillion-dollar foreign aid program, perhaps under U.N. auspices, to promote the economic and cultural resurgence of all of southeast Asia.

A policy of true national liberation is a policy which the United States can support, but which the Chinese Communists and Soviets cannot. A policy of national liberation, backed by the full support of the West and by unlimited U.S. commitment to counter any Chinese or Soviet intervention, would evoke strong Communist protests and threats, and perhaps even a military probe. In the long run, however, this is the best policy to exert a moderating influence not

only on the Soviets but also on the Chinese Communists. This is also the only policy consistent with our basic American foreign policy, which is to make the world not democratic, but safe for any country—with the ability and desire—to build democracy.

APRIL 23, 1965.

THE NEED FOR A U.S. POLICY ON THE LIBERATION OF VIETNAM

From: Robert D. Crans.

To: Adm. Arleigh Burke.

Two premises are at the heart of the failure of U.S. policy in Vietnam. They are: (1) military victory must be given priority over everything else, and (2) there is no other choice than ending the war by winning it in South Vietnam.

Military power plays a supporting role and therefore should not be given top priority. The confrontation with communism is political, though it is backed by a peripheral military duel. In order to win against communism we must adopt a forward political strategy, as have the Communists. The greatest fallacy of our time is the dream of a status quo with communism, particularly in "national liberation" wars. In Europe it may work, but Europe is not going to be the arena of conflict during the next decade.

The American policy of trying to win the national liberation struggle in Vietnam by strategic bombing represents the bankruptcy of our global strategy. The same may be said about the Soviet decision to send surface-to-air missiles into Vietnam. If present trends continue, both the United States and the U.S.S.R. may be out of Vietnam by next year at this time and the Chinese Communists may have proven the superiority of their particular strategy of revolution and conflict control.¹

The destruction of value targets in North Vietnam is not going to influence basically the conflict in Vietnam, nor would the destruction of Soviet missile bases in North Vietnam. Strategic offense and defense are not going to decide anything in a national liberation struggle. This may be precisely what the Chinese hoped to prove by changing their minds and letting the Soviets send their missiles through safe Chinese territory to Vietnam.

We must, of course, consider the possibility that the Soviet missiles in North Vietnam will force the United States to call off its strategic bombing without the United States at the same time shifting to a policy of national liberation. This would be the most catastrophic of all policies, because it would prove that both the Soviet and Chinese strategies of world revolution are right. Soviet psychostrategic warfare to neutralize U.S. strategic power would be demonstrated as correct, and Chinese revolutionary pressure to surround the cities from the countryside and create isolationism in the United States would have been vindicated. This is probably the maximum Soviet objective in Vietnam, and it would spell the worst possible defeat for the United States.

The second erroneous premise is that the war in Vietnam can be ended only by winning it in the South.

We must recognize that the war in Vietnam is a national liberation struggle of the most classic kind. And we must recognize that the only way to win a national liberation struggle is to win it. In helping the Vietnamese people wage this national liberation struggle we must recognize the cardinal principle that their efforts must be designed to liberate all of Vietnam. The Communists have never once indicated any other aim. It is absurd for us to have the impossible goal of trying to maintain com-

munist in Vietnam by our policy of status quo.

Second, the struggle must be not only a liberation struggle but a national struggle. This is also cardinal. We have alienated the most dynamic and able Vietnamese leaders by treating Vietnam as our strategic pawn. This treatment has gotten worse the more the Communists put pressure on us. The most able leaders went with Ho Chi Minh in 1954 because he was the only one who they thought showed promise of liberating their entire country from foreign domination. The leaders who stayed in the south have gradually become disillusioned and now in many cases hate Americans, because we have forbidden them from fulfilling their basic goals of liberating and unifying their ancient and proud country. We have kept them under foreign domination just as the Chinese have kept Ho under foreign domination. The leaders in Vietnam, both North and South, know that economically they would be better off without communism. We need only prove that they can unify and also fulfill their hopes of building their country without communism. The United States has never once even tried to do this. This is why we are losing and will continue to lose. Our failure to understand the elemental forces which are molding the world is undoubtedly encouraging to the Communists, particularly to the Chinese Communists. The Chinese believe, and probably correctly, that neither the Soviets nor the Americans understand the real dynamics of the world.

It is encouraging to note the realistic view President Johnson seems to be taking on the need to maintain U.S. strategic superiority. Nevertheless, it is discouraging to witness the simplicity of the U.S. approach to the real political conflict in the world. A status quo in the volatile world of the latter third of our century is an Alice in Wonderland concept. Unless the United States recognizes the necessity for adopting a policy of political offensive in the predominately political confrontation with communism, we may end up with strategic military superiority but nothing left to defend. Perhaps our problem is that in our cynical sophistication we don't understand our own principles and ideals and therefore cannot understand either our own real power or the power of the ideals and principles which motivate other people. We not only don't take ourselves seriously, we don't take the Communists seriously either.

Perhaps the root of our problem is the great gnostic revival which is molding the intellectual framework of our leading thinkers. The essence of the gnostic drive, and the most pervasive phenomenon of our time, is the search for an organizational and intellectual framework for the creation of utopia. The traditional gnostic search for the perfection of man was first articulated in the second century when a heretical gnostic sect of Egypt tried to achieve the perfection of heaven while still on earth. This traditional gnosticism is best illustrated by the development of Marxism in the 19th century. During the nuclear age the gnostic drive is shifting toward a search for either the resolution or the management of conflict. One of the most dangerous of the 20 or more modern gnostic utopias is the concept that strategic superiority in the modern era is the key to controlling conflict. Although it is very useful for the United States to have strategic superiority, and probably even essential, nevertheless strategic military superiority is really of secondary importance.

Another point we must realize if we are to play a creative role in history is that even the shift from the utopian search for the perfection of man toward the search for conflict control is utopian to the extent that some of the various approaches to conflict

³ The impact of psychostrategic warfare in the purely nuclear field is suggested in Robert D. Crane's, "A New Cold War?" *Survival*, Journal of the Institute for Strategic Studies (March-April 1965), pp. 79-82. Perhaps the first Western master of psychostrategic warfare in the nonnuclear field is General Georgios Grivas-Digenis, whom Eugen Weyde has called the non-Communist Mao-Tse-tung of Europe. The strategic concepts of General Grivas have been further developed in Germany at the School for Psychological Warfare, which has specialized in what Major Weyde terms the art of the "verdeckte Kampf." See Grivas, "Partisanenkrieg heute: Lehren aus dem Freiheitskampf Zyperns" (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag fuer Wehrwesen), 1964, with an introduction by Eugen Weyde.

¹ For background on this particular point see, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute on War and the Cuban Crisis," *Orbis*, fall 1964.

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control overlook the social revolutionary nature of the modern world.

This point was put quite clearly in a recent speech by Tran Van Dinh, former head of the equivalent of the USIA in Vietnam, former acting Ambassador of Vietnam to the United States, and during 1959 and 1960 organizer of the only successful national liberation movement against communism in Asia. Since the day in 1960 when the U.S. Government forbade the continuation of this national liberation movement in North Vietnam and forced its dissolution, Tran Van Dinh has been carrying on a one-man campaign to explain the need for an imaginative and forward policy in Vietnam.

According to a report in the National Catholic Reporter on April 21, 1965, Tran Van Dinh emphasized at the Xavier University forum that his nation's war against the Vietcong "cannot be won with the present strategy." That strategy, he explained, is to "win the war first and meet the people's needs second."

"Our government has to recognize that this is a war of the minds and hearts of people. We must have a positive social program." According to this very knowledgeable young Vietnamese leader, providing jobs for the unemployed, decent housing for poor city-dwellers, land reform for the peasants, reliable water systems—all of this is of greater importance than the military problem.

Our failure to recognize and lead the social revolution in the world (or sometimes the failure to act on this recognition, as in the case of Chiang Kai-shek during and after the Sino-Japanese war a generation ago) is one of our greatest weaknesses in controlling conflict. By failing to see that conflict control is not an ultimate aim, we fall in our aim to control conflict. During the past 2 years I have talked with the architects of our strategic hamlets program in Vietnam and have been shocked by their complete inability to see anything other than simple security (essential though it is) as the key to the promotion of freedom in Vietnam. Our policymakers have lost their sense of romanticism. Without an understanding of romanticism they cannot understand what motivates the leaders of people, particularly in the underdeveloped world. Without this understanding on our part, history will simply pass us by. This would be the greatest of human tragedies, because we Americans, of all peoples, have the greatest potential to help the peoples of the world fulfill their elemental needs and desires and to demonstrate that they can build their societies without the need to destroy the very freedom which in one way or another they all desire.

The adoption of an American policy to support national liberation in Vietnam can be really meaningful only within the context of a policy of national liberation on a global scale. It is important, of course, that all national liberation efforts of the United States should be strictly in accordance with international law. The U.S. policy of liberation should be geared to the specific needs and potential of each country. For Eastern Europe our national liberation policy should be directed toward increasing the cultural and economic independence of such countries as Rumania and Poland from Soviet control. In a situation like Vietnam, where the Communists have embarked on open warfare against neighboring governments, international law permits and may even require the defense of true national liberation movements against the false "national liberation" movements controlled and exploited by the Communists. This approach to national liberation would require a creative and positive orientation rare in American foreign policy. Perhaps the challenge of American failure in Vietnam will help us overcome our rather parochial and defensive approach to world affairs. We have all the potential for such a policy, both ideas and leadership.

FEED GRAINS

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, recently the southeastern region has been a deficit area in the production of feed grains. We import many millions of bushels of feed grains annually for our substantial poultry, livestock, and dairy businesses. The Kiplinger agricultural letter of April 23, 1965, deals with the economic tendency and the possible growth of the livestock industry in the Southeast if rates on the transportation of feed grains are further reduced. I ask unanimous consent that pages 1 and 2 of the Kiplinger agricultural letter dated April 23, 1965, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE KIPLINGER AGRICULTURAL LETTER

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1965.

DEAR SIR: A drastic overhaul of commodity transportation is underway * * * a basic revision of Government regulation and the freight rate structure.

It means billions will be saved by farmers and other shippers, and by consumers: Not overnight, but gradually as old ways go out.

It also means big shifts in geographic farm production patterns and changes in the traditional patterns in the way farm freight moves.

A revolution in railroad technology is what's back of it all. Railroads are beginning to wake up. Most have been asleep for years, result of the days of monopoly, and have been losing business steadily.

They're coming up with new kinds of equipment and new methods of handling commodities which are making drastic cuts in their costs. Ralls only now are catching up with modernization of other industry.

And they've "discovered" a new philosophy: Customer service. Used to be that ralls handled stuff to suit their convenience, but now they're switching to development of cars, etc., to suit customer needs.

A pioneer in all this is Southern Railway. It has developed a whole new line of freight cars tailor made for specific commodities.

For example, "Big John," a covered hopper car which carries 100 tons of grain, about twice as much as the old traditional car. And now, "Super Big John," bigger. Also: An all-door freight car whose entire side rolls up like a garage door, new 85-foot boxcar holding 118 hogsheads of tobacco, "Big Boy," 100-ton bulkheaded-end flatcar with permanent chain takedown for lumber and other products.

Southern also developed a supercushion boxcar underframe which eliminates much in-transit damage. More aluminum boxcars. Unit trains, one engine pulling string of cars with a single commodity.

Other major ralls are doing the same, a real revolution.

Cost cuts that ralls can make are enormous. Example: Big John cuts the cost of grain shipments as much as 60 percent from regular boxcar.

Billions will be cut off the Nation's freight bill each year as the savings are passed on to shippers and consumers. But, a problem:

Government regulators are reluctant to allow drastic cuts in rates for fear they might upset transportation patterns, hurt trucks, barges. Under the interstate commerce rules, Southern did get an OK for some cut, but the company is out for more. Trucks and barges fight it hard * * * there's little question they'd have to cut rates, maybe lose business.

But there's evidence the ralls will win greater rate freedom over the long pull. A recent Supreme Court decision is interpreted by transportation experts as a blow against strict Government regulation.

Sooner or later, Congress will relax the law on ratesetting, the experts predict. And the administration is known to favor this.

May seem strange ralls can't cut rates now if they want to, but it's traditional Government view, for better or worse. It will change.

Now, some effects on agriculture of transportation revolution:

A sure boom for the South. Lower grain rates already in effect may well be the biggest single factor in development of new agriculture in Southern States—touching off what looks like a tremendous expansion.

And it will come in cattle and hogs. Because of special climate, economists for years have anticipated a major livestock boom in the South. Slow in coming, but now one major drawback, expensive feed, is licked. For example, rates from Midwest to South are down a whopping 10 to 15 cents a bushel, depending upon destination and quantity bought, that saving for farmers.

Lower freight rates make it cheaper to import feed from Midwest than to produce it in the South. Midwest feed—basis for South's boom. That plus an enormous pasture potential, better than most other areas.

Biggest problem now: Persuading farmers to switch from crops such as cotton, tobacco, and peanuts to livestock—educating the bankers to the potential. Colleges already have started educational campaign.

Government programs will help, especially omnibus farm bill proposal allowing farmers to sell or lease allotments, make way for livestock.

Little farmers will be able to get in on it as well as the bigs.

And we look for big vertical integration trend, mainly in hogs.

What is the potential for livestock production in the South?

A \$3 to \$4 billion increase over current level of income, USDA and college studies indicate. That much more from hogs and cattle.

To feed the people in the South, about 1 billion pounds of beef are imported annually, 1.3 billion pounds of pork. This huge deficit, economists say, can be produced by southern farmers, not midwestern.

Add certain population growth, and the potential gets bigger.

As for businessmen, it means more meat-packing houses needed, more processing plants, more storage facilities, more bank loans, etc.

And aside from grain and livestock, fruits and vegetables, too. Production will go up and eventual lower freight rates are bound to draw processing plants, freezers, etc., into the South, near output areas.

In next 5 years, southern farming will undergo vast changes, and the man who plans now for it will be the one who cashes in later.

Effects outside the South: Relatively sharp rise in grain sales by midwest farmers to southern farmers. Almost an entirely new market. This includes corn, other feed grains, feed supplements, even wheat.

More competition for cattle and hog producers outside the South, even though southerners may eat more. Pressure on prices generally.

Those are the main effects. We'll cover others in later letters.

Overall, other freight rate changes are constantly going on, but none match the sweeping effect on agriculture of new rail technology.

On broiler production: Another big breakthrough is coming up, we understand—unrelated to the freight rate cuts we've talked about.

It's the 10-cent broiler. Cost of producing a bird is about 14 cents now, and a 4-cent cut may sound impossible, but one outfit says it can be done, is testing it now. Asked not to name, but thought you should know.

If it works, it's going to push all the smalls out of business.

For them, the answer is to convert bird houses into hog houses.

May 7, 1965

AMENDMENT TO FOREIGN SERVICE BUILDINGS ACT OF 1926—SAIGON CHANCERY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 162, H.R. 7064.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Russell of South Carolina in the chair). The bill will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 7064) to amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926, as amended.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record an excerpt from the report to explain why the bill was approved and reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

PURPOSE

The bill authorizes the appropriation of \$1 million, in addition to the amounts previously authorized for use in the Foreign Service buildings program, in order to permit the construction of a new chancery in Saigon, Vietnam.

A few days after the American chancery at Saigon was damaged by a bomb, the President, on April 1, 1965, transmitted to the Congress an authorization request for a \$1 million appropriation to begin construction of a new chancery. H.R. 7064 which carries out the President's recommendation was introduced by Congressman WAYNE HAYS that same date and reported to the House on April 3. The House passed the bill on April 5, 1965, by a vote of 378 to 0.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to amendment.

If there be no amendment to be proposed, the question is on the third reading and passage of the bill.

The bill (H.R. 7064) was ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

FLOODS IN WISCONSIN—EXPERT LEADERSHIP OF CITIZENS

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the western part of Wisconsin is still recovering from its worst flood in history. The city of La Crosse, Wis., was buffeted by Mississippi River floodwaters for most of last month and the early part of May. When the flood crested at La Crosse April 23, the river waters were almost 6 feet above flood stage.

During this period, Mr. President, communications were out much of the time—telephone and telegraph wires were down and existing communication systems that were not knocked out were severely overtaxed.

Nevertheless, vital messages—calls for help, data on the flood crest, information on separated families and emergency requests for men, equipment, and medical assistance—were relayed during this communications blackout by ham radio operators who are part of the Navy Mars Communications network.

I was informed recently that two La Crosse men performed outstanding service in passing important messages and in keeping the emergency radio network in operation.

The two men—Raymond Snider, of 203 South 23d Street, and Bruce Bjerstedt, of 335 South 22d Street—worked up to 18 hours a day from April 11 to April 23 to perform this valuable service for their community and State. They received no pay for this effort. Mr. Snider used his vacation time from his regular job so that he could devote full time to this vital service.

In the words of the Wisconsin Area Emergency Communications chief:

These two individuals provided the timely and expert leadership of the 150 amateur and citizens band operators that cooperated to save millions of dollars in property and many lives, through providing adequate communications over this extended interval.

I want to thank these men for the service they performed for the disaster victims and I urge that the proper agency issue a commendation to them for their outstanding contribution.

LT. BILL ROARK—A BRAVE YOUNG MAN WHO BELIEVED LIBERTY WORTH DYING FOR

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, across the Nation there is widespread support for this country's strong stand in Vietnam. In the main, the large majority of the Congress and the American people have responded overwhelmingly to the President's action.

The choice, while difficult, has been a simple one. It is a question of the defense of freedom against the onslaught of aggressive communism.

Throughout history the price of freedom is costly—costly in terms of our money and materials, but more important, in terms of our most precious asset—our fighting men.

Today I want to talk a few moments about one of these brave young men.

In the early summer of 1956, as will be repeated this year, from across the Nation there assembled at the Naval Academy at Annapolis the new class of plebes. Among the group was a young man from Omaha, Bill Roark. Although he was appointed by my successor in the House, I knew the lad and his family. I knew of his proud high school record.

Like so many others he survived the rugged first year and went on to graduate from the Academy in the class of 1960. From there he entered flying school and became a Navy pilot. Because of his skill, because of his proven ability, he was assigned to carrier duty—one of the most physically and mentally demanding jobs in the military. In December of 1964 he began his second tour aboard the aircraft carrier, the *Coral Sea*.

Today, Bill Roark is dead.

Today, his young widow, who just gave birth to his third child 2 weeks ago, begins to pick up the pieces of her shattered life and tries to carry on.

Navy Lt. William M. Roark is one of

160,000 Americans who have given their lives in defense of freedom since the end of World War II. He was shot down during air activity over North Vietnam.

Like the others who serve in all wars, Lieutenant Roark wrote home. One of the last letters he wrote contained a message that I want to share with the Senate. It contains a message for all America.

Bill Roark said:

I don't want my sons to fight a war I should have fought. I wish more Americans felt that way. I'm not a warmonger; it will be me who gets shot at. But it's blind and foolish not to have the courage of your convictions.

Bill Roark believed in America. He believed it worth fighting for. He believed that the war in Vietnam has a purpose. He believed that it was a cause worth life itself.

He wrote to his wife:

I will not live under a totalitarian society and I don't want you to, either. I believe in God and will resist any force that attempts to remove God from society, no matter what its name.

This is what we all must do if we believe in what the Founding Fathers stood for.

Mr. President, there is nothing I can add to Bill Roark's eloquent and moving words. I only hope that those who would have us believe that the cause of freedom is not worth fighting and dying for in Vietnam might somehow take heed.

Mr. President, the poignant story of Bill Roark's last letters to his wife has been written for the Omaha World-Herald which also published an editorial on his courageous convictions, together with the remarks of Dr. Harvey M. Throop, Th. D., at a memorial service for Lieutenant Roark.

I ask unanimous consent that these articles be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD as a tribute to the bravery and devotion of a brave young man who believed liberty is worth dying for.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Omaha (Nebr.) World-Herald, Apr. 12, 1965]

"WHAT ALL MUST DO"

"I don't want my sons to fight a war I should have fought. I wish more Americans felt that way.

"I'm not a warmonger; it will be me who gets shot at. But it's blind and foolish not to have the courage of your convictions."

The brave man who wrote the above words to his wife last month is now dead. The plane piloted by Navy Lt. William R. Roark, of Omaha, was shot down over North Vietnam and he parachuted, presumably lifeless, into the sea.

Unlike some other Americans Lieutenant Roark thought the war had a purpose. He thought resistance to communism in that far corner of the world was a cause worth dying for. He said in his letter to his wife:

"I will not live under a totalitarian society and I don't want you to, either. I believe in God and will resist any force that attempts to remove God from society, no matter what the name.

"This is what we all must do if we believe in what the Founding Fathers stood for."

The words should bite into the conscience of every American, and especially those who